THE INDONESIAN INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

The Indonesian Update

Monthly Review on Economic, Legal, Security, Political, and Social Affairs

Main Report

The Analysis of the Relationship between Regulatory Efficiency and the Rule of Law for Environmental Sustainability in Indonesia

Law

- The Notes on the National Police Chief's Regulation on the Handling of Attacks on Police Officers
- The DPR's Next Strategy After the August 2025 Demonstrations

Politics

- The Stability Paradox: When Indonesian Democracy Loses Its Political Tension

Social

- Ensuring Transparency and Total Reform of Free Nutritious Meals Following Repeated Food Poisoning Cases
- Optimizing Cervical Cancer Elimination Through Expanding HPV Vaccination for Adolescents in Indonesia

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FOREWORD

The October 2025 edition of the Indonesian Update presents a critical analysis of the political, social, legal, and environmental dynamics that have influenced Indonesian public policy this month.

The main report, "The Analysis of the Relationship between Regulatory Efficiency and *the Rule of Law* for Environmental Sustainability in Indonesia," highlights the link between regulatory effectiveness, law enforcement, and environmental conservation efforts. The article asserts that sustainability cannot be achieved without strong legal governance and regulations oriented toward ecological justice.

In the political field, the article The Paradox of Stability: When Indonesian Democracy Loses Political Tension discusses the decline in political dynamics in the Indonesian democratic system, where government stability is often paid for by weakening the function of the opposition and the space for public criticism.

On the social side, two key articles address important public health issues. The article, "Ensuring Transparency and Total Reform of the MBG Following Repeated Poisoning Cases," examines the weak oversight of the food industry and the importance of comprehensive reform to protect consumers. Meanwhile, the article, "Optimizing Cervical Cancer Elimination Through Expanding HPV Vaccination for Adolescents in Indonesia," highlights the challenges of implementing HPV vaccination as a strategic step towards eliminating cervical cancer in Indonesia.

In the legal field, this edition contains two important analyses. The first is "The Notes for the National Police Chief's Regulation on Police Assault Response," which examines the aspects of proportionality and accountability in law enforcement. The second is "The DPR's Further Strategy After the August 2025 Demonstrations," which discusses the dynamics of parliament in responding to public demands for political reform and transparency.

Through this edition, Update Indonesia remains committed to being a space for critical reflection on public policy across various fields. We hope that the articles in this October 2025 edition will broaden readers' understanding of the relationship between law, governance, and public welfare.

Happy reading.

Main Report

The Analysis of the Relationship between Regulatory Efficiency and the Rule of Law for Environmental Sustainability in Indonesia

-Putu Rusta Adijaya-



Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), in Damak and Güngör (2025), explain that a combination of strong state regulations, effective monitoring, and clear penalties for non-compliance is the best way experts recommend to encourage positive environmental practices. The quality of institutions can influence the sustainable initiatives adopted by high-emitting industries, where strong institutions can invigorate compliance with effective ecological management systems (Damak & Güngör, 2025).

Damak and Güngör (2025) also state that the quality of an institution has a significant role in encouraging or inhibiting progressive initiatives, even though many factors can foster these initiatives. By using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) to analyze time series data from 1990 to 2021 in Japan, they found that regulatory quality had a positive and significant long-term relationship with the ecological footprint. However, the rule of law showed no significance, despite showing a negative sign.

This positive relationship showed that higher regulatory quality contributed to the long-term upsurge in environmental degradation in Japan (Damak and Güngör, 2025). If we observe Indonesia, similar findings were also exhibited by Adijaya (2024), where the variable of government integrity apparently expanded the ecological footprint in the long term in Indonesia. A 1% increase in government integrity elevated the ecological footprint by 0.1129%, *ceteris paribus*. The results, which were re-examined in Adijaya

(February 2025), also indicate a similar attribute; namely, a 1% increase in government integrity raised the ecological footprint by 0.3394%. The government integrity variable in both findings was statistically significant at the 1% significance level.

The results discussed earlier indicate that when there is an increase in government integrity in Indonesia, which produces a stable and efficient business environment, reduces corruption, and improves public trust, there will be economic growth and development, where advancing industrial production, energy consumption, and infrastructure development can boost the ecological footprint (Adijaya, 2024).

Thus, this study shall aim to investigate the relationship between regulatory efficiency and the rule of law for environmental sustainability in Indonesia. Environmental sustainability is proxied by the ecological footprint variable as employed in Adijaya (2024), Adijaya (February 2025), and Damak and Güngör (2025). The econometric analysis is also derived from the models in the three studies. Moreover, this study shall also provide policy recommendations for the administration of President Prabowo Subianto.

The Analysis of the Relationship between Regulatory Efficiency and the Rule of Law for Environmental Sustainability in Indonesia

To analyze the relationship between regulatory efficiency and the rule of law for environmental sustainability in Indonesia, this study shall utilize the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) Bounds Test model employed in Adijaya (2024), Adijaya (February 2025), and Damak and Güngör (2025). The mathematical model is

$$EcoFP = f(Trade, AveRoL, AvREoE, EnConscap, LCSE) \quad (1)$$

where ***EcoFP*** is the ecological footprint by the Global Footprint Network in global hectares units, which is later in natural logarithms; ***Trade*** is trading in units of % of GDP from the World Bank which is later in natural logarithms; ***AveRoL*** is the rule of law index value which will later be in natural logarithm calculated by averaging the index values for property rights, judicial effectiveness and government integrity from The Heritage Foundation.

AvREoE is the regulatory efficiency index value, which will be in natural logarithms, calculated by averaging the index values of business freedom, labor freedom, and monetary freedom from The Heritage Foundation; *EnConscap* is primary energy consumption per capita in kWh units per person from OurWorldinData which is later in natural logarithms; *LCSE* is low carbon energy from renewable sources in % equivalent primary energy units by the Statistical Review of World Energy processed by OurWorldinData.

By using EViews statistical software, which observes constant & trend in the unit root analysis, only the *logEcoFP* variable is stationary at level (I(0)) and the other variables are stationary at the first difference (I(1)). The result indicates that the proposed variables are feasible for the ARDL Bounds Test, where no variables are stationary at the second degree.

After the unit root test, the lag is tested to determine the ARDL model (p, q, r, s, t, u) to determine: lag p for the *logEcoFP* variable, lag q for the *logTrade* variable, lag r for the *logAveRoL* variable, lag s for the *logAvREoE* variable, lag t for the *logEnConscap* variable, lag u for the *LCSE* variable. The ARDL model used, based on the smallest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value, is ARDL (3, 2, 1, 2, 0, 2).

Next, a Bounds Test is undertaken to observe whether the model has cointegration. If the calculated F-statistic exceeds the upper limit critical value (I(1)), then the null hypothesis (H0), which states there is no long-term relationship, will be rejected. If the calculated F-statistic is below the lower limit critical value (I(0)), then the null hypothesis (H0) will not be rejected. However, if the calculated F-statistic is between the lower and upper limit critical values, then there is no conclusion (Sugiawan & Managi, 2016).

