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Main Report

The Russian-Ukrainian War in 2025: its Impact, Indonesia's Position, and Policy Recommendations

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- Bhayangkara Anniversary and the Future of Human Rights Approach in Polri
- The Constitutional Court Decision on the Separation of General Elections and Regional Elections and its Impact on Inclusive Electoral Processes

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- Rereading Political Legitimacy and the Discourse on Gibran's Impeachment

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- End the Silence: It's Time to Integrate Reproductive Health into Indonesia's Education System
- A Planetary Health Approach to Advancing Menstrual Hygiene Management for Women Affected by the Climate Crisis

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FOREWORD

The July 2025 edition of the Indonesian Update presents an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of global politics, economics, social issues, and legal developments that influence the direction of national policy.

This month's main report examines the Russia-Ukraine war in 2025, its impacts on both countries and Indonesia, Indonesia's position in the conflict, and policy recommendations for the administration of President Prabowo Subianto. This article analyzes the losses by Russia and Ukraine as of 2025, the impact of the war on the Indonesian economy, and the potential implications for Indonesia's strategic position.

In the political realm, we examine the impeachment discourse surrounding Gibran Rakabuming. This analysis addresses not only the legal and constitutional aspects but also maps the dynamics of power, political loyalties, and public perception of ethics in government.

In the social section, we address two main issues. The first article highlights the importance of proper menstrual hygiene management for women, as part of the right to health and a dignified life. The second article explores the urgency of comprehensive reproductive and sexual health education for adolescents, particularly in the context of the rising incidence of child marriage in Indonesia.

From a legal perspective, we present a reflection on the commemoration of Bhayangkara Day by examining the extent to which a human rights approach has become the foundation for police institutional reform. We also examine the Constitutional Court's ruling on the separation of general elections and regional elections, and its potential impact on citizen participation and political inclusion.

Through this edition, the Indonesian Update continues to strive to be a space for critical reflection and a bridge for cross-sector understanding. We encourage readers to not only follow issues but also understand their context and consequences for national and state life.

Happy reading.

Main Report

The Russian-Ukrainian War in 2025: its Impact, Indonesia's Position, and Policy Recommendations

-Putu Rusta Adijaya-



There are several definitions to describe geopolitical risks; for example, spglobal.com (accessed July 14, 2025) defines geopolitical risks as 'the risks arising out of interactions between countries … [which] include trade relationships, security partnerships, alliances, multinational climate initiatives, supply chains and territorial disputes.' Caldara and Iacoviello (2022) argues that geopolitical risks as 'the threat, realization, and escalation of adverse events associated with wars, terrorism, and any tensions among states and political actors that affect the peaceful course of international relations.'

Moreover, geopolitical risk also refers to 'the potential adverse effects of political, economic, and social events on the stability and prosperity of a region' (Balli, Uddin, and Shahzad, 2019 in Adel, 2024). This article applies the definition of geopolitical risk by Caldara and Iacoviello (2022). Therefore, it could be said that geopolitical risks are types of risks that threaten relations between countries, such as economic, social, and political relations, for peaceful coexistence.

This article shall discuss the geopolitical risks of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which is in its third year, its impact on Indonesia and both countries, Indonesia's current position, as well as policy recommendations for the administration of President Prabowo Subianto.

The 2025 Russo-Ukrainian War, Its Impact, and Indonesia's Position

According to the definition of geopolitical risk by Caldara and Iacoviello (2022), war is one form of event that escalates geopolitical risk. For example, Russia's invasion of Ukraine since 2022, which as of this writing (15 July 2025), has entered its 1,237th day. According to aljazeera.com (15 July 2025), United States (US) President Donald Trump gave Russia an ultimatum to immediately sign a peace agreement with Ukraine within 50 days. If it fails, Uncle Sam will impose sanctions in very high tariffs, including 100 percent for secondary tariffs (aljazeera.com, 15 July 2025).

In addition to sanctions in tariffs increase, which in fact are other forms of sanctions by Western countries, President Trump said he would provide military equipment worth 'billions of dollars' in an agreement that would be paid for by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (aljazeera.com, 15 July 2025).

The casualties in this war have been enormous. The British Ministry of Defense as stated in theguardian.com (22 June 2025) explained that more than one million Russian troops had been killed or injured since the large-scale invasion three years ago. Although the exact death toll was difficult to quantify, Mediazona, an independent media outlet in Russia, identified more than 111 thousand fallen Russian military personnel using official records, news on social media, and images of tombstones (theguardian.com, 22 June 2025).

With a simple calculation, if the average cost of a funeral in Russia is 40-60 thousand rubles according to en.ritual.ru (access 15 July 2025), where The Guardian (22 June 2025) stated that funeral services in Russia earned more than 40 billion rubles during the period January-April 2025, then the number of victims who have been buried in that period is 666,667 to one million victims. It could be assumed that more of the war victims buried were soldiers and civilians.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in kyivindependent.com (12 June 2025) that more than 46 thousand Ukrainian soldiers had been killed since the 2022 invasion, and 390 thousand cases had been injured on the battlefield. According to United Nations (UN) statistics on the same site, as many as 13,134 Ukrainian civilians have been killed and more than 31,867 Ukrainians have been injured since the invasion, with more casualties due to aerial bombs and long-range weapons.

What impact did the Russia-Ukraine war have on the two countries and on Indonesia? First, for Russia. As of January 19 2025, there have been more than 21 thousand sanctions imposed on Russia since the invasion, of which the US imposed the most sanctions (6,433) followed by Canada (3,185), Switzerland (3,010), the European Union (2,234), France (2,175), the United Kingdom (1,918), Australia (1,378), and Japan (1,359) (castellum.ai, access 15 July 2025).

For Russia and Ukraine as countries at war, the losses could be said to be gigantic, although there were differences in estimates by various institutions. For example, according to russiamatters.org (24 February 2025), sanctions by Western countries have had an impact on Russia in several ways, such as 1) the freezing of Russian Central Bank deposits amounting to US$340 billion; 2) Russia's financial sector lost billions of US dollars; 3) loss of revenue from the energy sector of US$78.5 billion from the period December 2022-June 2024 compared to the scenario without export sanctions; 4) gasoline and diesel production facilities not operating, and 5) hundreds of companies moving their operations from Russia.

