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Main Report:
The Authority of the Constitutional Court in Decisions 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and 70/PUU-XXII/2024

The Economics

- Bolstering Financial Literacy and Inclusion in the Prabowo-Gibran Administration
- Reducing Poverty and Inequality from the Perspective of Economic Freedom

Politics

- Jakarta's Dynamics and Individual Candidates in the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections
- Rethinking the Multiparty System and The Discourse on the Formation of a New Party in Indonesia
- Looking at the Expert Cabinet Zaken in the Prabowo-Gibran Government

Social

- Reflection on 10 Years of Jokowi's Administration and The Challenges of Implementing The Law on Sexual Violence (TPKS)
- The Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Government Policies in Handling Gender-Based Violence Cases in the 2023 Annual Report

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FOREWORD

The September 2024 edition of the Indonesian Update features a main report on the debate over the authority of the Constitutional Court (MK) in the decision of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 60/PUU-XXII/2024 (MK Decision 60), which regulates the minimum age requirements for Candidates for Governor or Candidates for Deputy Governor, and Constitutional Court Decision Number 70/PUU-XXII/2024 (MK Decision 70), which decides the threshold for nomination in regional head elections. Decisions 60 and 70 are considered to have exceeded the limits of the Constitutional Court's authority in conducting material tests, which should prioritize judicial constraints. However, looking at the state conditions in Indonesia and the aspirations of the people, it is clear that even though the Constitutional Court has carried out judicial activism in these cases, the public considers these decisions to realize justice and answer their concerns.

In the economic field, Update Indonesia discusses the conditions of financial literacy and inclusion in Indonesia, the importance of financial literacy and inclusion, and recommendations for the government of President and Vice President-elect Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka (Prabowo-Gibran) to strengthen literacy and finance in Indonesia. Furthermore, we also discuss poverty and inequality as envisioned in Indonesia Emas 2045, the government of President and Vice President 2024-2029 Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka must also be able to improve the conditions of economic freedom in Indonesia. This is because economic freedom has been empirically proven to reduce poverty.

In the political field, Update Indonesia discusses the Jakarta Pilkada, which is always in the spotlight because of its status as the center of the economy and a barometer of national politics, where victory often has a big impact on the political map of Indonesia. Next, we discuss reflections on the multi-party system and the discourse on the formation of new parties in Indonesia. Still in the political field, Update Indonesia also discusses the emergence of several discourses that have emerged regarding the formation of the Prabowo-Gibran cabinet. One that attracts attention is the formation of the zaken cabinet.

In the social sector, the Indonesian Update discusses the evaluation of the effectiveness of government policies in handling gender-based violence

cases in the 2023 Annual Report. Furthermore, we also discuss the reflection on ten years of the Jokowi Administration and the challenges of implementing the Sexual Violence Crime Law (TPKS). The TPKS Law as a result of the struggle of civil society during the Joko Widodo administration deserves appreciation. The ratification of the TPKS Law also indicates that the enforcement, handling system and enforcement of women's rights as victims are important to be recognized by the state.

The monthly publication of Update Indonesia with current themes is expected to help policy makers in government and business institutions – as well as academics, think tanks, and civil society elements, both domestic and foreign, to obtain current information and contextual analysis of economic, political, social, and legal conditions in Indonesia, as well as an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy reading.

The Authority of the Constitutional Court in Decisions 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and 70/PUU-XXII/2024

The Draft Law on Regional Head Elections (RUU Pilkada) has become the biggest controversy in Indonesia in 2024. This controversy has led to large demonstrations in almost all cities in Indonesia under the title "Emergency Alert". These demonstrations were because the House of Representatives (DPR) planned to pass the Regional Elections Bill without heeding the results of Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 (Decision 60), which regulates the minimum age requirement for candidates for governor or deputy governor, and Constitutional Court Decision No. 70/PUU-XXII/2024 (Decision 70), which regulates the nomination threshold (kompaspedia.kompas.id, 28/8/2024). In a meeting of the House of Representatives' Legislation Body held the next day after the Constitutional Court Decision was issued, the House chose not to adopt the provisions decided in the Constitutional Court Decision. The Pilkada Bill was then approved for the Plenary Session the following day.

The coverage of the Legislation Department of DPR meeting that could be accessed by the public and after demonstrations and strong encouragement from the wider community, the DPR finally canceled the Pilkada Bill and continued to follow the Constitutional Court Decision (cnnindonesia.com, 22/8/2024). However, the DPR through the Chair of Commission II, Ahmad Doli Kurnia Tandjung, said that the authority of the Constitutional Court to decide on the Pilkada Law was questionable and needed to be evaluated. This was because the Constitutional Court was working on many matters that were not its authority (national.tempo.co, 1/9/2024). This statement was clarified again that the intended evaluation was in the context of the state administration system for the future. The improvement of the constitutional system in question does not only require revision of laws but can go as far as the amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which is claimed to be widely voiced, one of which will discuss the Constitutional

Court. Not to be weakened, but strengthened, according to Doli Kurnia (cnnindonesia.com, 10/9/2024).

Regarding the debate on the authority of the Constitutional Court, the author shall discuss the authority of the Constitutional Court in deciding material testing. The relationship between the interpretation of state institutions and the court, the nature of the decision, as well as understandings such as judicial activism, open legal policy, and legislative authority shall be touched upon in this paper. All of these constitutional aspects are the basic causes of the conflict that has occurred yesterday.

The Constitutional Court's Authority to Examine Materially

The authority of the Constitutional Court is provided in Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution), which states that the Constitutional Court has the authority to hear cases at the first and final instance, whose decisions are binding, to review laws against the 1945 Constitution. Furthermore, it is also regulated in Article 10 paragraph (1) letter a of Law Number 24/2003 concerning the Constitutional Court as amended by Law Number 7/2020 and in Article 29 paragraph (1) of Law Number 48/2009 concerning Judicial Power.

According to Constitutional Court Regulation Number 2/2021 concerning Procedure in Constitutional Review Cases (Constitutional Review Procedure) it is further regulated regarding the points of testing. It is explained in Article 2 paragraph (4) of the Constitutional Review Procedure that material testing is a test relating to the content material in paragraphs, articles, and/or parts of laws or government regulations in the lieu of law that are considered contrary to the 1945 Constitution. Not only juxtaposed with the constitution, Jimly Asshiddiqie (2005) also said that other parameters were also used such as written documents that were closely related to the Constitution, the living values of the Constitution, and the values that live in the society and the state. The Constitutional Court can provide results to revoke, negate, delete, or cancel laws if they are declared unconstitutional.

The decisions above reflect the Constitutional Court as a negative legislator, which is defined as the cancellation of norms carried out by the legislature to uphold the original intent of the 1945 Constitution

(Esfandiario, Fitria, et al., 2012; Sari & Raharjo, 2022). The role of the Constitutional Court as a negative legislator is a form of judicial restraint or self-limiting efforts made by the Constitutional Court so as not to make policies that are not its authority (Thayer, 1893). This is also in line with the opinion of Hans Kelsen where the court has the competence to revoke individual laws and also states that the court acts as a negative legislator (Kelsen, 1949). The Constitutional Court also cannot revoke laws or provisions that have been declared open by the 1945 Constitution (Sari & Rahardjo, 2022). In addition to these matters, Mahfud MD (2010) also emphasized that the Court's decision should not be ultra petita or decide more than what was requested.