The F-statistic result calculated by the Bounds Test is 5.639, which is greater than the upper limit critical value (I(1)), both at the 10% significance level with an F-statistic of 3.858, and 5% significance level with an F-statistic of 4.608. Thus, this model is said to have long-term cointegration. Table 1 below shows the results of these long-term estimates.[1]

[1] Due to page limitations, long-term mathematical models, short-term mathematical models, and short-term regression results are not included. Tables and figures for variable unit root tests, determining the optimal lag for the model, Bounds Test results, model diagnostic tests, and model stability tests are also not attached to the article. However, the diagnostic test results show that the model is good in theory (no serial correlation, no heteroscedasticity, and a normal distribution model), a stable model based on CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares.

Table 1. Long Term ARDL Estimation Results

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistics	Prob.
logTrade	0.299	0.826	0.4175
logAveRoL	0.759	2.335	0.029**
logAvREoE	2.335	1.903	0.070*
logEnConscap	2.251	3.250	0.004***
LCSE	-0.137	-2.235	0.036**

*Source: Processed by the author with Eviews 13. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Estimation use Newey-West standard errors*

According to the regression results, the ***logEnConscap*** variable has a statistically significant coefficient at 1% in the long term, while the ***logAveRoL*** and *LCSE* variables are statistically significant at the 5% level in the long term. A 1% increase in the ***logAveRoL***, which is a rule of law variable, is associated with a change of 0.759% in the ecological footprint in Indonesia, holding constant other variables. This result could indicate that enhancing the rule of law in Indonesia is still focused on strengthening economic conditions that facilitate the extraction of natural resources and is not related to the enforcement of strict environmental protection. The results in the ***logEnConscap*** variable are similar to the results obtained by Adijaya (2024) and Adijaya (February 2025).

Although ***logAvREoE***, which is a regulatory efficiency variable, is only statistically significant at the 10% significance level, a 1% rise in it is associated with an increase of 2.335% in the ecological footprint in Indonesia, holding constant other variables. Similar to the exhibited result by ***logAveRoL***, the positive and significant results shown by regulatory efficiency and the ecological footprint in Indonesia can indicate that regulatory improvements in Indonesia are still oriented towards ease of economic activity rather than environmental sustainability. In other words, bureaucratic efficiency, ease of investment policies, and the rule of law have not been followed by strengthening aspects of environmental protection and sustainability in Indonesia, which actually increases extractive economic activities, thereby increasing the ecological footprint.

Meanwhile, per capita energy consumption that is statistically significant at 1% will also elevate the ecological footprint, where a 1% rise in per capita energy consumption will increase the ecological footprint by 2.251%, holding constant other variables. *LCSE* or low carbon energy from renewable

sources, which is significant at 5% reduces the ecological footprint, as every change of one *LCSE* unit (which is in %) is associated with a change of -13.7% in the ecological footprint, holding constant other variables. The results for these variables are similar to the results obtained by Adijaya (2024) and Adijaya (February 2025).

Policy Recommendations

According to the previous explanations, the following are policy recommendations for President Prabowo Subianto's administration, particularly in terms of the rule of law and regulatory efficiency. First, in terms of the rule of law, the government through the Coordinating Ministry for Law, Human Rights, Immigration and Corrections, the Ministry of Law, the Ministry of Human Rights, the Ministry of the Environment/Environmental Control Agency, the Ministry of Forestry, the Supreme Court and related ministries/institutions, as well as law enforcement officials must synergize and collaborate to strengthen law enforcement related to the environment and ensure that every environmental violation (environmental pollution, violation of mining permits/illegal mining) is given strict and transparent sanctions, and can be monitored by all elements of society.

The government must also be willing to integrate indicators of environmental sustainability, for instance, violations of human rights, into the assessment of penalties. The government must also encourage the capacity of human resources and law enforcement officers based on environmental justice.

Second, in terms of regulatory efficiency, the government through the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming/Investment Coordinating Agency, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform, the Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency, and related ministries/institutions must synergize and collaborate not only to provide regulatory convenience in terms of speed of administration/permitting, but also integrate this with a track record and commitment to environmental protection in granting permits.

The government must have the courage to change the mindset from a brown economy to a green economy and make it easier to invest and innovate for companies/individuals in the clean energy, green technology, and circular economy sectors. The government must also be willing to review regulations that improve the economy but actually harm the environment and disrupt the welfare of people who make their living from the environment.

"In terms of the rule of law, the government, relevant ministries/ institutions, and law enforcement officials must synergize and collaborate to strengthen law enforcement related to the environment and ensure that every environmental violation (environmental pollution, violation of mining permits/ illegal mining) is given strict and transparent sanctions and can be monitored by all elements of the society. The government must also be willing to integrate indicators of environmental sustainability, for instance, violations of human rights, into the assessment of penalties. In terms of regulatory efficiency, the government and related ministries/institutions must synergize and collaborate to not only provide ease of regulation in terms of speed of administration/ permitting, but also integrate this with the quality of environmental protection in granting permits. "The government must have the courage to change the mindset from a brown economy to a green economy and provide ease of investment and innovation for companies/individuals in the clean energy, green technology, and circular economy sectors."

Laws

The Notes on the National Police Chief's Regulation on the Handling of Attacks on Police Officers

-Christina Clarissa Intania-



In August and September 2025, in a number of cities in Indonesia, several Indonesian National Police (Polri) facilities were damaged. Some were burned down and others were destroyed. Some examples include the destruction of the East Jakarta Police Headquarters and six police stations in the area (kompas.id, 8/9/2025) and the destruction of a police station in Malang (22/9/2025). This destruction is suspected to have been carried out by civilians in response to the death of Affan Kurniawan, a civilian who was run over by a tactical vehicle belonging to the Mobile Brigade Corps on August 28, 2025.

In response to the damage to police facilities, National Police Chief General Listyo Sigit signed National Police Chief Regulation No. 4/2025 concerning the Actions against Attacks on the Indonesian National Police (Perkapolri Penindakan Penyerangan). This regulation allows the members of the National Police to use force when there are attempts to damage police facilities in the field. Head of the Public Information Division of the Indonesian National Police, Senior Superintendent Erdi A. Chaniago, also explained that Perkapolri Penindakan Penyerangan was created as a form of anticipation and prevention to protect the lives of the members of the Indonesian National Police and the community (Kompas.id, 1/10/2025).

On the other hand, the Executive Director of Amnesty International Indonesia, Usman Hamid, commented that this regulation could actually

create opportunities for excessive violence in the field. Usman said that this Perkapolri had the potential to justify excessive force against peaceful demonstrators (Kompas.id, 1/10/2025). This article shall further elaborate on the points regulated in the Police Chief Regulation on the Handling of Attacks and its implications for human rights. In the spirit of Police Reform, which is currently a priority among the government, the police, and civil society, it is hoped that this article could contribute to the legal products currently owned by the police.

The Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police No. 4/2025

The Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police Number 4/2025 concerning the Actions against Attacks on the Indonesian National Police (Perkapolri Penindakan Penyerangan) was signed on September 29, 2025. However, this regulation has not been made public as of the date of this writing (10/14). Only a few parties have accessed this regulation, as seen from the individuals and institutions that have given statements to the media. This needs to be taken seriously and addressed in terms of the transparency of law enforcement agencies, including the Indonesian National Police, when not all civilians have the ability to access the same information.

Several media outlets have provided descriptions of the contents of the National Police Chief Regulation on Assault Enforcement, thereby helping to provide a better picture of the contents of the regulation, which is not yet accessible. According to reports from Kompas, the Police Chief Regulation on Assault Enforcement contains 18 articles, of which Article 1 states that this regulation governs actions taken by the police to stop or control acts that are considered illegal; namely, attacks against the Indonesian National Police. The actions referred to include attacks on police headquarters, police stations, police dormitories/official residences, police educational units, and police hospitals/clinics/health facilities (kompas.id, 1/10/2025).

Then, the efforts made could be in the form of force or other means to prevent, hinder, or stop perpetrators of attacks that threaten safety or endanger life, property, or honor. The actions referred to are warnings; arrests; inspections/searches; securing items/objects used for attacks; and the decisive and structured use of firearms. Next, firearms are used when attackers forcibly enter the police environment and commit arson, destruction, theft, seizure, looting, hostage-taking, abuse, and assault. Also, when attackers threaten the lives of police officers or other people. The firearms in question are also equipped with rubber bullets and live ammunition (kompas.id, 1/10/2025).

From media observations, several inputs and notes from observers and the police themselves provide an overview of the National Police Chief Regulation on Attack Response. Head of Public Information at the National Police's Public Relations Division, Senior Superintendent Erdi A. Chaniago, explained that this National Police Chief Regulation would serve as a strong basis for action, ranging from warnings and arrests to the proportional use of firearms. Erdi hopes that this regulation will make the implementations of the National Police's duties in the field more professional, proportional, and based on the law (humas.polri.go.id, 9/30/2025).

The Executive Director of Amnesty International, Usman Hamid, commented that Article 6 of the Police Chief Regulation on Assault Enforcement had a problematic formulation because it did not explain the concrete limits of what was meant by a "firm and measured" situation allowing for the use of firearms. Then, in his opinion, Article 12 could pose a serious risk because it allows for the use of sharp ammunition. He also argued that the Police Chief Regulation on Assault Response did not clearly distinguish between individual criminal acts and mass actions, which could justify the use of lethal force against peaceful demonstrations. The use of firearms should be a last resort, according to the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (kompas.id, 1/10/2025).

The Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS), represented by the Head of the Legal Division, Andrie Yunus, also argued that the Police Chief Regulation on Assault Response would threaten the human rights of citizens. According to him, this Police Chief Regulation should not regulate matters that restrict human rights, which should be regulated by law. The Perkapolri is an internal police regulation (kbr.id, 7/10/2025). Similarly, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (2025) also stated in its press release that this Perkapolri exceeded its authority, contradicted the Criminal Procedure Code, contained ambiguous terms, contradicted Perkapolri Number 1/2009 and Perkapolri Number 8/2009, and lacked accountability (ylbhi.or.id, 2/10/2025; kbr.id, 7/10/2025).

Member of the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) M. Choirul Anam said that he agreed that the National Police Chief's Regulation on the Handling of Attacks must be ensured and maintained so that it did not lead to excessive actions by the police. Thus, supervision and accountability in the use of authority must be tightened. Regarding the difference between individual criminal acts and mass actions, Anam said that for the exercise of the right to express oneself in front of a police station, they need to be invited in for dialogue. This is different from people who suddenly carry out

attacks, such as throwing Molotov cocktails at police stations without any reasons. It is the latter situation that must be dealt with clearly (kompas.id, 1/10/2025).

Important Notes

Acoording to the observations of experts in the previous discussion, one important point to underline is the aspect of authority that is bypassed by this regulation. The National Police Chief Regulation is intended for internal implementations. Looking at this regulation from the above perspectives, it not only regulates the implementations of activities within the National Police, but also how these implementations directly intersect with human rights.

The use of firearms to deal with civil society actions should be regulated at the legislative level. This is especially true given that the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia stipulates that every person has the right to life and freedom from torture. In Law Number 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, there are no provisions regarding the use of firearms in situations as regulated in the Indonesian National Police Chief Regulation on Assault Response. Even before the Police Chief Regulation on Assault Response was enacted, the use of firearms was regulated at the Police Chief Regulation level, namely Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 concerning the Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Performance of Duties by the Indonesian National Police and Police Chief Regulation No. 1 of 2009 concerning the Use of Force in Police Actions.

The momentum of police reform should be a good opportunity to change the direction of the police force towards a humanistic approach, based on human rights, and prioritizing civilian supremacy. The rule of law is also one of the things that must be addressed in the administration of the police force. The existence of the National Police Chief Regulation on the Handling of Assaults, with its inappropriate content and ambiguous provisions, actually undermines the intention of reform and may even contradict higher laws and regulations, including the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the Law on Human Rights.

Police reform requires the implementations of transparent, accountable, and human rights-committed policing functions. The National Police Chief Regulation regarding the prosecution of attacks against police officers should also be critically examined and open to meaningful public participation. This is important to ensure that the National Police works in accordance with the applicable legal hierarchy and does not abuse its authority in carrying out its policing functions.

Recommendations

Referring to the above analysis, here are some recommendations:

a. The Indonesian National Police must publish and disseminate the Chief of Police Regulation on Assault Immediate Actions to increase public participation and initiate dialogue regarding its content;

b. The Indonesian National Police must review the Police Chief Regulation on Assault Enforcement and its overlap with other regulations, such as Police Chief Regulations related to human rights and other higher regulations that contain provisions related to human rights; and

c. The DPR, DPD, civil society (the public, civil society organizations, academics, the media, and various other relevant stakeholders) must monitor the implementations and follow-up of this regulation so that it is not misused as a tool to excessively repress civil society.

Laws

The DPR's Next Strategy After the August 2025 Demonstrations

-Christina Clarissa Intania-



In August 2025, large demonstrations targeting the House of Representatives (DPR) of the Republic of Indonesia took place. These demonstrations, which lasted for days, initially began due to news of a Rp50 million increase in housing allowances for DPR members amid rampant unemployment, which reached 7.2 million people according to the Central Statistics Agency (2025), and declining purchasing power among the people (kbr.id, 6/5/2025; kompas.id, 11/7/2025). The situation worsened and sparked public outrage when several DPR members responded to the issue without empathy for the economic situation of the people, but instead defended the allowances. In fact, they labelled the public as an uneducated group (theconversation.com, 8/28/2025).