For Ukraine, the World Bank in the report "Ukraine: Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4)" (2025) from February 2022 to December 2024, explained that the total direct loss to buildings and infrastructure was US$176 billion, of which the most affected sector was housing (around US$57 billion), followed by the transportation sector (around US$37 billion), the energy and extractive sector (more than US$20 billion), the trade and industrial sectors (more than of US$17 billion), the education and science sector (over US$13 billion), and the agricultural sector (over US$11 billion). If we look at overall economic, social and other losses, the total losses experienced by Ukraine were US$589 billion, mainly in the trade and industrial sectors, followed by agriculture, energy and extractives, transportation, and explosive hazards management (World Bank, 2025).

The war between Russia and Ukraine, which has entered its third year in 2025, had an impact on Indonesia. For example, Adijaya (December 2023) in The Indonesian Institute's Indonesian Update study entitled "Analysis of the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Wars on the Indonesian Economy and Mitigation Efforts", revealed that the wheat supply chain would be disrupted if the war continued, which could lead to an increase in wheat prices felt by consumers and producers. Indonesia is still importing wheat because wheat is one of the staple foods currently. Professor at the

Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB), Dwi Andreas Santosa, in TEMPO (23 November 2024), said that Indonesia's wheat consumption had reached 28 percent, which was an increase of 24 percentage points compared to 1970's which was only 4 percent.

Moreover, the performance of Indonesia's exports to Russia, such as non-oil and gas exports, was also affected by this war. Table 1 below shows the value of Indonesia's non-oil and gas exports to Russia in the 2022-2025 period.

Table 1. Value of Indonesian Non-Oil and Gas Exports to Russia in 2022-2025 (thousand US$)

	2022	2023	2024	CAGR '22-'24	2025
January	176,455.5	68,763.6	64,149.0	-39.7%	188,854.3
February	151,526.8	70,543.6	78,919.5	-27.8%	136,108.7
March	66,987.6	120,009.0	80,469.4	9.6%	194,564.5
April	120,128.3	58,065.2	98,143.8	-9.6%	164,744.8
May	56,259.3	64,527.7	95,320.6	30.2%	-
June	140,875.8	68,955.5	94,016.7	-18.3%	-
July	95,436.9	65,741.0	121,025.7	12.6%	-
August	143,716.0	86,056.1	103,114.9	-15.3%	-
September	87,618.5	53,518.2	147,755.9	29.9%	-
October	100,539.3	95,618.7	138,004.0	17.2%	-
November	118,954.6	75,647.3	132,462.8	5.5%	-
December	123,137.0	85,184.6	161,289.4	14.4%	-
Total	**1,381,635.5**	**912,630.4**	**1,314,671.7**	**-2.5%**	**-**

Source: Central Statistics Agency, access 15 July 2025. Processed by the Author.

As attached in Table 1, the total value of Indonesia's non-oil and gas exports to Russia stagnated in 2023 or one year after the 2022 invasion, reaching only US$912.6 million compared to the previous year which was more than US$1.38 billion. Even though the value was still smaller than in 2022, the value of Indonesia's non-oil and gas exports to Russia bounced back to US$1.31 billion in 2024. If you look at the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) for each month in the 2022-2024 period, it also looks fluctuating with the CAGR in May being the highest at 30.2 percent and the lowest CAGR being -39.7 percent in January. If we look at exports in the period January-April 2025, it can be seen that there has been an increase in the value of non-oil and gas exports from Indonesia to Russia.

Likewise, the conditions of Indonesia's exports to Ukraine also experienced a setback during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Based on databoks.katadata.co.id (20 February 2025), as of December 2023, Indonesia's exports to Ukraine were US$10.9 million or down 70.39 percent compared to exports in 2022 which amounted to US$36.81 million. In fact, on the same site, it also explained that Indonesia's exports to Ukraine in the last 10 years have decreased a lot, with the lowest export figure being US$10.9 million and the highest being US$416.99 million.

As an illustration of other impacts, according to the "Export Foreign Trade Statistics Bulletin by Commodity Group and Country, December 2022" (2023) by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), coffee, which is one of the commodities exported to Ukraine, decreased in value from the January-December 2021 period, which was US$323,610 to US$229,728 in the January-December 2022 period. In addition, BPS data (2024) also shows a significant decline in exports for palm oil from a value of US$18,614,344 in January-November 2022 to US$26,003 in January-November 2023.

In order to reduce the impacts of these geopolitical risks, President Prabowo Subianto also made many foreign visits. As a non-aligned country with a free and active foreign policy, President Prabowo has been vocal about peace in various international forums which were also attended by Russia as one of the countries in conflict. For example, in the plenary session speaker St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) 2025 in St. Petersburg, Russia, as reported by TEMPO (25 June 2025), President Prabowo proposed a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine as implemented on the Korean Peninsula where there is a demilitarized zone. However, the proposal was rejected by the Ukrainian side and accepted by the Russian side.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Even though Indonesia strives for free and active foreign policy, the Indonesian government must also continue to play a flexible and balanced role and not only lean towards one or two member countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa plus (BRICS+) but also embrace other countries through fair political diplomacy. Therefore, in this case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemenlu), must continue to strengthen Indonesia's neutral position with free and active politics in various international forums and organizations; for example, the G20, BRICS, ASEAN, etc., to avoid being trapped in certain geopolitical blocs amidst the current multipolarization.

Even though Indonesia strives for free and active foreign policy, the Indonesian government must also continue to play a flexible and balanced role and not only be biased towards one or two countries. Indonesia needs to continue to strengthen its neutral position by prioritizing its national interests in various international forums and organizations. Apart from that, it is important for Indonesian diplomacy to strengthen Indonesia's foreign political and economic diplomacy position in BRICS+, without neglecting relations with G7 member countries, as well as using existing international platforms to encourage mutual, strategic and sustainable economic cooperation

Apart from that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must also be able to strengthen Indonesia's foreign political and economic diplomacy position in BRICS+ without sacrificing or neglecting relations with G7 member countries. Again, foreign policy communication must be neutral and not take sides or argue that one is better/worse than the other. Indonesia must also ensure that its foreign policy is based on a national interest agenda.