In deciding judicial review cases, judicial activism or conditions where the Constitutional Court makes more effort to decide on executive or legislative actions (Roosevelt, 2022) is sometimes inevitable in constitutional interpretation (Heryansyah & Nugraha, 2019). In its development, the Constitutional Court began to make interpretations of provisions or laws that were tested to fulfill constitutional requirements so that new norms were formed. So that there is a shift from negative to positive legislator (Sari & Raharjo, 2022). Hamdan Zoelva said that the shift in the role of the Constitutional Court to become a positive legislator was due to the urgency to proportionally balance legal certainty, justice, and expediency (Huda, 2011). There are several decisions of the Constitutional Court that are *ultra petita* or more than what is requested which ends in legislative intervention. There are also decisions that regulate or are based on contradictions between one law and another, which should be between the law and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This shift is not mandated by the Constitution. However, in conditions such as urgent situations, the need to bring about a situation of justice and public benefit, and filling a legal vacuum to avoid chaos, the Constitutional Court becomes a positive legislator in giving its decision.

Despan Heryansyah and Harry Setya Nugraha (2019) explain that the Constitutional Court's authority to review laws is often seen as a limitation for the DPR and the government because its discretion can be limited by the Constitutional Court's interpretation. This restriction is a consequence of the Constitutional Court's function as the interpreter and guardian of the constitution. Indonesia, which now adheres to the supremacy of the constitution, uses judicial

review as a constitutional control over legislation. This is to prevent the implementation of laws that are born due to the interests of the political elite and contrary to the values in the constitution (Heryansyah & Nugraha, 2019).

In the implementations of the Constitutional Court's decision, often the legislators do not implement the decision; for example, Decision Number 98/PUU-VII/2009 regarding the prohibition of the announcement of quick count results during the quiet period of the presidential and vice presidential elections (Heryansyah & Nugraha, 2019). According to George Stephan Vanberg (1999) who took the example of Germany, there are three alternatives for the German parliament/bundestag to follow up on the court's decision: obey, avoid, or oppose. In Indonesia, there are still parties who challenge the Court's authority to conduct judicial review. However, it can still be argued that the review function is important to be carried out by the judiciary (Heryansyah & Nugraha, 2019).

Regarding interpretations, the Government and Parliament actually have the authority to provide interpretations in the forms of open legal policy ad discretion. However, so as to the interpretations of the constitution can be recognized by all elements of the state, the judiciary is given the authority to interpret. The two interpretive abilities possessed by the Constitutional Court and the Government as well as the DPR have different characters, where the Constitutional Court interprets to test the validity of norms, while the DPR and the Government implement the regulations.

In essence, the Constitutional Court's interpretive authority is important to maintain checks and balances. Constitutional Court decisions must be implemented as binding decisions (Heryansyah & Nugraha, 2019). The statement related to the usurpation of the authority of the DPR and the Government cannot be justified because the Constitutional Court's decision is not a form of intervention into the area of legislative formation. The DPR and the government as holders of the legislative function may disobey the Constitutional Court's decision, but in several conditions such as the Constitution that in the long run cannot be upheld; the existence of the Constitutional Court that is not useful for fostering the legal and constitutional system; the Constitutional Court's decision that has lost its authority; or the unstoppable laws formed

after the Constitutional Court's decision that potentially contain other constitutional problems (Suroso, 2018: 246).

The Authority and Role of the Constitutional Court in Decisions 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and 70/PUU-XXII/2024

In accordance with Decisions 60 and 70, the Constitutional Court stated that it had the authority to hear cases challenging the Pilkada Law. In case 60, the issue was related to the nomination threshold for regional head candidates in Article 40 paragraph (3) of the Pilkada Law. The Constitutional Court was asked to declare Article 40 paragraph (3) unconstitutional and has no legal force or to declare that it has no legal force as long as it is not interpreted as "In the event that a Political Party or a coalition of Political Parties proposes a candidate pair using the provision of obtaining at least 25% (twenty-five percent) of the accumulated valid votes as referred to in paragraph (1), if the quotient of the accumulated valid votes in the general election of members of the Regional House of Representatives in the area concerned results in a fractional number, it shall be calculated by rounding up".

As for case 70, what is being contested is related to the age requirements for candidates for governor and deputy governor in Article 7 paragraph (2) letter e of the Pilkada Law and the petitum wants the Constitutional Court to issue a decision before the registration of candidates for the 2024 Pilkada on August 27, 2024 and declare that Constitutional Judge Anwar Usman is not allowed to be involved or involve himself in examining and making decisions in this application. Regarding Article 7 paragraph (2) letter e, the petitioner requests that this article be declared unconstitutional and has no legal force as long as it is not interpreted as "at least 30 (thirty) years old for Candidates for Governor and Deputy Governor and 25 (twenty-five) years old for Candidates for Regent and Deputy Regent or Candidates for Mayor and Deputy Mayor as of the determination of the Candidate Pair".

In deciding these cases, the Constitutional Court gave the final verdict for decision 60, which was to grant the petition in part. Article 40 paragraph (1) of the Pilkada Law is declared unconstitutional insofar as it does not interpret several percentage requirements, namely a minimum of 10%, 8.5%, 7.5%, and 6.5% for provinces for

each population from 2 million to 12 million and the same percentage for regencies or cities with a population from 250,000 to 1,000,000 respectively. Meanwhile, Article 40 paragraph (3) was declared unconstitutional and not binding. Meanwhile, in verdict 70, the petition was rejected, but the Constitutional Court underlined the interpretation that the age requirement referred to was at the time of nomination, not when inaugurated, so as not to be anomalous with the provisions of the age requirements for other positions which should be at the time of nomination.

Decision 60 shows that there is an addition to the point decided, namely the addition of the meaning of Article 40 paragraph (1) when only Article 40 paragraph (3) was requested. Meanwhile, decision 70 shows that although the decision was rejected, the Constitutional Court provided an interpretation of the requirements that had an impact on policy. It can be categorized that decision 60 is *ultra petita* and decision 70 provides interpretations that can be categorized as legislative and government policies. So, technically, the Constitutional Court in these two decisions has carried out judicial activism which is inversely proportional to judicial restraint as the authority of the Constitutional Court. However, several conditions need to be considered in this regard.

Recalling the previous discussion, the motives of the Constitutional Court and several conditions under which the Constitutional Court has shifted to become a positive legislator were explained. The reason for the Constitutional Court to shift from negative legislator is to balance legal certainty, justice, and expediency as stated by Hamdan Zoelfa. Considering the situation in Indonesia, there is a phenomenon of neglecting law enforcement and justice in the electoral process as shown by the previous Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 (Decision 90) related to the requirements for presidential and vice presidential candidates in the 2024 General Election (Pemilu 2024). This decision issued by the same institution does not reflect the limitations that the Constitutional Court should have adhered to from the beginning in deciding decisions; namely, that it should not decide on provisions that are open legal policy and provide new provisions. Decision 90 also does not reflect the public interest due to the inaccurate logic underlying the decision. Not only that, there are inconsistencies in decisions for other similar cases, where cases with the same article petitum are rejected, but only the number (Decision 90) is accepted

(Intania, 2024). The decision issued from the Constitutional Court caused a shock to the public who began to voice the emergency of democracy and the constitution (koran.tempo.co, 12/2/2024; bbc.com, 12/10/2023). This response then resulted in an enforcement action to restore the Constitutional Court back to its dignity by dismissing Anwar Usman from his position as Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court.

Not only because of Decision 90, but Indonesia's legal culture has also begun to deteriorate with minimal participation in the formation of laws such as the Electronic Information and Transaction Law, discourses on provisions that limit democracy such as in the Broadcasting Bill and the Indonesian Police Bill (hukumonline.com, 23/11/2023; safenet.or.id, 12/7/2023; cnnindonesia.com, 29/5/2024; kompas.com, 2/6/2024). This has caused the public to experience a decrease in trust in a legal system that is fair and prioritizes the public interest in Indonesia.