The aftermath of these demonstrations was the emergence of numerous demands from the public, represented by civil society organizations (CSOs). The most prominent examples of these demands are those made by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation together with 211 other CSOs throughout Indonesia and those made by an individual group titled *Tuntutan* 17+8 (17+8 Demands). Both demands call on state institutions such as the House of Representatives, the Presidency, and others to take a stand and do something to improve the situations in Indonesia.

The series of demonstrations in August and even into early September 2025 became an important moment to see the commitment of relevant ministries/

institutions, especially the DPR, to accommodate the points raised by civil society organizations (CSOs). This article shall discuss in more detail the further steps that could be taken by the DPR to follow up on these points. It is hoped that the DPR can gradually change its working methods to become more participatory, accountable, and transparent.

Demands of Indonesian Civil Society and Public Organizations

In this paper, the demands of CSOs and the public that shall be used as a reference for analysis are the demands of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) together with 211 CSOs (YLBHI Demands) in Indonesia and the 17+8 Demands. In the YLBHI Demands, these demands were made on the basis of violence by law enforcement officials; namely, the Indonesian National Police (Polri), against demonstrators that continued to occur during the demonstration period (ylbhi.or.id, 29/8/2025). From these demands, YLBHI and 211 other CSOs demanded that the DPR:

"[...] 7. The leadership of political parties and the DPR-RI institution must take action and impose severe sanctions by dismissing members of the DPR-RI who have behaved inappropriately and provoke public anger, such as Ahmad Sahroni, Eko Hendro Purnomo, Adies Kadir, Deddy Sitorus, Nafa Urbach, Surya Utama, Rahayu Saraswati, and Sigit Purnomo Syamsuddin Said;

8. The President and the House of Representatives must immediately fulfill the demonstrators' demands, starting with addressing the employment crisis, canceling the Criminal Procedural Code Bill, halting all national strategic programs and government programs that damage the environment and deprive indigenous peoples of their rights to life, discuss the Asset Seizure Bill with meaningful public participation, stopping state budget management that is contrary to the principles of effectiveness and efficiency, and implementing fair tax policies; [...]"

Next, the 17+8 Demands consist of short-term and long-term demands. The points of the demands that intersect with the DPR include (bijakmemantau.id, 15/10/2025):

Short-Term Demands:

a. Party cadres who are members of the House of Representatives must engage in public dialogue with students and civil society in order to increase meaningful participation;

b. Encouraging the DPR Ethics Council to investigate members who disregard the aspirations of the people;

c. Proactively publish budget transparency (salaries, allowances, housing, DPR facilities) and report it regularly; and

d. Freeze salary/allowance increases for DPR members and cancel new facilities.

Long-term demands:

a. Revising the Indonesian National Army Law and the National Police Law;

b. Enacting the Corruptors' Asset Seizure Law; and

c. Reforming the DPR.

Based on the two demands above from YLBHI and 17+8, basically both demands want: a more accountable, transparent, and participatory DPR; asking the DPR to be more representative in voicing public concerns about policies; and prioritizing the formation of laws that are urgently needed by the public. These points are not new demands from the public, civil society organizations, or academics.

DPR Strategy

Assessing the contents of the demands made by YLBHI and 17+8, the petitioners want the DPR to carry out its duties and functions properly. The DPR is asked to return to its essence as a representative body of the people. In order to improve the accountability, transparency, and participation of the DPR, there needs to be a commitment to improve the current system of managing public aspirations.

Not only transparency regarding documents related to the absorption of aspirations, but also the follow-up actions taken by the DPR after receiving aspirations. End-to-end management in managing aspirations needs to be carried out consistently from receiving aspirations to converting them into policies or providing feedback to the aspirants. Feedback to the aspirant has been regulated in the DPR's complaint reception mechanism. This needs to be consistently implemented for all aspirations submitted through other methods. The use of information technology needs to be optimized to achieve this.

In terms of becoming more representative, the DPR could start with more empathetic public communication and strive to understand the people. As elected public officials representing the people, it is important to speak in a way that represents the interests of the people who elected them. They should

The points raised by the people, including 17+8, are not new demands made by civil society organizations and academics. It is important for the House of Representatives to be proactive and responsive in following up on these demands seriously and accountably as part of its representative function.

not make gestures that attack the people or ask the people to understand or improve themselves. This reflects the level of participation therapy at the second lowest level, according to Arnstein's ladder of participation (1989). It should also be noted that the public is required to express their opinions in a polite, clear, and constructive manner, especially in accordance with DPR Secretariat General Regulation Number 2 of 2024. Therefore, the DPR should also do the same when responding.

Furthermore, in order to draft laws that better reflect the needs of society, the DPR must first stop the fast track legislation procedure that is currently being implemented. The fast track legislation adopted by the DPR does not accommodate draft laws that are urgently needed due to certain situations that could have an impact on the public. However, it does accommodate draft laws that are more politically charged or only impact certain groups. Some examples include the Job Creation Law and the TNI Law. The procedure for enacting laws was carried out quickly even though they were not urgent and did not meet the cumulative criteria.

Therefore, priority should be given to the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) as a first step. Prolegnas has outlined the legal needs of the community and has undergone a more participatory process in its determination compared to laws that go through fast track legislation. Not only that, Prolegnas is also jointly monitored for its fulfillment. This makes the priority of completing draft laws in Prolegnas more strategic in demonstrating the DPR's commitment to accommodating the voice of the community.

Recommendations

Referring to the above explantions, the following recommendations are proposed:

a. The DPR needs to utilize information technology in displaying the progress of aspirations from receipt to application in policy or explanation back to the aspirant;

b. The DPR must be consistent in conveying the aspirations of the people to the relevant organs or ministries/institutions;

c. The Members of the DPR, as state officials, must improve communication with the public; and

d. The DPR must prioritize draft laws in the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) for follow-ups.

Politics

The Stability Paradox: When Indonesian Democracy Loses Its Political Tension

-Felia Primaresti-



Budget politics is an arena where democracy is tested: between the need for government stability and the demands of public oversight (Shelton, 2014). In this context, the recent *government shutdown in the United States (US) is a case in point. According to CNBC Indonesia (September 30, 2025), the United States has experienced 21 government shutdowns in nearly five decades*. This demonstrates the extremes of political stability being jeopardized for partisan interests, with the legislature and executive disagreeing to the point that some basic government functions must cease. On the other hand, a government *shutdown* is a mature political decision, where transparency and accountability are not sacrificed for the sake of apparent stability.