Apart from that, Indonesia must also be able to mobilize all its diplomatic capabilities and resources for the welfare of the Indonesian people, in accordance with Asta Cita and Golden Indonesia 2045. Thus, in the international realm, government across ministries/institutions, such as the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) and other related ministries/institutions must be able to use existing international platforms to encourage strategic and sustainable economic cooperation.

Laws

Bhayangkara Anniversary and the Future of Human Rights Approach in Polri

-Christina Clarissa Intania-



On July 1, 2024, the 79th Anniversary of Bhayangkara or the Indonesian National Police (Polri) was celebrated. In this year, it should be underlined that the National Police has been assigned not only in security matters but also in other matters in the food sector. In this year's Bhayangkara Anniversary, President Prabowo expressed his appreciation regarding the initiative of the National Police in the field of food security and spearheading nutritious meals together with the Indonesian National Army (TNI) (national.kompas.com, 1/7/2025).

At the same time, Polri is in a difficult position to improve its trust and image before the public. According to monitoring from the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), there were 602 incidents of violence committed by members of the National Police from June 2024 to June 2025. Of all the cases, there were 411 shooting incidents, 81 cases of persecution, 72 cases of arbitrary arrest, and 42 cases of forced dispersal. Not only that, there were 38 cases of torture, 24 cases of intimidation, 9 cases of criminalization, 7 cases of sexual violence, and 4 inhumane acts (national.kompas.com, 30/6/2025).

The cases above show that an approach that emphasizes stability through violence and is territorially based is still more common. A number of cases

that require a human rights approach have not been applied thoroughly. It is also not uncommon for some members of the Indonesian National Police to be the actors who carry out repression in some cases even with the motive of law enforcement.

Therefore, this paper shall seek to discuss the regulations and application of the human rights approach in the realm of the National Police. Bhayangkara Anniversary should be used as a momentum for evaluation and improvement to become a better protector of society.

Human Rights in the Police

The human rights approach in Polri is not something new to be echoed. Polri has taken several steps to realize the human rights approach in terms of regulations. Broadly speaking, at the level of the law, it has been regulated in Law Number 2/2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police (Polri Law). The Polri Law stipulates in Article 14 that one of the duties of the National Police is to protect the safety of body and soul, property, the society, and the environment from disturbances to order and/or disasters, including providing assistance and help by upholding human rights. Article 19 Paragraph (1) of the Polri Law also stipulates that in carrying out their duties and authorities, Polri officials need to act based on legal norms and respect religious norms, decency, morality, and human rights.

In its application, the Polri administration in the form of a code of ethics also includes points of implementations based on human rights, which are regulated in Polri Regulation Number 7/2022 concerning the Professional Code of Ethics and the Ethics Code Commission of the Indonesian National Police (Polri Code of Ethics). As the Police Law has set out several points on the promotion of human rights, the Polri Code of Ethics further translates this into obligations and prohibitions for Polri members. These include maintaining security and order, protection, protection, and community service that upholds human rights; refusing superior orders that are contrary to the norms of law, religion, and decency; respecting human dignity based on human rights; upholding the equality of every citizen before the law; and conducting investigations without coercion, intimidation, and/or violence. Polri members in community ethics are also prohibited from finding faults in the community; behaving, saying, and acting arbitrarily; making it difficult for people who need protection, protection, and services; committing acts that can degrade the honor of women, and being discriminatory in serving the community. Furthermore, personally, Polri members must not commit discriminatory and violent acts.

Furthermore, regulations at the Polri Chief level (Perkapolri) also further regulate some specific aspects of human rights-based implementation (Fachrain & Hayati, 2024). Some of these regulations are for example:

a. Perkapolri No. 3/2008 on the Establishment of a Special Service Room and Procedures for the Examination of Witnesses and/or Victims of Crime;

b. Perkapolri No. 10/2007 on the Organization and Working Procedures of the Women and Children Service Unit (PPA Unit) within the National Police;

c. Perkapolri No. 852009 on the Implementations of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Performance of Police Duties;

d. Perkapolri Number 8/2021 concerning Handling Crimes Based on Restorative Justice, and

e. Perkapolri Number 2019 on Criminal Investigation.

Not only that, Polri also has a memorandum of understanding to collaborate in promoting human rights in the implementation of Polri duties with the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM). This cooperation has been in place since 2011 and continues to this day. In the Memorandum of Understanding Number: 03/MoU-KH/IV/2021 NUMBER: NK/9/IV/2021, cooperation is emphasized in the scope of data and/or information exchange; promotion and enforcement of human rights; support for scientific investigations, and other agreed activities.

This cooperation has resulted in training and products such as the Pocket Guide. One of the trainings that has been held between Komnas HAM and the National Police is the Human Rights Training at the North Sulawesi Regional Police (Sulut) in Manado (tribatanews.polri.go.id, 15/7/2025). For pocket books that have been produced; namely, Handbook on Human Rights of the Brimob Police Corps; Handbook on Human Rights of the Detention & Evidence Unit; Handbook on Human Rights of the Sabhara Unit, and Handbook on Human Rights of the Detection Unit.

Challenges to Human Rights Implementation in the National Police

Thus, it can be seen that Polri does not lack a legal basis and specific regulations governing implementation. Education and socialization efforts have also been made. Ideally, the implementations of Polri's duties in the field should be fully understood.

However, there are several challenges faced that affect the implementation of human rights by Polri in the field, namely (Nugraha, Mulyadi, and Rangkuti, 2024: 5024, 5032; Fachrain and Hayati, 2024: 2820-2821):

a. institutional culture that is still militaristic;

b. large workload and limited budget;

c. lack of leadership supervision on the application of human rights by personnel in the field;

d. lack of understanding of human rights among police officers;

e. the application of human rights has not been consistently and thoroughly implemented by members of the National Police, and

f. changing conditions in the field.

The problem highlighted in this paper is primarily a lack of understanding. According to Komnas HAM's activity reports and as mentioned earlier, Komnas HAM has conducted training on human rights implementation with Polri. However, the problem is how this knowledge is evenly distributed to all members of the National Police down to the level of the Sector Police (Polsek) throughout Indonesia.

Members of the Polsek are at the forefront of community service. Therefore, knowledge and skills in applying human rights approach in their duties are the key to optimal service in accordance with human rights. Debriefing cannot be given only to members at high levels. There needs to be further debriefing for Polri members who are directly in charge of the field to understand and apply the human rights approach in carrying out their functions.