In this case, it can be indicated that the Constitutional Court is trying to improve this situation by accepting cases related to the Pilkada threshold and age requirements for candidates for governor and deputy governor. From the conditions above, the Constitutional Court is trying to provide a breath of fresh air and a solution that creates justice and benefits the community as mentioned in the previous chapter. These conditions and efforts can be one of the reasons that justify the need for MK actions that reflect judicial activism. One phenomenon that proves why *ultra petita* decisions need to be carried out by the Constitutional Court to realize a just legal system in society is that when the decisions in question were planned not to be implemented by the DPR, the public was angry and eventually there were large demonstrations at the offices of the DPR, the President, and the General Election Commission. This shows the public's appreciation of Decisions 60 and 70 and objections when the DPR plans not to accommodate these decisions despite these decisions exceeding the limits of the Constitutional Court's authority in judicial review.

Recommendations

Referring to this discussion, it can be concluded that Decisions 60 and 70 have exceeded the limits of the Constitutional Court's authority in conducting judicial review, which should prioritize

judicial constraint. However, given the state of Indonesia and the aspirations of the public, it appears that although the Constitutional Court has engaged in judicial activism in these cases, the public considers these decisions to embody justice and address their concerns. The public also urges the DPR and the Government to accommodate the provisions set out in Decisions 60 and 70.

Decisions 60 and 70 have exceeded the limits of the Court's authority in conducting judicial review, which should prioritize judicial constraints. However, looking at the conditions of the state in Indonesia and the aspirations of the public, it appears that although the Constitutional Court has conducted judicial activism in these cases, the public considers these decisions to embody justice and answer their concerns.

For the future, the author proposes several things, namely:

a. Going forward, the Court needs to better enforce its code of ethics and its judges need to be more disciplined in preventing themselves from being involved in conflicts of interest. This needs to be done to prevent unjust decisions that do not reflect the public interest;
b. The Constitutional Court needs to firmly prioritize judicial restraint to prevent overlapping authority with legislation;
c. The Constitutional Court can produce decisions that create new provisions that reflect judicial activism, but it must be with clear parameters such as emergency conditions, the realization of justice needed, and others that have been explained previously;
d. Further studies need to be conducted regarding the parameters of the Constitutional Court to produce *ultra petita* decisions under certain conditions. Academics, civil society groups, the Constitutional Court, and other relevant parties need to collaborate to study this further; and
e. In the next stage, the parameters that have been obtained through the study results can be set into binding regulatory provisions so that there are clear limits for the Constitutional Court as a negative legislator or positive legislator in certain conditions.

- Christina Clarissa Intania -

Bolstering Financial Literacy and Inclusion in the Prabowo-Gibran Administration

According to Financial Services Authority Regulation Number 3/2023 on Financial Inclusion and Literacy Enhancement in the Financial Services Sector for Consumers and the Public (POJK 3/2023), financial literacy is "knowledge, skills, and beliefs, which influence attitudes and behavior to improve the quality of decisions financial decisions and management to achieve financial prosperity." Meanwhile, financial inclusion is "the availability of access and utilization of products and/or services of Financial Services Business Actors (PUJK) that are affordable, high quality, and sustainable following the needs and abilities of the community to improve the financial welfare of the community." Several studies have also found that financial literacy and inclusion are two examples of significant elements for poverty alleviation and economic development.

For example, Koomson et al. (2023) found that financial literacy could reduce poverty levels in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. In terms of economic development, Van and Linh (2019) found a 1 percent increase in the financial inclusion indicators studied, such as the number of bank branches per 100 thousand adults, the number of ATMs per 100 thousand adults, and domestic credit to the private sector, would increase the average economic development levels in Asia were 0.017 percent, 0.006 percent, and 0.00045 percent, respectively.

Although financial literacy and inclusion have been empirically proven to reduce poverty and improve the economy, it turns out that there are still people who are marginalized from the formal financial system, such as the unbanked and underbanked, especially in developing and poor countries. Unbanked refers to adult individuals who do not use, and do not have access to, financial services, including savings accounts and credit cards. Meanwhile, underbanked individuals already have a bank account but often rely on alternative financial services. For example, money orders, check cashing services, and payday loans rather than traditional loans and credit cards to manage their finances and fund their purchases (investopedia.com, March 5, 2022; February 20, 2024).

According to a World Bank report entitled "The Invisible Toll of COVID-19 on Learning" (2023), more than 98 million or almost 50 percent of adults in Indonesia did not have access to a transaction account, making Indonesia one of the countries with the largest unbanked population in the world. It limited the future investment of individuals, households, and companies, and raised their risks of unexpected shocks, such as the current economic shocks due to foreign geopolitical conditions and domestic financial conditions. In other words, the impact of the large unbanked population is also intertwined with reduced economic freedom in terms of individual economic activity involvement.

Therefore, this article would like to describe the condition of financial literacy and inclusion in Indonesia, the importance of financial literacy and inclusion, and recommendations for the future government of President and Vice President-elect Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka (Prabowo-Gibran) to strengthen literacy and finance in Indonesia.

The Conditions of Financial Literacy and Inclusion in Indonesia

The Financial Services Authority (OJK) with the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) issued the 2024 National Survey of Financial Literacy and Inclusion (SNLIK). According to the Joint Press Release of OJK and BPS (August 2, 2024), the financial literacy index of the Indonesian population in SNLIK 2024 is 65.43 percent, while the financial inclusion index is 75.02 percent or has a gap of 9.59 percentage points. In other words, 65 people out of every 100 residents are well-iterate in finances and 75 out of 100 people have taken advantage of access and benefits of financial products and/or services.

Although the numbers have shown an increase in the financial literacy index from 2022 (49.68 percent in 2022) and a decrease in the financial inclusion index from 2022 (85.10 percent in 2022), Acting Chief Statistician of BPS, Amalia Adininggar Widyasanti, reported on Kompas.com (August 2, 2024), said that the 2024 SNLIK index could not be directly compared with the 2022 financial literacy and inclusion index due to differences in the sampling methods used.

Apart from that, SNLIK 2024 also presents conventional financial literacy and inclusion indices, which respectively have values of 65.08 percent and 73.55 percent. This value is almost not much different from the aggregate financial literacy and inclusion index. Meanwhile, the Sharia financial literacy index is 39.11 percent and the Sharia financial inclusion index is 12.88 percent. The gap be-

tween the Sharia financial literacy index and the Sharia financial inclusion index is still high, namely 26.23 percentage points.

Interestingly, if the financial literacy and inclusion index is observed by gender, women have surpassed men for both in SNLIK 2024. The financial literacy index for women is 66.75 percent compared to 64.14 percent for men. Meanwhile, the women's financial inclusion index is 2.11 percentage points higher than the men's (76.08 percent vs. 73.97 percent). It indicates that government support and programs to increase women's financial literacy and inclusion, especially women in the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector, where around 64 percent are managed by women, have been running quite well through support and collaboration between OJK with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), provincial government (Pemprov), and other related parties.

However, the future Indonesian government, which will be led by President and Vice President-elect Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka, will still face homework to increase the literacy index and financial inclusion for people with less than tertiary and high school/equivalent education. It is because the financial literacy and inclusion index for people who have not/haven't attended school/haven't finished elementary school/equivalent finished elementary school/equivalent, and finished junior high school/equivalent are still far compared to people with tertiary education and high school/equivalent education. Table 1 shows comparative data on financial literacy and inclusion indices based on education level.

Table 1. Financial Literacy and Inclusion Index in Indonesia Based on Education Level in 2024

Education Level	Financial Literacy Index	Financial Inclusion Index
No/never went to school/-didn't finish elementary school/equivalent	38,19%	51,53%
Completed elementary school/equivalent	57,77%	62,58%
Completed junior high school/equivalent	65,76%	73,18%
Completed high school /equivalent	75,92%	88,29%
Graduated from college	86,19%	98,54%

Source: Joint Press Release from OJK and BPS, August 2, 2024.