In relation to this, this paper shall analyze and reflect in the Indonesian context, focusing on on period 2019–2025 under Joko Widodo and the transition to the Prabowo Subianto administration. A US -style "shutdown" is virtually impossible in Indonesia, given the strong government coalition and the almost consistent support of the legislature as a whole. However, this stability comes at the cost of compromises that often reduce the quality of deliberation, oversight, accountability for the budget, and other public policies.

The Reflection on Transparency and Accountability of Policies in Indonesia (2019-2025)

This section shall attempt to highlight some of Indonesia's "controversial" policies from 2019 to 2025, demonstrating how political stability often goes hand in hand with a decline in public and legislative oversight. Although Indonesia's presidential system theoretically guarantees a separation of powers, post-2019 political practice has shown that large coalitions in parliament have created governments with virtually no opposition.

This condition has resulted in various strategic policies, including those that have a major impact on the direction of democracy and civil liberties, being passed without substantial debate and instead resulting in a wave of protests. In this context, "stability" no longer means a balance of power but rather a political hegemony institutionalized through elitist consensus.

Table 1. List of Controversial Policy Cases 2019-2025

Policy Case	Description and Criticism	The Implications for the Oversight Function and Public Aspirations
The Revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission Law (2019)	The 2019 revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law was passed hastily and without adequate public participation. Its substance transformed the KPK from an independent institution to part of the executive branch, established a Supervisory Board that must authorize wiretapping and searches, and turned KPK employees into civil servants.	This revision erodes the oversight function of power, as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), once a symbol of public control, is now seen as more subservient to the government. A wave of national protests, dubbed #ReformasiDikorupsi (Corrupted Reform), in September 2019, became movement people when thousands students and society demand cancellation revision and confirmation return aspirations for a truly independent anti-corruption agency.

The Job Creation Law / *Omnibus Law* (2020)	The Job Creation Law (*Omnibus Law*) was passed in October 2020 through a rapid legislative process with minimal public participation . In fact , the draft the final had time changeable after ratified . Main criticism covers subtraction protection laborers (for example deletion severance pay , flexibility contracts and *outsourcing* without limits), convenience permission business without followed the principle of " good governance" which risks degradation environment , as well as pruning role regions and participation public in licensing.	The process of compiling is not Transparency and substance that favor capital give rise to the perception that the state is increasingly moving away from the principles of social justice and democratic oversight. A large wave of protests #RejectOmnibusLaw erupted in various places. area in October 2020 , reflecting crisis trust in legislative mechanisms and affirming public aspirations for a participatory, fair, and people-friendly policy process.
The New Criminal Code Law (2022)	The new Criminal Code replaced the colonial Criminal Code with its controversial articles (criminalization of extramarital relations, insulting the president/ institutions, restrictions on demonstrations, etc.). The process considered minimal participation public and threatening freedom civil.	The defamation provisions and restrictions on action have the potential to be used to curb public scrutiny . extends , including demonstration students , journalists, and human rights activists on end 2022 , shows concerns that the Criminal Code reduces space for democratic criticism.

The National Capital City Law (IKN) (2022)	The National Capital Law establishes the framework for relocating the capital to East Kalimantan and grants the National Capital Authority broad authority. Key criticisms include limited public participation, ecological risks, unclear funding, and authority accountability.	Strong authority and centralized decision-making reduce legislative control mechanisms and citizen participation. Regional protests (environmental activists and students in East Kalimantan , Jakarta, etc.) reflect this. concern community concerns about the marginalization of local residents and the lack of transparency.
The Presidential Instruction (Inpres) on Budget Efficiency (2025)	The Presidential Instruction on budget efficiency mandates budget cuts across various ministries and regional transfers, citing fiscal stability. However, this policy has been criticized as *top-down* , lacking public consultation, and potentially cutting basic service programs. Criticism has also arisen because these austerity measures lack policy consistency.	This policy demonstrates a lack of consistency and transparency in state financial management. This has fueled distrust in the government. Waves of protests, such as #IndonesiaDark, #EmergencyWarning, and #ResetIndonesia, have become public expressions of dissatisfaction with policies perceived as ignoring fiscal justice and the principles of democratic accountability.
The Revision of the TNI Law (2025)	The revisions expand the TNI's civilian duties, granting greater non-combatant assignments and career flexibility to military officers. Criticism: blurring the lines civil-military and clear give justification For turn on back to dual function practice .	The expanded role of the TNI complicates civilian oversight and risks normalizing military presence in public policy. The demand #TNIReturnToBarak has become a slogan used by student organizations and activists in response to this policy.

Source : Processed from various source

The table above shows a similar pattern: public policies in Indonesia post-2019 are relatively easy to achieve politically but are always accompanied by social resistance at the grassroots level. The rapid legislative process,

Kasus Pati bukan sekadar polemik lokal mengenai pajak daerah, tetapi sebuah cermin dari tantangan struktural dalam demokrasi lokal Indonesia. Absennya partisipasi, lemahnya representasi DPRD, dan ketergantungan pada koreksi vertikal dari pusat memperlihatkan bahwa demokrasi lokal masih berada pada tahap prosedural, belum sepenuhnya substantif. Demokrasi substantif hanya dapat tercapai jika warga tidak sekadar dipandang sebagai objek kebijakan, tetapi sebagai subjek yang aktif dalam proses perumusan dan pengambilan keputusan..

minimal debate, and often no public review indicate that political stability in Indonesia is essentially superficial, temporary, and based on elitist consensus, not deliberative legitimacy.

In fact, at the end of August 2025, Indonesia recorded one of the largest protests this decade. The action began with the House of Representatives' decision to increase the allowances and salaries of members amidst the national budget efficiency policy. Tensions escalated after an online motorcycle taxi driver, Affan Kurniawan, was killed by a police tactical vehicle while delivering food during the demonstration (Tempo.com, August 29, 2025). The penalties from the authorities, which were only administrative punishments; namely, an apology and special placement (patsus) for 20 days (Kompas, October 10, 2025), showed how far the state has moved away from the principle of public accountability.

This incident shows that Indonesian democracy is experiencing a stability paradox: the government appears stable on the surface due to minimal political conflict in the Parliament but is actually fragile at the grassroots level. In reality, there are social and political polemics, as aspirations from the public no longer find representative channels in formal institutions.

In the perspective of political capture theory according to George J. Stigler (1971), this condition describes how dominant political actors, both the ruling party and the bureaucratic elite, control the policy-making process to protect their own interests.

The 2019 revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law marked a significant turning point, as the weakening of the anti-corruption agency signaled a shift in the power structure from rule-based to discretionary governance . Subsequently, a similar pattern recurred in the Job Creation Law, the National Capital City Law, and the revision of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) Law, all of which demonstrated a convergence of executive, legislative, and military interests without significant control from the opposition.