The National Police and all its ranks at various levels need to raise awareness in applying a human rights approach in carrying out their main duties and functions, including members of the Polsek who are at the forefront of community service. Therefore, knowledge and skills in applying the human rights approach in their duties are key to optimal service in accordance human rights.

Related to that, the resource factor can be one of the obstacles that education cannot be provided to all members at all levels (Fachrain and Hayati, 2024: 2820-2821). Conducting education requires teaching staff, distribution of materials, and mobilization of participants to attend education. Not only that, a monitoring program is needed to ensure that the practice of the Polri has implemented the human rights points taught during education. Evaluation also needs to be held to ensure how the implementation of human rights has been carried out so far. All of these activities require significant commitment and resources that need to be prioritized.

Recommendations

In order to successfully implement human rights in the National Police to celebrate Bhayangkara Anniversary this year, here are some recommendations:

a. The police need to prioritize education at the Polsek level related to the applications of human rights in carrying out their duties;

b. Not only Komnas HAM, higher education institutions and civil society organizations, as well as Polri's collaboration with other related parties should also be encouraged to contribute in sharing their knowledge about human rights;

c. Polri needs to demonstrate its commitment to the implementation of human rights by following up on reports of its members who commit human rights violations against citizens or fellow members, and

d. The general public needs to increase their awareness, knowledge and courage to report Polri practices that are not in accordance with human rights values and principles to the Police Professional and Security Division through available complaint channels, as well as other public complaint channels. For example, through the Ombudsman, the Public Aspiration Board of the House of Representatives, reader letters in the media, and even through content on social media by taking into account the applicable provisions and policies of the relevant social media platform.

Laws

The Constitutional Court Decision on the Separation of General Elections and Regional Elections and its Impact on Inclusive Electoral Processes

-Christina Clarissa Intania-



On June 26, 2025, the Constitutional Court (MK) issued Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 (MK Decision, which rules that the general elections for president, vice president, members of the House of Representatives (DPR), Regional Representatives Council (DPD), and Regional Representatives Council (DPRD), as well as regional head elections (pilkada) should be held separately in different years. In accordance with this Decision, elections and local elections will be held with a minimum gap of two years and a maximum of two years and six months between each other.

In order to follow up on the Constitutional Court Decision, the House of Representatives (DPR) addressed this as a constitutional dilemma as expressed by Member of Commission III of the DPR, Martin Daniel Tumbelaka, on behalf of public anxiety (5/7). Therefore, the House invited a number of experts and former constitutional judges to further discuss the constitutional implications of the Constitutional Court Decision (jdih.dpr.go.id, 5/7/2025).

On the other hand, inclusive elections and local elections have been a target of election organizers and civil society that has yet to be fully achieved throughout Indonesia. In connection with this Constitutional Court Decision, the organization of elections and local elections has changed.

Therefore, it is interesting to further examine whether or not there is an impact of this model on efforts for more inclusive elections, especially for people with disabilities and indigenous peoples.

For this reason, this paper shall explain the important things that have been evaluated in the implementations of previous elections and local elections, as well as the need to realize inclusive elections and local elections. From these points, this paper shall analyzes their relationship with the latest election and local election models based on the Constitutional Court Decision.

Organizing Inclusive Elections and Local Elections

The election and local election organizers, consisting of the General Election Commission (KPU), the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu), and the Election Organizer Honorary Council (DKPP) in collaboration with relevant ministries/agencies and civil society organizations, have consistently strived for elections and local elections that are inclusive for all groups. In the 2024 General and Regional Elections, there are several efforts made to better accommodate the political rights of persons with disabilities and indigenous peoples as voters. For example, with the Disability Friendly Movement held by the KPU at the regional level (kpu.go.id, 4/20/2023) with information dissemination, simulation, and provision of assistive devices for voters with disabilities. In addition, the noken system is also implemented for voters in Papua to facilitate elections in accordance with the wisdom that the local community has known (aman.or.id, 12/2/20/2024).

However, there are several points of evaluation submitted regarding the organization of elections and regional elections. Some of them are: difficult access to polling stations; unregistered voters; unfulfilled population documents that are required to become voters; disability aids that have not been evenly provided for voters with disabilities who need them; Voting Organizing Groups that are not all well trained and understand the rights and ways to accommodate vulnerable groups during elections and regional elections, and lack of education of marginalized voters due to lack of access to government services (Intania, 2024; Rahmawati, 2024; kompas.id, 1/11/2023).

Referring to the standards described by the National Democratic Institute (2013), to be able to hold inclusive elections and local elections, there are several important things that must be met; namely, reasonable conditions for being able to vote; a non-discriminatory electoral system; the opportunity

to improve data on the geographical, literacy, and physical ease of getting to the polling station; reasonable and justifiable requirements to run for office; a reasonable and non-discriminatory registration period for candidacy; the ability to exercise the rights of association, assembly, movement, and expression; and freedom to campaign without violence, intimidation, coercion, or extortion.

It can be seen that there are several components of the inclusive election and local election standards that Indonesia is still tasked with fulfilling. Along with the changes to the electoral and local election systems decided by the Constitutional Court, it is necessary to further examine what impact these changes have on the fulfillment of inclusion.

The Constitutional Court Decision and its Impact on Inclusion

In this Constitutional Court Decision, the petitioners from the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem) focused on the impact on the quality of people's sovereignty, the fulfillment of election principles, the workload of organizing elections, and the ease of voters in casting their votes. Some of the petitioners' arguments include explaining that political parties do not have time to conduct optimal political recruitment and regeneration to nominate legislative members at three levels at once. Then during the election, political parties will also lose to capital owners, famous figures, and have a lot of material. The petitioners considered a 2-year gap between elections and local elections in order to address the issue of political party regeneration (Constitutional Court Decision 135/PUU-XXII/2024). Next, the petitioners also explained that the five-box elections created confusion for voters which led to a high percentage of invalid votes.

The Constitutional Court in its deliberations agreed that simultaneous elections and regional elections create a buildup of organizers' workload that has an impact on the quality of elections and regional elections. Regarding the issue of regeneration that has limited time, the Court also agreed with this. The Court also added that there was saturation among voters with a busy election and regional election agenda due to divided focus.