Table 1 explains that the financial inclusion index is still higher than the financial literacy index at every level of education. In addition, the ability to understand financial products and utilize financial products and/or services improves at a higher level of education. Therefore, overall financial literacy and financial inclusion for low-educated individuals need to be encouraged by the next Prabowo-Gibran government.

The Importance of Financial Literacy and Inclusion

Encouraging financial literacy and inclusion for the entire community, especially communities that do not yet have a good level of literacy and finance, such as people with education below university and high school/equivalent, is paramount because it also includes vulnerable communities, people with disabilities, and women. Efforts to strengthen and encourage financial literacy and inclusion in Indonesia have also been included in several official government documents, such as the document "National Strategy for Financial Literacy Indonesia (SNLKI) 2021-2025" (2021) and "Road Map for Monitoring the Behavior of Financial Services Business Actors, Education, and Consumer Protection (2023 - 2027)" (2023) by OJK.

For example, in the OJK report (2021) above, there are several strategic programs to improve Indonesia's financial literacy and inclusion index, such as Financial Capability, Wise Financial Attitudes and Behavior, and Financial Access in which there are various initiatives and core actions that will be implemented. The numerous programs that have been launched and implemented by the government aim to achieve financial literacy and inclusion targets to encourage economic growth and social welfare based on literature and empirical studies.

Generally, financial literacy and inclusion have at least three roles as catalysts for economic development. First, financial literacy and inclusion can encourage savings and investment. Individuals who have well-iterated financial literacy will also have good knowledge and information regarding available financial products and/or services. The information held can assist economic agents in selecting and accessing the best financial products and/or services to maximize capital accumulation and other economic interests. This accumulated capital can later be channeled for business expansion and other economic activities so that it can encourage economic growth.

Second, financial literacy and inclusion can encourage MSMEs to 'move up a class' to achieve targeted economic growth. In 2023, the number of MSMEs reached 66 million with a contribution to Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 61 percent (kadin. id, accessed September 15, 2024). Optimal financial literacy and inclusion for MSMEs can further encourage more MSMEs to access official loans and credit from intermediation institutions. It can reduce and mitigate moneylenders and unofficial online loans to defraud MSMEs, especially MSMEs managed by women, vulnerable communities, and people with disabilities.

Third, financial literacy and inclusion can improve individual risk management abilities to allocate their limited resources. Having knowledge and access to financial products and/or services can help individuals to diversify their finances so they can survive shocks to economic conditions, and can be active in the economy. In other words, financial literacy and inclusion have a role in maintaining individual economic freedom.

Policy Recommendations

According to the explanations above, there are several recommendations for the Prabowo-Gibran government to improve and strengthen financial inclusion and literacy in Indonesia. First, the government, through the Financial Services Authority (OJK) in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance (Kemenkeu), Ministry of Communication and Information (Kominfo), related ministries and/or institutions, as well as financial associations must collaborate to expand infrastructure and facilities and infrastructure for digital intermediation services, especially in rural and remote areas. Digital wallets and mobile banking can reduce transaction costs and provide a safer alternative to informal financial systems.

The existence of alternative financial access is also intertwined with the principle of economic freedom in terms of personal choice. Apart from that, these ministries and/or institutions must also be able to encourage financial technology (fintech) innovation, such as microloan platforms, and support startups that target unbanked and underbanked populations. These recommendations can also be carried out in parallel by increasing educational programs about finance and financial products, especially for women, vulnerable communities, and people with disabilities with simplified language adapted to regions so that they are easy to understand.

Second, the government through the OJK, Kominfo, Ministry of Law and Human Rights (HAM), as well as related ministries and/or institutions must strengthen the regulatory framework to foster innovation in financial services while maintaining consumer protection, privacy, and cyber security. Apart from that, these ministries and/or institutions must also collaborate with each other in the monitoring and evaluation (monev) process, so that they can produce evidence-based policy conclusions and recommendations.

Third, OJK, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises (UKM), the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration (Kemen DPDTT), as well as other related ministries and/or institutions must adjust financial products and access for unbanked and underbanked groups by increasing access towards microloans for SMEs, especially for women and rural entrepreneurs. The relevant ministries also need to make it easier to register MSMEs so that they are recorded by the government so that it can be facilitated to increase capacity, including in relation to financial literacy, financial access, and networking with relevant stakeholders.

- Putu Rusta Adijaya -

In order to increase and strengthen financial inclusion and literacy in Indonesia, the Prabowo-Gibran government should collaborate to expand infrastructure and facilities and infrastructure for digital intermediation services, encourage fintech innovation, increase educational programs about finance and financial products, strengthen the regulatory framework and monitoring and evaluation processes, as well as adapting financial products and access for unbanked and underbanked groups through increasing access to microloans for SMEs, especially for women and rural entrepreneurs.

Reducing Poverty and Inequality from the Perspective of Economic Freedom


Poverty and inequality are still big challenges for both developed and developing countries. Global initiatives, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), poverty eradication (SDG 1), and reducing inequality (SDG 10), are still targets in every policy formulated on a national, regional, and international scale.

For example, the Indonesian government targets poverty to reach zero percent and inequality to decrease by 2045, when Indonesia will be 100 years old or known as "Golden Indonesia." According to the presentation of the Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency (Ministry of National Development Planning/Bappenas) in the Indonesian Forum series 106 by the Indonesian Institute (March 29, 2024), the poverty level target in 2045 is 0.5-0.8 percent, the Gini ratio is 0.290-0.320, and the contribution to Gross Regional Domestic Income (GRDP) from the Eastern Region of Indonesia (KTI) is 28.5 percent or an increase of seven percentage points compared to 2022 which was 21.5 percent. To achieve the vision and mission of Golden Indonesia 2045, the government has also established 20 existent strategies in five pillars; namely, (1) Social Transformation, (2) Economic Transformation, (3) Governance Transformation, (4) Rule of Law, Stability and Leadership Indonesia, as well as (5) Socio-Cultural and Ecological Resilience.

Although, generally, policies to eradicate poverty and reduce inequality have become the spearhead of policy in the majority of countries, poverty and inequality are still a big challenge and are even worsening in some regions. According to the World Bank (accessed September 17, 2023), 2023 is also called the "year of inequality" because many countries are still in the process of recovering after the Covid-19 pandemic and are increasingly squeezed by geopolitical conflicts, economic uncertainty, food insecurity caused

by climate change, etc. Graph 1 shows the number of poor people in the world from 2010-2023.

Graph 1. Total Poor People in the World for the Period 2010-2023



Source: 2023 in Nine Charts: A Growing Inequality, World Bank (accessed September 17, 2023). The poverty line is US$2.15 or the equivalent of IDR 32,250 (exchange rate IDR 15,000).

In general, the number of poor people in the world shows a downward trend in Graph 1. However, there was an increase in the number of poor people in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic which had destroyed three years of progress in efforts to reduce poverty.

The same thing also happened in Indonesia. According to the Official Statistical News of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) (July 1, 2024), the number of poor people in March 2024 was 25.22 million people compared to March 2023 which was 25.90 million people. Even though the trend is decreasing, efforts to reduce the number of poor people can be said to be stagnant. The number of poor people is likely to increase in March 2024 if compared to the March 2019 figure of 25.14 million people.

Therefore, to reduce poverty and inequality as envisioned in Golden Indonesia 2045, the government of President and Vice President 2024-2029 Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka must also be able to improve the conditions of economic freedom in Indonesia. This is because economic freedom has been empirically proven to reduce poverty. For example, Geloso and Dean (2023) found that people remaining in poverty for more than eight years was strongly associated with lower levels of economic freedom.