From a budgetary political perspective, capture also occurs through centrally controlled fiscal allocation mechanisms, as seen in the 2025 Presidential Instruction on Budget Efficiency. Budget cut policies were implemented without public consultation, but political spending such as the inauguration of new officials and ceremonial projects continued. The standard justification for this is that discretion president often become explanation in public communication without give context of policy priorities, including aspect financing policy. This indicates that efficiency is not purely fiscal policy instruments but rather political tools to rearrange power priorities.

As a consequence, the public and legislative oversight functions have been systematically eroded. The DPR, which should function as a mechanism of checks and balances, has instead become part of a bloc. When formal deliberation spaces are closed, people channel their dissatisfactions through protests and digital campaigns (#ReformasiDikorupsi, #TolakOmnibusLaw, #TNIKulangKeBarak, #IndonesiaGelap). This pattern shows that public oversight in Indonesia has shifted from formal institutions to informal arenas, including the streets and social media .

In contrast to the United States, where " government shutdown " becomes symbol for an overly competitive democracy characterized by a tug-of-war between the executive and legislative branches. Indonesia is at the opposite extreme: an overly competitive democracy vs compromise and biased interests elite.

Compromise at the level elite of course ensures the continuity of government but eliminates the dynamic opposition that should act as a counterbalance. This phenomenon demonstrates that political stability is not always a sign of democratic maturity. In fact, when compromise becomes a tool for maintaining power, rather than the result of substantive deliberation, stability turns into stagnation.

The lesson to be learned from the US is not about copying " shutdown " mechanism but understanding its the essence that transparent political deadlock is much healthier than stability that closes off space for difference. The democratic system needs tension politics and " critical" mass ", as well as policy process with principles of " good" governance " is truly implemented and becomes the commitment of every party and rational policy so that public policies remain accountable and side with the citizens, not with the ruling elite. Enforcement law is also important for ensuring democracy walk in accordance his dignity .

Recommendations

a. Government together and the DPR should conduct public testing and review impact regulation (RIA) before every design Constitution discussed in stage Committee Work (Panja) or Baleg. This mechanism is not merely a consultation formality but a substantive prerequisite for ensuring that every policy has a transparent and measurable basis for its social, economic, and environmental impacts.

b. The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the Ministry Finance need to strengthen fiscal transparency through Participatory audits and real-

Political stability is often considered a sign of democratic maturity, but in practice, it can reflect excessive compromise. Post-2019 Indonesia demonstrates how a large coalition and a minimal opposition have actually weaken the public's oversight function. Amidst the seemingly calm facade of democracy, a shift in power is actually occurring that blurs the lines between the interests of the people and the interests of the government or the elite .

time publication of state spending. As guardians of fiscal accountability, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the Ministry of Finance need to expand their audit function beyond procedural compliance to participatory audits, involving civil society and academics to assess budget effectiveness and priorities.

c. Civil Society and Institutions Independent should keep promoting social accountability mechanism "outside the state structure. This could be done by building cross-issue policy monitoring coalitions, utilizing open government data to analyze budget gaps, and strengthening public communication channels (digital platforms, data journalism, and periodic policy reports) that pressure political actors to be accountable. This approach mimics lessons from the US, where information transparency and consistent public pressure maintain a balance between the executive and legislative branches, regardless of Democratic or Republican partisan interests. In In the Indonesian context , social "checks and balances " are a key element in balancing overly compromising political power

Social

Ensuring Transparency and Total Reform of Free Nutritious Meals Following Repeated Food Poisoning Cases

-Made Natasya Restu Dewi Pratiwi-



The repeated mass food poisoning cases during the Free Nutritional Meals (MBG) program have reopened old wounds that have not healed due to weak governance of the program. The repeated cases of food poisoning in various regions, resulting in fatalities, show that a program that should symbolize the fulfilment of children's basic right to healthy food has instead become a new threat to public health.

Ironically, of the 8,583 Nutrition Fulfillment Service Units (*Satuan Pelayanan Pemenuhan Gizi*/SPPG) operating, only 34 or 0.4% have obtained a Certificate of Hygiene and Sanitation Suitability (*Sertifikat Laik Higiene Sanitasi*/SLHS) according to records from the Presidential Staff Office (Tempo, September 23, 2025). This figure indicates that the implementations of the MBG have not prioritized food safety and quality.

Most kitchens supplying food to thousands of students have not yet been certified to meet the basic requirements for safe, clean, and nutritious food prepared on a large scale. This fact is even more concerning because, despite the widespread death toll from food poisoning, the MBG program continues without transparency regarding the participatory evaluation methods the government will employ.

To date, there is only information regarding the planned ratification of the Presidential Regulation on MBG governance in the first week of October.

The National Nutrition Agency emphasized that the draft Presidential Decree on MBG to be ratified would not only address food safety and hygiene standards but will also encompass broader supply chain aspects and the division of authority as the program expands (Kompas.com, October 2, 2025). This means that MBG is no longer merely a technical distribution issue but a strategic, cross-sectoral policy that demands transparency, accountability, and evidence-based governance.

In response to the government's ongoing efforts to improve the governance of MBG, the author shall analyse aspects that need to be strengthened after the ratification of the Presidential Regulation to ensure that the benefits of the MBG program are truly felt by the community and to prevent similar tragedies from recurring in the future.

Four Critical Gaps in MBG Implementations

An analysis of the MBG implementations reveals four crucial gaps that need to be addressed immediately from a public health perspective. First, nutritional fulfilment is not up to the Recommended Dietary Intake (RDA) standards as stipulated in Minister of Health Regulation Number 28 of 2019 concerning the Recommended Nutritional Intake for the Indonesian People. Many menus still use ultra-processed ingredients and fail to consider the health conditions of recipients.

As a result, MBG distribution often focuses solely on achieving quantity without considering the actual nutritional adequacy of children's consumption. Menu composition standards must also be reviewed to ensure they do not ignore the local context and the potential of regional foods, which can enrich variety, increase appetite, and support local food security. The cases of MBG menus still using sausages, ultra-processed ingredients, burgers, and even shark demonstrate that standardizing healthy and safe menus is a priority for improvement.

Second, regarding calorie and food portion fulfilment, food intake often does not meet the needs of students at various age levels. In some areas, children report not finishing their meals because the portions are too large or refusing monotonous menus (Pratiwi, 2025). This condition not only risks causing imbalances in calorie intake, either excess or deficiency, but also leads to large amounts of food waste, indicating a failure in menu planning based on the needs and preferences of beneficiaries.

Third, in terms of food hygiene, the low proportion of SLHS-certified SPPGs demonstrates a weak upstream food safety system. Minimal training

for food handlers, inadequate sanitation facilities, and the use of unsanitary water create ample opportunities for contamination by pathogenic bacteria such as *Escherichia coli* and *Salmonella sp.* In the context of mass food supply, a small error in the production chain could have far-reaching consequences, as is now evident in the numerous cases of food poisoning in schools.