In relation to inclusive elections and local elections, the Constitutional Court Decision would have an impact on inclusive elections and local elections, both for voters and candidates, especially from vulnerable and marginalized groups. *First*, according to the evaluation of elections and local elections, counseling and education is still lacking among both voters and candidates

The Constitutional Court's ruling on the separation of elections and local elections would have a significant and beneficial impact on the education aspect of achieving inclusive elections and local elections. Careful and early preparation is needed by the DPR, election and local election organizers and participants, political parties, and voters to follow up on the decision as best as possible.

from vulnerable and marginalized groups. With the separation of elections and local elections, political parties are expected to be able to recruit and cadre candidates from vulnerable and marginalized groups better. Representation from these groups is highly anticipated and their regeneration requires time and energy that may be different from other cadres. With this decision, political parties should be encouraged to conduct political education with more quality and inclusion-oriented.

Second, this decision also provides an opportunity to conduct voter education more optimally, both education for voters from vulnerable and marginalized groups, as well as for general voters regarding the importance of group representation and issues of marginalization and inclusion. This allows election and local election organizers, civil society, and academics to work more freely to educate the surrounding community.

Therefore, the Constitutional Court Decision would have a significant and favorable impact on the education aspect of achieving inclusive elections and local elections. The quality of elections and local elections woul be much improved if we have well-educated voters and candidates, especially in this case related to inclusion. Thus, substantive democratic practices could truly represent vulnerable and marginalized groups.

Recommendations

Referring to the analysis above, this paper recommends:

a. The DPR must comply with the Constitutional Court's decision by amending the current Election Law to separate elections and local elections;

b. The House of Representatives together with the KPU must reform the electoral and local election mechanisms to accommodate maximum political education, both for voters and candidates, from vulnerable and marginalized groups, and

c. Civil society organizations, academics, and the public in general need to participate in voicing reforms to realize more inclusive elections and local elections by demanding a system that provides space for political education for voters and candidates who are more inclusive.

Politics

Rereading Political Legitimacy and the Discourse on Gibran's Impeachment

-Felia Primaresti-



The presidential ticket of Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka has been the subject of much criticism since the 2024 general election campaign. One issue that sparked controversy was Constitutional Court (MK) Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 concerning the age limit for vice presidential candidates. Critics argued that the ruling was seen as an attempt to facilitate the candidacy of Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who previously did not meet the age requirement under applicable regulations.

Despite the negative publicity, the nomination process continued, and the pair have successfully held office for approximately eight months to date. This phenomenon has raised several questions regarding the legitimacy of the current government, including discussions about the possibility of impeachment *or* dismissal of the relevant officials. Although such a procedure is considered unlikely to be implemented in the current political context, this paper shall analyzes the dynamics behind this discourse and its potential implications for Indonesia's political stability.

Thus, this paper shall aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the complexity of the issues of legitimacy and political stability after the 2024 elections .

The Dynamics and Political Legitimacy Behind the Impeachment Issue

Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka won the 2024 election and have served eight months in office, despite significant political controversy surrounding their nomination process. The Constitutional Court's ruling on the age limit for vice-presidential candidates became a critical point, fueling skepticism about the integrity of the electoral process and strengthening the narrative of dissatisfaction among the opposition and civil society. In the context of Indonesian politics, this phenomenon is interesting to examine from the perspective of power dynamics, public policy responses, and future government stability.

Although Prabowo-Gibran successfully won the election and formed a government, the issue of legitimacy remains a challenge. Criticism of Gibran's nomination process not only influenced public perception but also triggered fragmentation among many interest groups. On the one hand, civil society continues to pressure and urge the government to account for the political process, which is considered flawed in legitimacy. This pressure is reflected in the increasing number of demonstrations that emerged even before the official inauguration, with demands that are no longer symbolic, but substantive, pushing for legal and moral accountability of public officials . For example, through the hashtags #EmergencyWarning, #DarkIndonesia, and #BlurAjaDulu.

In an episode of Pandji Pragiwaksono's Skakmat podcast with Feri Amsari (aired on YouTube on June 9 , 2025), Feri Amsari, a constitutional law expert from Andalas University, emphasized that the idea of immediately dismissing Gibran from his position could be said to be way too far . *However* , he also said that what civil society is fighting for is proof that a serious violation of the law has occurred, which could ultimately provide a constitutional basis for dismissing one or both of them.

Referring to Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution, there are five categories of violations that can be grounds for dismissal of the president and/or vice president: corruption, bribery, other serious crimes, treason, and moral turpitude. In Gibran's context, the debate has largely centered on the term "moral turpitude," a term that tends to be abstract and open to interpretation. However, it is precisely for this reason that civil society is pushing for an expanded legal and ethical discussion surrounding Gibran's candidacy, including potential nepotism, violations of the principle of justice, and the use of power to perpetuate political dynasties.

This issue touches on a fundamental issue in democracy: is legality alone sufficient to underpin the legitimacy of a government? The Prabowo-Gibran administration may be legally legitimate due to its victory in the official contest, but its legitimacy remains questionable when the process is deemed ethically and morally flawed. The tension between these two poles—legality versus legitimacy—and the rising issue of impeaching Gibran indirectly illustrate an unresolved crisis of public trust that needs to be addressed immediately.

Furthermore, civil society's move not to immediately demand Gibran's dismissal, but rather to test the legal validity of his candidacy, reflects a strategic approach oriented toward strengthening constitutional democracy. This step is also part of the learning process in democracy, which is not merely political resistance but also an effort to assert ethical and legal boundaries in the exercise of power.

This was further exacerbated by the emergence of the "Fufufafa" phenomenon, the name of an account on the online forum Kaskus that became controversial due to alleged negative and racist comments about various public figures, including Prabowo Subianto and his family, as well as Indonesian celebrities (Bisnis.com/10/9/2024). This account was also linked to Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, who at the time served as Mayor of Solo. Although Gibran denied ownership of the account, the issue became a polemic in the political world and on social media.

The "Fufufafa" phenomenon illustrates how current political dynamics unfold not only in formal arenas like elections and parliament, but also in digital spaces rife with speculation and conflicting discourse. The accusations against Gibran, while never legally proven, continue to reinforce the narrative of public doubt about his integrity and political maturity. In the context of legitimacy, this issue deepens negative perceptions of Gibran as a figure deemed ethically and morally unprepared to hold a strategic position in government.