The Role of Economic Freedom in Reducing Poverty and Inequality

According to the Fraser Institute (accessed September 17, 2024), economic freedom is based on personal choice, voluntary exchange coordinated by the market, freedom to enter and compete in the market, and the protection of a person and his property from aggression by others. Economic freedom is also related to encouraging entrepreneurial practices for individuals and providing the ability for individuals to allocate their resources efficiently which can be a driver for individuals to get out of poverty and inequality.

The components of economic freedom also vary, such as freedom to do business and protection of property rights. It can be said that these two paths to economic freedom can help Indonesia get out of poverty and inequality.

First, in terms of freedom to do business. The freedom to set up a business is intertwined with personal choice. With the freedom to do business supported by regulations that are 'not fat' and not restrictive, individuals who want to become entrepreneurs will grow and will create jobs. When many people get access to employment opportunities, which are also adapted to link and match, then they can get out of poverty and inequality. Second, with protected property rights, individuals will be able to use their ownership optimally, productively and innovatively so that they can build and provide broader economic benefits for other communities.

Therefore, economic freedom such as freedom to do business and protection of property rights can be said to be able to encourage individuals to get out of poverty and inequality, which will lead to increasing the individual's potential and can contribute to the country's economy.

Policy Recommendations

According to the explanations above, the recommendations for the next Prabowo-Gibran government to reduce poverty and inequality include: first, the government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (HAM), law enforcement officials and other legal institutions must be able to collaborate to strengthen the supremacy of law in Indonesia. This is because the supremacy of law is closely related to the protection of property rights. If property rights protection is guaranteed, individuals, especially the poor, can use their ownership; for example, land, for economic activities that can lift them out of the abyss of poverty and inequality.

Second, the government through cross-ministerial cooperation such as the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Investment/Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), and other related ministries/institutions must work together to deregulate or simplify regulations related to trying and doing business and not getting involved in bureaucracy. This is to encourage people's interest in becoming entrepreneurs as is also targeted by the government, as well as making it easier for micro, small, and medium enterprises (SMEs) to enter the market so that it can create competition that leads to innovation.

- Putu Rusta Adijaya -

Economic freedom can be said to reduce poverty and inequality. The next Prabowo-Gibran government must be able to strengthen the supremacy of law, which is closely related to the protection of property rights, as well as simplify regulations related to business and business to encourage people's interest in becoming entrepreneurs.

Jakarta's Dynamics and Individual Candidates in the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections

The Jakarta regional head election (Pilkada) has always been a political contestation event that is full of drama, because of its position as the center of the economy and the former capital city, as well as a barometer of national politics. Victory in the Jakarta Pilkada often has a major influence on national politics, as experienced by Joko Widodo in the 2012 Pilkada and Anies Baswedan in the 2017 Pilkada, both of whom later advanced as presidential candidates.

The 2024 Jakarta gubernatorial election is getting more interesting with the emergence of three candidate pairs: Pramono Anung-Rano Karno, Ridwan Kamil-Suswono, and Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana. However, this article shall focus on how the competition between the three is, but will focus more on Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana who have recently been in the news because they are running as independent candidates and are suspected of being involved in the KTP fraud.

The Importance of Clarity in Candidate Background

In the General Election Commission Regulation (PKPU) Number 8/2024 concerning the Nomination of Governors and Deputy Governors, Regents and Deputy Regents, and Mayors and Deputy Mayors, it is stipulated that to advance as an individual candidate for governor and deputy governor, at least they must have public support of around 5-9%, depending on the number of permanent voters in the area. The names Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana became interesting in this discussion, especially after both were suspected of being involved in the case of using electronic ID cards as one of the conditions for support. However, before discussing the issue in more depth, the emergence of Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana, or hereinafter referred to as Dharma-Kun, can be said to be surprising. Usually, independent candidates who advance in the election contest are supported by a strong community movement or emerge in response to disappointment with the existing political system.

Interestingly, Dharma-Kun's figures do not have a strong background in the world of activism or practical politics, making their presence as independent candidates something rare in Indonesian political tradition. This is worth noting because most independent candidates are usually driven by a strong background, either through community movements, long experience in the world of activism, or disappointment with political parties. The absence of these factors in Dharma-Kun's profile raises big questions about their motivation and readiness to participate in high-level political contests such as gubernatorial elections.

Their emergence has become increasingly discussed when the two were interviewed by KompasTV on September 1, 2024 regarding their vision and mission. The answer given; namely, that they would not rush to convey their vision and mission, and would study it first, thus giving rise to speculation among the public. Some parties argued that the answer showed a cautious attitude, but many also suspected that the two were not ready to face this contest. In a competitive political climate, where candidates generally already have a structured and planned vision and mission long before entering the political event, statements like this give the image of unpreparedness.

The absence of a clear political background from Dharma-Kun shows a striking difference from the candidates supported by parties, who generally will carry the interests of the party and its constituents. Independent candidates also often emerge from activists or public figures who have a track record in fighting for certain issues, such as the anti-corruption movement, human rights, or bureaucratic reform. For example, Ridwan Kamil in the 2013-2018 Bandung mayoral election, and Faisal Basri in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election, although he did not win. However, Dharma-Kun does not seem to offer a distinctive political narrative or agenda, thus causing confusion, if not potentially detrimental, among voters.

The inability or unwillingness to immediately convey their vision and mission, or at least their ideas, creates a negative perception of their capabilities. On the one hand, this can be seen as a strategy to hold back and ensure that their vision and mission are mature. On the other hand, in a political world full of dynamics and competition, an overly cautious attitude can guarantee approval of preparation or even unpreparedness to lead. This is crucial considering that Jakarta has the characteristics of voters who tend to be rational (Political Indicators, 2023). As one of the areas with a relatively

high level of education and wider access to information, voters in Jakarta usually put more emphasis on concrete programs, candidate track records, and real solutions offered to urban problems.

Controversies

The case of the misappropriation of the Population Identification Number (NIK) involving the governor and deputy governor pair Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana, candidates in the 2024 Jakarta Pilkada, has raised serious controversy regarding violations of the law, especially Law Number 27/2022 concerning Personal Data Protection (UU PDP). The alleged misappropriation of the NIK of hundreds of Jakarta residents to meet the requirements for support for independent candidacy has passed verification by the General Elections Commission (KPU), even though this clearly violates the rights of citizens whose data is used without permission. This raises fundamental questions about the accountability of election organizing institutions and the effectiveness of legal protection for citizens as owners of personal data.

According to Parasurama Pamungkas, a researcher from the Institute for the Study and Advocacy of Society (ELSAM), violations of the PDP Law, especially Article 65 Paragraphs (1) and (3), are very relevant in this case. The PDP Law clearly prohibits the collection and use of personal data without the permission of the data subject for the purpose of benefiting oneself or others, which can result in losses for the data owner. In the context of Dharma-Kun's candidacy, the personal data of citizens was used illegally for political interests, which should be subject to criminal sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the PDP Law.

However, despite strong allegations of violations of the law, Polda Metro Jaya stated that there was insufficient evidence to continue the investigation into this case, as reported by Kompas (29/8/2024). This decision has raised concerns about law enforcement against violations of personal data protection, as well as setting a bad precedent for democracy and future elections.

In addition, the case of NIK misappropriation in the dynamics of the 2024 Jakarta Pilkada reflects the weak supervision and law enforcement related to personal data protection in Indonesia. In an ideal election system, every independent candidate must meet strict requirements, including obtaining public support legally and transparently. NIK misappropriation is clearly a form of manipulation that

undermines the basic principles of democracy, namely justice and integrity. If left untreated, this will not only damage the legitimacy of the candidate concerned, but will also reduce public trust in the election process as a whole.

The KPU's decision to pass the verification despite indications of data recording also reflects problems in the accountability of the election organizing institution. The KPU should be responsible for ensuring that all administrative requirements are met legally and without violations. In addition, the decision of the Polda Metro Jaya to stop the investigation on the grounds of lack of evidence also indicates that law enforcement in Indonesia still has many challenges, especially in protecting the rights of citizens in the digital era, where personal data is very vulnerable to protection.