Fourth, the aspect of safety and quality control is still far from ideal. The system does not yet provide traceability or the ability to trace the source of food ingredients from upstream to downstream, making it difficult to identify the causes of poisoning. Even when audits or surveillance are carried out, the lack of basic data (baseline) regarding nutritional status, quality and source of ingredients, and menu distribution makes program evaluation reactive only conducted when a case occurs rather than active and prevention oriented.

These four aspects demonstrate that the MBG issue does not stand alone but is closely related to the governance of the national food supply chain, from pre-production to distribution. According to WHO (2008) and Ministry of Health (2011) guidelines on food poisoning investigation, food poisoning incidents cannot be viewed as random accidents but as direct indicators of a food safety system failure.

For example, poisoning cases that have arisen in MBG, especially those involving *E. coli* pathogens, are generally caused by unhygienic washing practices or errors in storing food that is left at room temperature for too long (time-temperature abuse). In a large production scheme like MBG, these factors reflect systemic unpreparedness, ranging from minimal oversight of production kitchens and inadequate food processing capacity to weak temperature control during shipping. In other words, the poisoning case were not the result of individual error but rather the weakness of a public food safety system that should have been carefully designed by the government.

Furthermore, the government's response to the tragedy involving the alleged deaths of MBG victims has deepened the public's crisis of confidence in the MBG program. In its report (Liputan6.com, October 2, 2025), the civil society believes that the government is worsening wounds by covering up the facts on the ground. For example, the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) hastily declared that the deaths of students at SMKN 1 Cihampelas, West Bandung, were unrelated to MBG. However, an autopsy had not yet been performed on the victims, and an independent investigative team had not been transparently formed.

After this tragedy, a total MBG evaluation based on epidemiological investigation is a necessity, not an option. The government must scientifically trace the source of contamination, ensure transparency in the chain of pathogen transmission, and establish specific control measures for the causes of poisoning based on WHO and Ministry of Health guidelines.

This investigation process includes identifying the pathogen causing the poisoning, analysing the contamination chain from raw materials to distribution, and implementing evidence-based controls such as the use of clean water, proper thermal processing, hygiene management training for kitchen staff, monitoring food storage temperatures, and paying attention to food storage times.

Beyond technical measures, transparency in investigation results is a key element in restoring public trust. The government must not conceal facts or soften incident reports. The public has the right to know what really happened, the extent of the responsibility of relevant institutions, and what corrective actions are being taken. Transparency is not only a form of accountability but also a tool for collective learning to improve national food and nutrition policies.

Recommendations

To strengthen the benefits of MBG and ensure the sustainability of governance reforms following the ratification of the Presidential Decree, the following strategic steps need to be taken immediately:

a. The National Nutritional Agency (*Badan Gizi Nasional*/BGN), together with the Ministry of Health and Food and Drug Administration (*Badan Pengawas Obat dan Makanan*/BPOM), needs to immediately form a Rapid Response Team for Food Poisoning in each province, involving health workers, education personnel, and grassroots civil society. This team is tasked with conducting epidemiological investigations, sanitation audits, SPPG kitchen facility assessments, and transparent public reporting.

b. The National Nutritional Agency must also develop a national digital-based MBG dashboard containing real-time data. This includes information on food distribution, SPPG training status, food poisoning cases, SLHS certification, and quarterly audit and evaluation results. This will serve as an accountability tool for the public to monitor program quality, impact, and food safety.

MBG reform cannot stop at the ratification of the Presidential Regulation. The government must have the courage to open data transparently, to involve the public in the evaluation process, and to ensure that every kitchen is truly safe and has the standardized capacity before implementing MBG. Zero poisoning cases must be an absolute goal, not just a hope.

c. The Ministry of Health must expand SLHS certification and access to training on maintaining food hygiene, safety, and nutritional standards for all MBG kitchens before operational permits are issued. The Ministry must also ensure integrated cross-sectoral reporting of food poisoning cases, not only to BGN but also to the public through an early warning system.

d. Regional governments, under the coordination of BGN, must form an MBG Cross-Sector Coordination Forum involving the Health Office, Education Office, schools, and civil society to monitor the implementations, the accuracy of distribution targets, and food quality. Schools and community health centers could be empowered to spearhead this effort through early reporting of poisoning incidents and balanced nutrition education based on local foods.

e. BGN, BPOM, and the Coordinating Ministry for Food must ensure the traceability system for MBG food ingredients from upstream to downstream so that sources of contamination could be easily identified. BGN needs to involve the Ministry of Health, the National Food Agency, and the Central Statistics Agency to map priority areas for MBG, such as regions with the highest stunting, extreme poverty, and low food security, to increase program effectiveness and impact.

f. Civil society organizations, media, and academics should be involved in independent social audits and evaluations of MBG from food quality monitoring and nutritional analysis to epidemiological investigations. Public engagement is the key to restoring trust and ensuring transparency in programs that affect the lives, nutritional status, and future of Indonesian children.

Social

Optimizing Cervical Cancer Elimination Through Expanding HPV Vaccination for Adolescents in Indonesia

-Made Natasya Restu Dewi Pratiwi-



Cervical cancer remains a leading cause of cancer death among women in Indonesia. The data from the Global Cancer Observatory (Globocan) in 2020 recorded 36,633 new cases and 21,003 deaths from cervical cancer in Indonesia. These figures placed Indonesia as the country with the highest cervical cancer burden in Southeast Asia, contributing 53% of cases and 55% of deaths in the region (Globocan, 2020). This disease generally affects women of reproductive age, especially those with limited access to preventive reproductive health services.

More than 103 million women aged over 15 years in Indonesia are in the high-risk group for infection with Human Papillomavirus (HPV), the virus that causes more than 95% of cervical cancer cases (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). HPV is transmitted primarily through sexual activity, making vaccination before sexual activity the most effective intervention in preventing infection. However, delays in vaccine access, information gaps, and socio-cultural factors that still consider discussing reproductive organs taboo prevent this primary prevention effort from reaching its full potential.

Cervical cancer is not only a health issue but also a social and economic justice issue. This disease can cause lost productivity in working-age women, exacerbate household poverty, and burden the national health insurance system. Without comprehensive preventive interventions, it is estimated

that more than 1.7 million Indonesian women will die from cervical cancer by 2070 (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023).

Therefore, accelerating cervical cancer elimination cannot be viewed solely as a medical goal but as a social investment that determines the quality of Indonesia's human development. This paper shall critique the HPV vaccination expansion strategy to optimize cervical cancer elimination and examine gaps in the implementation of cervical cancer prevention policies in Indonesia.

Cervical Cancer Prevention Policy in Indonesia

As part of its global commitment, Indonesia has adopted the cervical cancer elimination strategy initiated by the World Health Organization (WHO) through the "90–70–90" framework by 2020. This strategy targets 90% of girls to receive HPV vaccination by age 15, 70% of women aged 30–69 to undergo screening with HPV DNA testing, and 90% of women diagnosed with cervical cancer to receive timely and effective treatment (WHO, 2020).