Furthermore, the emergence of this case reveals the vulnerability of political actors to "digital footprints" and the importance of personal accountability in an era of open information. Furthermore, Gibran's defensive response, lacking in-depth clarification, only reinforced suspicions among a public already critical of his candidacy. For civil society groups that initially rejected Gibran's candidacy, the "Fufufafa" phenomenon served as a kind of additional moral justification that legitimacy is not just a matter of rules, but also of character.

Risks and Impact of Impeachment

The issue of Gibran's controversial candidacy should not stop with formal legal justification through a Constitutional Court ruling. When civil society highlights abuses of power, from sudden regulatory changes, state apparatus intervention, the involvement of State Civil Apparatus (ASN) , to mobilization through village funds, this is not merely a matter of ethics, but of the integrity of democracy itself.

If this is not addressed and openly acknowledged as a violation of democratic principles, similar practices are highly likely to recur, particularly at the local level, using state apparatus such as security forces, civil servants, and even village funds to secure elite political interests. This is not merely a procedural violation, but a clear abuse of power that undermines public trust in elections as an instrument of sovereignty.

Therefore , it is crucial for the House of Representatives (DPR) not to remain silent. This phenomenon should be a serious concern in parliament and discussed openly through the right of inquiry mechanism. This is not merely to bring down the president, but to create a constitutionally sound platform for clarification and proof. If Gibran is truly innocent of the various accusations and speculation, including alleged government intervention, abuse of power , and even the "Fufufafa" issue, then the inquiry forum is the most valid platform to prove it.

On the other hand, if left unchecked, the public will continue to question: is this a political precedent that will be normalized going forward? Democracy cannot be run on the principle of "just winning," regardless of the methods and tools used. Legitimacy is built not only on results, but also on a fair, open, and accountable process.

Nevertheless, still citing Feri Amsari's statement in the Skakmat Podcast (July 9, 2025), the forum for proving alleged violations in the presidential and vice presidential nomination process should ideally be conducted first through the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court is the first gateway to assess whether there are legal flaws in the nomination that have implications for delegitimizing the election results. If in this forum it can be proven that the nomination process is unconstitutional and violates public moral and ethical principles, then the next constitutional mechanism is to hand over the authority to the House of Representatives (DPR) to propose dismissal through the right to express opinions and impeachment .

However, politically, this path is very difficult. The composition of the House of Representatives (DPR) resulting from the 2024 elections shows the dominance of the governing coalition parties. Practically only the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), with 110 seats, or approximately 19% (CNN Indonesia, August 26, 2024), remains outside the government and has the potential to play a formal opposition role. This figure is far from sufficient to effectively encourage the use of the right of inquiry, let alone lead to a request for the impeachment of the president/vice president, which constitutionally requires the support of two-thirds of the members of the DPR and the MPR. Such a composition It has been proven that *the checks and balances* mechanism has been placed in a weak position because the political dynamics are directed towards a harmonious rhythm and support for the government in power, compared to the role of the DPR which should play a critical role as a representative of the people, including in overseeing the running of the government.

The discourse on Gibran Rakabuming Raka's impeachment, while politically difficult to realize, emerged in response to a legitimacy crisis that has remained unresolved since his candidacy. Government legitimacy is determined not only by legally valid election results, but also by the integrity of the process and public perception of the morality of power. When ethical violations and alleged abuses of power are not addressed transparently, public trust in democratic institutions is eroded.

Therefore, accountability measures through legal and political forums, including the Constitutional Court and the House of Representatives, remain crucial to verify whether violations that violate democratic principles have occurred. Failure to do so could set a precedent that could jeopardize future democratic governance.

Recommendations

Referring to the analysis above, here are some recommendations that can be conveyed:

a. The Constitutional Court needs to immediately open up space for substantive and not merely procedural constitutional lawsuits, by prioritizing transparency in re-examining the legality and ethics of the previous presidential and vice-presidential nomination process, including its impact on the principle of electoral justice.

The issue of Gibran's candidacy cannot be separated from the debate over the legitimacy of the current government. The process, deemed ethically and legally flawed, has sparked a crisis of public trust and activism . Therefore , concrete steps are needed to ensure that the accountability of those in power remains intact .

b. The House of Representatives , through members of parliament from various factions who still maintain integrity, needs to encourage the use of the right of inquiry as an official forum for public clarification regarding allegations of intervention by officials, misuse of public funds, and controversies involving the figure of the vice president, as well as monitoring the potential for similar violations at the local level.

c. Civil society and independent media need to continue public pressure and oversight through research, advocacy campaigns, and investigative reporting . This is crucial to ensure that this issue does not become submerged in the normalization of power, and to build public awareness and a collective movement that democracy requires fair processes, not just winning outcomes.

Social

End the Silence: It's Time to Integrate Reproductive Health into Indonesia's Education System

-Made Natasya Restu Dewi Pratiwi-



Sumber Foto: freepik.com

Despite numerous efforts in recent years, Indonesia continues to face alarming challenges in adolescent reproductive health, driven primarily by cultural taboos and systemic gaps in access to accurate information and services. These barriers have led Indonesia to remain among the top six Southeast Asian countries with the highest rates of teenage pregnancy: Laos (73.2 births per 1,000 women), the Philippines (48.2), Cambodia (45.5), Vietnam (34.6), Indonesia (33.9), and Timor-Leste (33.8) (UN DESA, 2022).

This crisis is even more severe in rural areas, where adolescent girls face a disproportionate burden of early pregnancy and child marriage. The 2017 Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey (IDHS) reported a staggering 53 births per 1,000 girls aged 15–19 in rural regions, an alarming figure that demands urgent and targeted intervention. However, the absence of updated and disaggregated data continues to hinder evidence-based policymaking, limiting the government's ability to design targeted, effective, and equitable interventions.

At the heart of this issue lies the persistent belief, especially among adolescents from low-income and rural households, that reproductive health knowledge is only relevant after marriage. Many face restricted access to reproductive

health services, contraceptives, and adolescent counseling. Moreover, deep-rooted cultural norms continue to legitimize child marriage, often pressuring young girls to conceive immediately in the name of family honor. One stark example can be found in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB), where the practice of *merariq* (elopement marriage) persists. In 2024, NTB reported the highest rate of child marriage in the country at 14.96%, significantly above the national average of 5.6% (UNICEF, 2024).