Ultimately, this case highlights the importance of consistent enforcement of the PDP Law, especially in the context of politics and elections, as well as how to hold direct, free, honest, and fair elections. If the use of personal data is considered trivial and is not subject to appropriate sanctions, then similar violations have the potential to continue to occur, which in turn can damage public trust in the integrity of the election process. Therefore, the firmness of election and regional election organizers, as well as firm legal action, are needed to provide a deterrent effect and ensure that every citizen is protected from the protection of their personal data.

Recommendations

According to the above explanations, here are some policy recommendations that can be adopted to better carry out tasks and functions for each stakeholder:

1. The KPU must strengthen the verification process for independent candidate support, especially in ensuring the authenticity of supporting documents such as ID cards. More sophisticated and secure technology-based systems, such as biometrics, can be used to ensure that submitted data is not falsified. In addition, the KPU also needs to conduct an independent audit of the nomination process involving independent candidates to ensure that no data is used without permission. The KPU also needs to be more open about the document verification process to the public so that the public can monitor the nomination process directly.
2. Bawaslu must strengthen its monitoring mechanisms for alleged data recording violations and report the results of its investigations transparently to the public. Strict monitoring must be car-

ried out at every stage of verification to prevent violations. In addition, Bawaslu must work with law enforcement to ensure that violations such as data recording are handled seriously and given strict sanctions. The resolution of this case could set an important precedent in strengthening election integrity.

3. Civil society in general needs to increase educational programs about citizens' rights to personal data, as well as how to file complaints if their data is released without permission. This can increase public awareness and proactive attitudes in protecting their personal data. In this case, NGOs also need to be involved in advocacy for improving regulations related to personal data protection, including in the context of regional elections and general elections. This advocacy can focus on strengthening the PDP Law and how its enforcement must be an integral part of the implementation of elections and regional elections.

- Felia Primaresti -

The Jakarta gubernatorial election has always been in the spotlight due to its status as the economic center and national political barometer. Victory often has a major impact on Indonesia's political map, as seen from the journey of Joko Widodo and Anies Baswedan. In the 2024 Jakarta gubernatorial election, in addition to being interesting with the presence of three candidate pairs, public attention is also focused on the independent pair Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana who are suspected of being involved in the controversy over alleged KTP fraud.

Rethinking the Multiparty System and The Discourse on the Formation of a New Party in Indonesia

This article is based on a 14-minute clarification video shared by Anies Baswedan, which recently went viral on social media. In the video, Anies reveals that the political dynamics surrounding him, especially regarding the decision not to run in the 2024 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada). He also talks about the shackles of power that often bind political parties, which leads to the reasons behind his reluctance to join any political party. Anies emphasized that currently no party is completely free from the influence of power, which may be one of the main factors in his considerations. Furthermore, in the video Anies also said that he was open to the possibility of forming an organization or even a new party as a forum to accommodate his aspirations and ideas.

In the context of an increasingly complex multiparty political system that is often filled with political pragmatism, can the formation of new parties really offer an effective solution? This article aims to answer these questions by further exploring the role and function of political parties in the power system, and assessing whether the formation of new parties can really be a meaningful alternative. In this discussion, we will analyze the internal dynamics of political parties, the influence of power on political decisions, and the impact of dominant political pragmatism. Through this perspective, it is hoped that we can get a clearer picture of the possible solutions and challenges faced by the current political system.

Reflections on the Multiparty System

Before answering the above question in more depth, there is one fundamental thing that must be understood first: political parties have never been entities free from values, interests, or justifications for power. Inherently , political parties are indeed tools or means for various groups or individuals to achieve power (Sartori, 1976). In other words, political parties are not sterile spaces free from interests, but rather fields full of diverse interests that sometimes collide or reinforce each other.

In fact, political parties are ideally born from values and interests, which in turn become ideologies and visions and missions, which are then consistently carried and fought for. In the context of the multi-party system in Indonesia, philosophically, this system was born for broader political representation. Using the same logic, the more parties that are born, the more will be born new ideologies and visions and missions that compete healthily with each other to achieve power.

In fact, the multiparty system implemented since the fall of the New Order regime has often caused problems, such as those seen in the Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) administration (1999-2001). Gus Dur was elected president, but the complex multiparty coalition—involving parties such as PAN, PDIP, PKB, Golkar, and PPP—turned out to be fragile and full of political friction due to differences in interests (Windasari, 2012). This tension increased when Gus Dur removed Jusuf Kalla and Admiral Sukardi as ministers without consulting parliament (Kompas.com, 7/23/2022), causing turmoil in his administration. Doubts about Gus Dur's leadership then grew among the military and members of parliament, especially from Golkar and PDIP, until an impeachment effort was led by MPR Chairman Amien Rais. Finally, in 2001, Gus Dur's administration was prematurely ended and replaced by Megawati Soekarnoputri.

In the context of Indonesian politics in the last ten years, a similar situation has also occurred. During the administration of Joko Widodo (Jokowi), a very broad government coalition involved many parties with various backgrounds. Even opposition parties such as Gerindra finally joined the coalition in Jokowi's second term, creating political pragmatism that often complicates decision-making and gives rise to transactional politics. This large coalition also reduces oversight mechanisms and exacerbates internal fragmentation within political parties, as seen in the PKB recently.

On the other hand, Jokowi as the President has the authority to use or not use presidential decrees or regulations, which have the potential to cause conflict. For example, Jokowi issued a Perppu to replace Law No. 17 of 2013 concerning Mass Organizations (Ormas) due to concerns about radical mass organizations, accelerating the dissolution of HTI without a long legal process despite protests from various parties, including the DPR. In addition, in September 2019, the DPR passed a revision of the KPK Law which changed important provisions related to the KPK's authority, triggering major protests from students, activists, and civil society who considered

the revision to weaken the eradication of corruption. Despite calls to issue a Perppu to cancel the revision, Jokowi chose to let the revised KPK Law take effect. These two incidents demonstrate the lack of oversight mechanisms when the government coalition is too large, where the DPR often works with the president to achieve certain interests, rather than carrying out its oversight function effectively.

To overcome the various negative implications arising from the multiparty system, Indonesia has implemented a parliamentary threshold, although this policy has also drawn much criticism. However, the parliamentary threshold has not had a significant impact on the simplification of political parties. In fact, this issue is often raised as a political-legal product before the election and is changed according to interests every five years. This happened, for example, in Law No. 3 of 1999, which set a threshold of two percent of seats in the DPR and three percent in the DPRD. In Law No. 12 of 2003, parties that failed to reach the threshold could change their names and symbols to participate in the next election, as was done by the Justice Party which later changed to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

In addition, it is also important to look at the legislative election landscape in Indonesia. In the 2004 election, four major parties won the election, with the Golkar Party gaining 21.5% of the vote, followed by the PDIP with 18.53%, the PKB with 10.57%, the PPP with 8.15%, and the newly emerged Demokrat Party with 7.45%. Although the number of participating parties decreased to 24 from 48 in the 1999 election, this figure is still quite high (processed from KPU data). What is interesting about the 2004 election is the success of the Demokrat Party as a newcomer who won eight million votes and entered the top five, motivating other new parties to compete in the next election. This assumption was proven in the 2009 election, where the number of participating parties increased sharply from 24 to 38, with the Demokrat Party emerging as the winner, winning 20.85% of the vote (CNN Indonesia, 4/19/2019). Although in the 2014 election the number of participants dropped drastically to 10 parties, this number rose again to 14 parties in the 2019 election and increased again in 2024, with data from the KPU showing 17 participating parties (processed from KPU data).

Is a New Party the Solution?