This commitment was then translated into the National Action Plan for Cervical Cancer Elimination 2023–2030, Indonesia's roadmap to a cervical cancer-free generation. Specifically, the government aims to target that by 2027, 90% of girls aged 15 will have received the HPV vaccine. By 2028–2030, vaccine coverage will be expanded to boys as part of a comprehensive, population-based prevention strategy.

As a first step, Indonesia launched a free national HPV immunization program for 5th and 6th-grade elementary school girls aged 11–15 years during the School Children Immunization Month, which began nationally in 2023 (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). Through a school-based approach, the government seeks to reach the most vulnerable and strategic age group for primary prevention: girls who are not yet sexually active.

Although the national policy direction is aligned with WHO's global strategy, the success of this program still depends heavily on the support of local health systems, the readiness of implementing personnel, and community acceptance. Many regions still face limited cold chain facilities for vaccine storage, a shortage of immunization personnel, and limited public understanding of the importance of the HPV vaccine. Disparities in access between urban and rural areas, and between public and non-formal schools, also create implementation gaps that have the potential to widen inequality in protection against HPV infection among Indonesian adolescent girls.

Obstacles to accelerating cervical cancer elimination in Indonesia can be analyzed from three main dimensions: namely, public awareness, health system readiness, and disparities in access between regions. First, low levels of knowledge about cervical cancer and the importance of HPV vaccination remain at the root of the problem. Most people do not understand that the HPV vaccine should be given before sexual activity begins, as its effectiveness reaches over 90% in women who have not been exposed to the virus (WHO, 2020).

In many cases, information about HPV vaccination is only obtained when individuals have entered young adulthood, even after marriage or sexual activity. This indicates weak integration of reproductive health and cancer prevention education into primary and secondary school curricula.

Second, limitations in the healthcare system also pose a structural challenge. Not all healthcare facilities have adequate human resources and facilities to provide quality vaccinations and screenings. Logistical barriers such as the distance between residence and community health centers, limited time for working women, and the lack of flexible service hours all limit access to preventive services. This is particularly true for women in rural and island areas that are not yet fully covered by national programs.

Third, funding disparities between regions have led to uneven program implementation. Although cervical cancer screening has been part of the Minimum Service Standards in the health sector, not all regions have adequate budget allocations for its operations. Similarly, HPV vaccine procurement relies heavily on state budget allocations and international aid, which often exclude adolescent girls who are no longer in school.

Therefore, Indonesian policy needs to encourage collaboration with pharmaceutical companies and researchers to develop local HPV vaccine production, thereby increasing vaccine stocks, reducing costs, and facilitating access for those outside the free vaccination program. Furthermore, the lack of an HPV vaccination subsidy scheme by The Health Social Security Administering Body (*Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan*/ BPJS Kesehatan) for girls over 15 years old prevents those outside the free vaccination program from accessing the full HPV vaccine dose due to its high cost.

On the other hand, social factors such as the influence of parents and community leaders also affect the success of school-based vaccination programs. Several cases have shown parental resistance due to religious issues, doubts about vaccine safety, or the perception that the HPV vaccine

is "not suitable for unmarried children." This highlights the importance of risk communication strategies that are sensitive to cultural and religious contexts.

In the context of the target for cervical cancer elimination by 2030, Indonesia needs to strengthen the inclusivity and equity dimensions of its HPV vaccination program. The government has targeted 90% of girls aged 15 years to get vaccinated by 2027 and to expand coverage to boys in the 2028–2030 period. However, there is still a large group of young women aged 15–26 who are not included in the school vaccination program or catch-up immunization.

This age group mostly consists of adolescents who are not yet sexually active and are a key population for primary prevention. Without specific intervention, they risk missing out on vaccination protection. Yet, they are still at the optimal age to receive the maximum benefit from the HPV vaccine (Pratiwi, 2023). Therefore, Indonesia must calculate the cost of HPV vaccination subsidies for women aged 15–26 who are not yet sexually active and have not received access to free vaccination at school.

This scheme could be developed through integration with the National Health Insurance as a preventive service, not just curative; cross-ministerial partnerships between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Social Affairs to reach out to non-school youth groups; as well as regional cooperation with the private sector. For example, through corporate social responsibility, collaboration in providing discounts or vaccination vouchers, and insurance services in the field of women's reproductive health.

In addition, Indonesia can learn from other countries. Australia, for example, has succeeded in significantly reducing the incidence of cervical cancer through mass vaccination for men and women by optimizing the digital vaccination registry and national reminder system. Malaysia has integrated HPV vaccine education into the school curriculum and involved teachers and health workers as key promotion agents. A similar approach could be adapted in Indonesia by strengthening cross-sector collaboration and involving religious leaders and influencers in public campaigns.

Acceleration efforts can also be made through studies on the effectiveness of a single-dose HPV vaccine. WHO has recommended this approach as a cost-effective and logistical alternative in middle-income countries. In addition to increasing affordability, this approach has the potential to expand vaccination coverage in remote areas. The expansion of HPV vaccination

The expansion of HPV vaccination for adolescents should not only focus on school-based vaccination coverage but also consider aspects of financial assistance for those outside the free vaccination program scheme, as well as the expansion of education and outreach to adolescents outside the formal education system

has marked a major step in this effort, but its success depends on the country's ability to ensure that every young woman and man, regardless of social status, geographic location, or educational level, can receive equal protection against HPV infection.

Recommendations

In order to accelerate the elimination of cervical cancer in Indonesia through prevention from adolescence, the following steps need to be taken:

a. BPJS Kesehatan, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Health need to involve academics and civil society in analyzing budget allocation opportunities for HPV vaccine subsidies to increase vaccination coverage among groups not yet receiving free vaccination, particularly among priority groups such as adolescents with low socioeconomic status and high HPV exposure. Civil society should collaborate to advocate for HPV vaccine financing and conduct public awareness campaigns on the importance of early cancer prevention.

b. The Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Health need to coordinate with the regional Education and Health Offices to expand the reach of HPV vaccination in non-formal schools, Islamic boarding schools, and equivalent educational institutions.

c. The Ministry of Health needs to collaborate with WHO and UNICEF Indonesia to continue research on the effectiveness of a single dose of HPV vaccine in preventing cervical cancer in Indonesia to reduce costs and expand distribution in areas with limited resources.

d. The Ministry of Health must collaborate with the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Digital Communications, and the private sector to expand campaigns and education on the benefits of the HPV vaccine in cancer prevention for both women and men. This education should also involve influential figures and private companies through shopping vouchers or health check collaborations, such as partnerships with cosmetic companies or telemedicine providers, and involve religious leaders' associations to incorporate religious and cultural-based education. Integrating the HPV vaccine into primary, secondary, and tertiary education curricula is also essential to ensure early access to information on cervical cancer prevention.

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