To address this multidimensional crisis, Indonesia must take a bold, evidence-based step: mainstream comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) should be incorporated into national education policy. This is not just a matter of curriculum—it is a matter of rights. Every adolescent has the right to life (free from the risks of early pregnancy), to liberty and security (protection from forced marriage), to autonomy (the freedom to choose when to become pregnant), and to information (access to reliable reproductive health knowledge). These rights are universal, inalienable, and must be protected without discrimination.

Breaking the Taboo, Protecting Adolescent Rights

Indonesia has introduced numerous regulatory measures to strengthen reproductive health education, most notably through the recent issuance of Minister of Health Regulation No. 2/2025, which outlines the implementation framework for national reproductive health efforts. This regulation represents a progressive attempt to involve teachers, healthcare workers, families, youth counselors, and peer educators in delivering reproductive health education.

While laudable, this policy falls short of what is needed. First, the regulation fails to mandate reproductive health education for in-school and out-of-school youth. Second, it lacks alignment with global best practices, particularly the World Health Organization's recommendation to embed Comprehensive Sexuality Education (CSE) into the national school curriculum (WHO, 2023).

CSE—when properly implemented—is not about encouraging early sexual activity. It is about empowering adolescents with age-appropriate, gender-sensitive, rights-based, and scientifically accurate knowledge. It is about giving young people the tools to make informed, responsible decisions about their bodies and their futures. Currently, Indonesian adolescents who are not married are excluded from education on contraceptives, despite WHO and

UNESCO guidelines advocating early awareness (ages 12–18) to prevent unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections (UNESCO, 2018).

Moreover, the regulation lacks clarity on monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, leaving gaps in accountability and increasing the risk that youth-focused services—whether in schools, health clinics, or community settings—become box-ticking exercises rather than meaningful interventions.

The absence of CSE in Indonesia's formal and informal education systems is not merely a policy gap—it is a failure to protect young people from preventable harm. The lack of structured, inclusive, and non-stigmatizing education increases adolescent vulnerability to coercion, unsafe sexual practices, and sexual violence.

In environments where even parents and teachers deem reproductive health taboo, adolescents are left isolated and uninformed. Studies have shown that many sexually active adolescents in Indonesia do not use contraceptives, not due to recklessness, but due to lack of access, misinformation, and fear of stigma (Habito et al., 2023). Without supportive and educated adults, adolescents face judgment when seeking help, which only reinforces silence and shame.

Thus, reproductive health education must extend beyond adolescents to include their parents, educators, healthcare providers, and community leaders. These key stakeholders must be trained not only in the science of reproductive health but also in how to provide guidance that is empathetic, respectful, and free from judgment and discrimination.

A truly protective ecosystem—one that respects adolescent agency—must also ensure access for out-of-school youth, young mothers, and other vulnerable groups. This includes youth living with disabilities, those from religious and gender minorities, and those in rural or underserved communities. Without robust and mandatory reproductive health education, policy reform is rendered meaningless in the face of cultural resistance and societal ignorance.

Comprehensive reproductive health knowledge exists not to corrupt our youth but to protect them. It is this shift in mindset that must be championed by policymakers, by educators, by communities. It is time for the government to protect adolescent sexual and reproductive rights through the bold integration of CSE into both formal and non-formal education pathways.

Policy Recommendations

To close the information gap and uphold the reproductive rights of adolescents, we offer the following recommendations:

a. **Integrate CSE into the National Curriculum**
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology—alongside the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the National Curriculum and Assessment Agency, and civil society actors—must work collaboratively to integrate Comprehensive Sexuality Education (CSE) into the national curriculum as a mandatory, age-appropriate, and culturally responsive component of formal and non-formal education. This curriculum should be age-specific, gender-responsive, culturally sensitive, and adaptable to local contexts.

b. **Build Capacity Among Key Influencers**
Cross-sectoral training for teachers, health workers, parents, and youth counselors is essential. The Ministries of Health, Population and Family Planning, and Women's Empowerment and Child Protection should collaborate to ensure a trauma-informed, non-stigmatizing approach that guarantees privacy and accessibility for adolescents seeking support.

c. **Harmonize Regulations Across Ministries**
The Ministry of Health should align Ministerial Regulation No. 2/2025 with existing laws and policies to avoid overlaps, ensure clarity of institutional roles, and provide a clear legal mandate for local governments to implement adolescent reproductive health education.

d. **Prioritize Vulnerable Youth**
Government and civil society must ensure that young people who are out of school or at risk of marginalization—such as adolescent mothers, youth with disabilities, or those in minority communities—are not excluded from CSE. Community-based education models must be funded, supported, and institutionalized.

Social

A Planetary Health Approach to Advancing Menstrual Hygiene Management for Women Affected by the Climate Crisis

-Made Natasya Restu Dewi Pratiwi-



Sumber Foto: andme.in

The climate crisis has increasingly threatened women's ability to manage their menstrual hygiene safely and with dignity. In Indonesia, for example, women living in the northern coastal areas of Demak Regency report difficulties accessing menstrual products due to tidal flooding caused by rising sea levels. The worsening decline in household incomes amplifies existing vulnerabilities, exacerbated by submerged farmland, disrupted aquaculture, and the ongoing lack of access to menstrual products, clean water, and adequate sanitation (Jurnal Perempuan, August 2024).

These realities reflect the broader consequences of climate change for coastal communities (World Bank, 2021). Rising sea levels not only cause economic disruption and displacement but also lead to long-term contamination of freshwater sources. This disproportionately affects women's health and dignity by making menstrual hygiene management (MHM) more difficult during an already vulnerable time.

While the Indonesian government has launched the Safe Sanitation Roadmap 2030 to accelerate the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 6 (clean water and sanitation), the roadmap still lacks explicit, actionable strategies to ensure adequate menstrual hygiene facilities for women, particularly those affected by climate-related disruptions (Bappenas, 2024).

According to UNICEF (2024), safe menstrual hygiene management requires equitable access to clean water and sanitation infrastructure that is gender-responsive, inclusive, and accessible to vulnerable populations, including women impacted by the climate crisis. Alarmingly, 82% of adolescents in Indonesia report that their schools lack disability-friendly toilets to support menstrual needs (UNICEF, 2024).