Previously, it must be understood between the formation of a party and a party as an election participant. If the formation of a party,

the rules refer to Law Number 2/2011. Meanwhile, the requirements as an election participant are regulated in Law Number 17 of 2017. Many parties have been established, but are not necessarily participants in the election. In the context of the 2024 Election, parties such as the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDRI), the People's Sovereignty Party, the Berkarya Party, the United Indonesia Bangkit Party, and the Pelita Party failed verification at the KPU (Kompas.com, 3/29/2023).

There are three main factors that encourage the emergence of new political parties: relatively low establishment costs, potential profits if they successfully enter the circle of power, and the possibility of support from voters. This study is in line with the theory of Gary W. Cox (2003), which states that new parties often emerge due to the decision of party elites who want to participate in the election as new contestants, although in practice, there are also many new parties that are the result of "translations" of old parties such as the Nasdem and Gelora Parties whose figures emerged from Golkar and PKS and the Ummat Party which emerged from PAN.

In addition, Tarvit's (2007) research in 22 developed countries, which shows that the emergence of new parties is influenced by relatively cheap registration fees, financial support, flexibility of rules, and administrative requirements set by election organizers, which again are all considered easy. In addition, the benefits of corporatism are also a driving factor. Therefore, there is often a paradox and great bias among political party elites in parliament when they design regulations regarding the establishment of new parties.

Although many studies have shown this, new parties often still claim that their establishment is based on ideological reasons. They often use the narrative of disappointment with old parties as a reason, as seen in the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) which positions itself as a new party consisting of young people who are considered to have no political "sins". Although this claim is valid, the fundamental problem that is often forgotten actually lies in Law No. 2/2011 concerning Amendments to Law No. 2/2008 concerning Political Parties (UU Parpol).

Fundamental criticism of the Political Party Law (Parpol) often highlights several key issues that need to be addressed to improve the quality of the political system in Indonesia. One of the main criticisms is the lack of accountability and transparency in party funding, which creates a large gap for corrupt practices and unhealthy

outside influence, oligarchy and political families that are significant problems in the structure of political parties in Indonesia, to the lack of internal democratic mechanisms in political parties that exacerbate these problems, which culminate in many of the problems as explained above.

So, as long as this fundamental problem is not fixed, efforts to form a new political party will be in vain, similar to buying new shoes that are often worn but never washed. Over time, the shoes will become dirty and no longer functional, just like a new political party that has not undergone renewal of its internal structure and mechanisms. Therefore, to achieve a healthier and more responsive political system, a comprehensive reform is needed in funding accountability, reducing oligarchic dominance, and increasing internal democracy in political parties.

Political parties, as the main institutions in democracy, play an important role in producing leaders, voicing public interests, and carrying out control functions over the government. However, reality shows that many parties in Indonesia are actually dragged into corrupt practices, nepotism, and lack of accountability. This is exacerbated by the increasing number of new parties being born without any significant changes.

Although the formation of new parties is relatively easy, as discussed at the beginning of the section, their participation in elections still faces many challenges related to administrative requirements. In the end, the old, established parties continue to dominate political contests and gain power. Forming new parties without the ability to participate in elections is ineffective. Steps to improve existing parties are more reasonable and realistic.

Recommendations

According to the above explanation, this article believes that the rottenness of the political system in Indonesia stems from political parties. Therefore, the following recommendations can be offered:

1. The DPR needs to revise the Political Party Law to improve the funding and recruitment system for party cadres.
2. NGOs must increase the role of political education for the community to strengthen monitoring of government performance and launch extra-parliamentary movements if the parliamentary monitoring function is already crippled.
3. The DPR needs to review the threshold policy to ensure that it does not hinder inclusive political participation, especially for small parties that represent the interests of minority groups or specific issues.

- Felia Primaresti -

Looking at the Expert Cabinet Zaken in the Prabowo-Gibran Government

The 2024 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election contest has decided the pair Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka as the winners. The Prabowo-Gibran pair won after obtaining 96,214,691 votes, or 58.59% of the total valid national votes, and meeting at least 20 percent of the votes in more than half of the provinces in Indonesia. The determination includes votes in 38 provinces and 128 regions abroad (rumahpemilu.org, 24/4).

Meanwhile, presidential and vice presidential candidate pair number 1 Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar received 40,971,906 votes, equivalent to 24.95% of all valid national votes. Then, candidate pair number 3, Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD, received 27,040,878 votes or 16.47% of valid national votes (rumahpemilu.org, 24/4). Now the Prabowo-Gibran pair are just waiting for their official inauguration as President and Vice President for the 2024-2029 period which will be held on October 20, 2024.

In its development, several discourses have emerged regarding the formation of the Prabowo-Gibran cabinet. One that has attracted attention is the formation of a zaken (expert) cabinet. This was conveyed by the Secretary General of the Gerindra Party, Ahmad Muzani, who said that President-elect Prabowo Subianto wanted to form a zaken cabinet in his government (kompas.com, 10/9/2024).

In addition, Muzani added that the president-elect wanted his cabinet assistants to be people who were indeed experts in their respective fields. This step will be taken so that a ministry is truly led by people who are experts and relevant to the ministry (kompas.com, 10/9/2024).

The Zaken cabinet itself can be interpreted as an expert cabinet, or also known as a business cabinet, which means a cabinet filled with professionals and experts in the field of affairs (Mochtar; Madinier, in Nggilu and Wantu, 2020). However, the problem is that the for-

mation of the Zaken cabinet is faced with the interests of political parties that support the Prabowo-Gibran government.

As is known, the political parties supporting Prabowo-Gibran are currently fatter than during the 2024 Presidential Election. This will of course depend on Prabowo as the president-elect shaping the direction of his leadership in the future.

Zaken Cabinet and Increasing the Number of Ministries

On the other hand, the discourse on the formation of a zaken cabinet is faced with the discourse on increasing the number of ministries. The Daily Chair of the Gerindra Party, Sufmi Dasco Ahmad said that the discourse on increasing ministries would be carried out in order to optimize the ministries and to realize the campaign promises contained in Asta Cita and the Prabowo-Gibran action program. Dasco also said that his party was still conducting simulations on ministerial posts in order to optimize the Prabowo-Gibran program (detik.com, 13/9).

However, if we look further, increasing the number of ministries is not just a discourse. Because since May 16, 2024, discussions have been held on the revision of Law Number 39/2008 concerning State Ministries. The Working Committee (Panja) of the Legislative Body (Baleg) of the House of Representatives (DPR) approved the revision of the Law on State Ministries to become a DPR initiative proposal.

In the plenary meeting for the decision-making on the drafting of the State Ministry Bill, all factions stated their support for the bill to be discussed at the next level. A number of discussion materials have been approved; namely, the elimination of Article 10, which contains the words deputy minister is a career official in the explanations of the State Ministry Bill (Kompas.com, 5/16/2024).

Meanwhile, Article 15, which previously stated that the total number of ministries is a maximum of 34, has been changed to the total number of ministries determined according to the president's needs while taking into account the effectiveness of government administration. The revision of the Law on State Ministries also accommodates additional provisions regarding the task of monitoring and reviewing the Law on State Ministries (Kompas.com, 5/16/2024).

The discourse on adding ministries is getting stronger, after the DPR Baleg on September 12, 2024 approved the Revision of the

State Ministry Law to be ratified in a plenary meeting next week. Thus, adding ministries is inevitable. Then, what will happen to the discourse on cabinet zaken amidst the increase in the number of ministries?

The formation of a cabinet is indeed the prerogative of the elected president, including adding ministries. However, it should be remembered that adding ministries will make the bureaucratic structure even fatter. What is clear is that it is very important to maintain the bureaucracy as an organization that can provide excellent public services effectively and efficiently.