This highlights the urgent need for policy that specifically addresses menstrual hygiene as a matter of public health, gender justice, and climate resilience. This editorial strongly advocates for the integration of a planetary health approach into menstrual hygiene management (MHM) policies as a strategic imperative to safeguard both women's long-term health and environmental sustainability.

Policy Context and Impacts

A rights-based approach to menstrual hygiene management must ensure access to safe, affordable, and environmentally friendly menstrual products, clean water, proper sanitation facilities, and reliable information. Studies in reproductive health indicate that inadequate menstrual hygiene practices can increase the risk of reproductive tract infections and, in extreme cases, cancer (V. Biju et al., 2022).

Women who are unable to access menstrual pads may resort to using unsafe alternatives such as tissue, rags, or plant leaves, heightening health risks. Poor MHM also contributes to reduced school attendance, lower workplace productivity, and broader gender inequalities (Alugnoa et al., 2022). Environmental degradation is another consequence, as most regions lack proper waste disposal systems for sanitary products.

Despite existing policies on reproductive health and sanitation, Indonesia has yet to adopt an integrated approach that explicitly addresses menstrual hygiene, especially within the critical context of climate resilience and adaptation. For instance, the 2025 Minister of Health Regulation on Reproductive Health Services has not been aligned with the Safe Sanitation Roadmap 2030 or the National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change.

This disconnect limits the ability of public policy to deliver integrated solutions. Strengthening inter-ministerial coordination is imperative to ensuring that menstrual hygiene management is no longer overlooked in national climate adaptation strategies, but instead recognized as a vital

component of resilient public health systems. For example, collaboration with technology companies could facilitate the provision of water filtration solutions in flood-prone areas, improving menstrual hygiene during crises.

Furthermore, menstrual hygiene challenges in climate-vulnerable regions, particularly in coastal and drought-prone areas, must be explicitly integrated into national and regional policy frameworks. Clear policy articulation is essential to guide budget allocations, infrastructure planning, and targeted interventions that guarantee access to menstrual products, clean water, and adequate sanitation facilities.

The Role of a Planetary Health Framework

Menstrual hygiene management is a critical component of both environmental health and climate justice. Climate change exacerbates inequities in access to water and sanitation, thereby obstructing women's ability to manage menstruation safely. Conversely, the widespread uses of disposable menstrual products, many of which are non-biodegradable and chemically hazardous, further harm the environment and sanitation systems.

A planetary health approach is vital in linking MHM with environmental sustainability, climate justice, and women's health. This approach emphasizes the interconnectedness of human and planetary well-being and is particularly relevant in gender and climate change policymaking. Adopting a planetary health perspective in the discourse on menstrual hygiene management (MHM) reveals the far-reaching ecological consequences of disposable menstrual products.

These products not only leach harmful chemicals into the environment and contaminate marine ecosystems but also jeopardize the health and dignity of sanitation workers through unsafe disposal practices, making MHM a critical intersection of environmental sustainability, public health, and social justice. Yet, sustainable alternatives such as reusable cloth pads or tampons remain inaccessible to many women, particularly those living in poverty or climate-affected areas, due to limited availability and lack of information.

To address these challenges, MHM solutions must be inclusive, community-based, gender-responsive, and climate-resilient. Locally produced and environmentally sustainable products, such as banana fiber pads, can serve as alternatives. Additionally, policies should support eco-friendly waste management systems and community education programs to overcome menstrual stigma.

Such solutions not only reduce environmental harm but also empower women socioeconomically. Engaging marginalized communities as change agents in climate adaptation efforts amplifies local resilience and promotes menstrual equity as part of a just climate transition. Investing in climate-resilient MHM is essential to ensuring that no woman loses productivity or dignity due to a lack of basic menstrual support.

Policy Recommendations

To advance climate-resilient menstrual hygiene management, we recommend the following actions:

a. Integrate MHM into National Climate Adaptation Plans
To advance equitable climate resilience and public health, the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas) must revise the National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation and the Safe Sanitation Roadmap 2030 to explicitly integrate menstrual hygiene management (MHM) strategies grounded in the principles of planetary health. This integration is essential to ensure that climate policies are not only environmentally sustainable but also inclusive of gender-specific needs. This process should engage UNICEF, UNFPA, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, the Ministry of Public Works, and civil society coalitions representing marginalized women.

b. Prioritize MHM in Disaster-Prone Areas
To promote gender-responsive and climate-resilient governance, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Bappenas, the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Commission VIII of the House of Representatives, whose mandates include women's empowerment and disaster risk management, should formally recognize menstrual hygiene management (MHM) as a policy priority. This is especially critical for regions vulnerable to flooding and drought, where disruptions to water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure disproportionately affect women and girls. Mapping affected areas based on the number of impacted women is critical for guiding resource allocation and policy implementation.

c. Foster Innovation and Partnerships
The Ministries of Health, Environment, and Women's Empowerment should partner with researchers, youth, civil society, and private

The climate crisis not only threatens to submerge coastlines and small islands but also erodes the fundamental rights of women to manage their menstruation safely, healthily, and with dignity. Thus, advancing climate justice must be aligned with advancing menstrual justice. Menstrual hygiene management must be protected through inclusive, planetary health-based policies that are adaptive to climate realities.

companies to develop climate-friendly toilets, water filtration technologies, and affordable reusable menstrual products that are accessible during emergencies.

d. Promote Community-Based Waste Management

The Ministry of Environment should collaborate with waste management organizations to establish community-level systems for the recycling or safe disposal of sanitary waste. These policy efforts must be complemented by comprehensive educational campaigns that promote safe, informed, and environmentally responsible menstrual waste management practices.

e. Embed MHM in Education Curricula

To cultivate climate-literate and menstruation-friendly generations, the Ministries of Education, Religious Affairs, Population and Family Planning, and Health should collaborate with youth forums, women's organizations, and teacher associations to institutionalize menstrual hygiene education across both formal and non-formal curricula. Such education should be anchored in the principles of gender equity, environmental sustainability, and planetary health, enabling it to address the interconnected challenges of public health, climate resilience, and social inclusion.

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