Going forward, Prabowo's government needs to ensure that the bureaucracy remains lean but is able to provide excellent public services effectively and efficiently. To that end, Prabowo must optimize the existing structure, apply the principles of good governance, and improve performance without having to add new ministries or institutions.

Zaken Cabinet and Supporting Parties

As mentioned above, the formation of the cabinet is the prerogative of the president. However, it is also worth remembering the role of the supporting parties of Prabowo-Gibran. This is because political parties are important institutions in a democratic system.

According to Alan Ware (1996), to see political parties there are two approaches that can be used, namely first, oriented towards competition. This means seeing political parties competing with other political parties, both in elections and when arguing in parliament. Second, is the institutional approach. Political parties are different from pressure groups or mass organizations, because political parties are legal organizations to place their cadres in government.

Furthermore, V.O. Key (in Aldrich, 2011) divides the function of political parties into three parts, namely; the function of parties in elections (party in electorate), parties as an organization (party organization), and parties in government institutions (party in government). Therefore, the Prabowo-Gibran Government is expected to form a zaken cabinet while still involving its supporting political parties.

This can be done if Prabowo-Gibran requires representatives from political parties to be individuals with certain expertise, who can lead the running of ministries/institutions in accordance with

Prabowo-Gibran's vision and mission. Thus, a zaken cabinet can still be formed. However, with the note, this must be preceded by an accountable selection within the political party to delegate cadres with certain expertise qualifications for the future government.

The formation of the cabinet is the prerogative of the President. However, it is also worth remembering the role of the parties supporting Prabowo-Gibran. This is because political parties are important institutions in a democratic system. The representatives from political parties should be individuals with certain expertise, who can lead the running of ministries/ institutions in accordance with the vision and mission of Prabowo-Gibran.

Recommendations

According to the above explanations, another important point in the framework of cabinet formation, Prabowo-Gibran as President and Vice President-elect must consider several things, such as maintaining a commitment to anti-corruption. The anti-corruption commitment is very important to be held by the Prabowo-Gibran pair and their supporting political parties for the formation of their cabinet.

In addition, ensuring the representation of diverse interests and inclusion in the cabinet. Thus, it is hoped that the future cabinet can accommodate diverse interests so that the vision, mission and programs campaigned in the 2024 Election can be implemented, while continuing the previous government's programs.

On the other hand, the cabinet also needs to be controlled by a constructive "opposition" to create balance in the government and in parliament in a democratic system and governance. For example, by opening up space for discussion, dialogue, and continuing to support independent media as a supervisor of the government's progress.

- Arfianto Purbolaksono -

Reflection on 10 Years of Jokowi's Administration and The Challenges of Implementing The Law on Sexual Violence (TPKS)

The Law on Criminal Acts of Sexual Violence (UU TPKS) as a result of the struggle of civil society during the Joko Widodo administration should be appreciated. The passing of the TPKS Law also indicates that the enforcement, handling system and enforcement of women's rights as victims are important to be recognized by the state.

In line with the law, the government also issued similar policy products in the form of several regulations. These regulations include Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 73/2022 on the Prevention and Handling of Sexual Violence in Education Units at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (PMA No. 73/2022), Regulation of the Minister of Education, Culture, Research and Technology No. 46/2023 on the Prevention and Handling of Violence in Education Units (Permendikbudristek No. 46/2023), and Decree of the Minister of Manpower No. 88/2023 on Guidelines for the Prevention and Handling of Sexual Violence in the Workplace (P3KS Guidelines in the workplace).

During the 10 years of Joko Widodo's administration, the implementations of policies to handle sexual violence cases still faces challenges. One of the challenges is the process of finalizing regulations derived from the TPKS Law which coincides with a change of government. The change of government along with the reshuffle of the ministerial structure is realized to open up opportunities for changes in the commitments that will be built by the next government (especially the vision and mission of the head of government). Therefore, the government's consistency towards the implementation of the upcoming TPKS Law is something to look forward to.

In this paper, the author will describe the flashback of the enactment of the TPKS Law, the substance of the importance of derivative regulations and the challenges faced in implementing the TPKS Law policy.

Dynamics and Development of Derivative Regulations of the TPKS Law During the Jokowi Administration.

The several derivative regulations of the TPKS Law that were prepared along with their development status are summarized in the table below:

Table 1.1
Development of Implementing Regulations of the TPKS Law

Derivative Regulations	Initiator	Progress Status	Nomenclatur of Regulation
RPP on Assistance Fund for Victims of Sexual Violence Crime	Ministry of Law and Human Rights	Plenary harmonization at Kemenkumham (May)	
RPP on Prevention, Handling, Protection, and Recovery of Victims of TPKS	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection.	Request for approval from The Ministry of State Secretariat (May)	
RPPres on the Implementation of Integrated Services for the Protection of Women and Children at the Center KemenPPPA Request for Presidential Decree	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection.	Approved July 2, 2024	Government Regulation No. 27 of 2024 on the Coordination and Monitoring of the Implementation of Prevention and Handling of Victims of Criminal Acts of Sexual Violence
RPPres on the Implementation of Integrated Services for the Protection of Women and Children at the Center KemenPPPA Request for Presidential Decree	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection.	Request for Presidential decree	
RPPres on Regional Technical Implementation Unit for Protection of Women and Children (UPTD PPA)	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection.	Approved July 2, 2024	Government Regulation No. 27 of 2024 on the Coordination and Monitoring of the Implementation of Prevention and Handling of Victims of Criminal Acts of Sexual Violence
Presidential Regulation on the Implementation of Integrated Education and Training for Law Enforcement Officials and Government Service Personnel, and Service Personnel at Community-Based Service Provider Institutions	Ministry of Law and Human Rights	Approved January 23, 2024	Presidential Regulation No. 9 of 2024 on the Implementation of Education and Training for the Prevention and Handling of Sexual Violence Crimes

Derivative Regulations	Initiator	Progress Status	Nomenclatur of Regulation
RPPres on National Policy to Eradicate Sexual Violence (TPKS)	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection.	Request for approval from the Ministry of State Secretariat (March)	

Source: Compiled from various sources and processed by the author, 2024.

The table above explains that there are three TPKS derivative regulations that have been passed. First, Presidential Regulation No. 9/2024 on the Implementations of Education and Training for the Prevention and Handling of Crimes of Sexual Violence. This regulation generally explains the implementations of education and training (diklat) aimed at three important participants as mandated by the Perpres, namely law enforcement officials (APH), government service personnel, and service personnel at community-based service provider institutions. Referring to the results of the author's search, until now, the development of policy implementations is still in the formation of derivative regulations including in the process of preparing curriculum, methods, and modules.

Education and training that will be carried out especially for human resources apparatus, especially law enforcement officers (Judges, Prosecutors and Investigators in the police) and government service personnel (in UPTD PPA) is very important to do. This is because in the context of handling cases of violence, a standard mechanism and minimum skills of the appointed human resources are required. Mechanism standards and minimum skills can be in the form of a flow of reporting implementation including the counseling approach that will be used in handling cases. Law enforcement officers and government service personnel as community servants need the same perspective in handling cases of violence involving women and children as victims.

Second, Presidential Regulation No. 55/2024 on the Regional Technical Implementation Unit for the Protection of Women and Children (UPTD PPA). This regulation, which was passed on April 22, regulates the implementation of the Regional Technical Implementation Unit for the Protection of Women and Children (UPTD

PPA). Services and handling of cases of violence against women and children through UPTD as an official state institution have been affirmed by various policy regulations developed before the TPKS Law was passed. One of them is through the Minister of PPPA Regulation Number 4 of 2018 concerning Guidelines for the Establishment of UPTD PPA. Through this PermenPPPA, local governments, both provincial, city and district are obliged to develop integrated service delivery in accordance with the contents of the ministerial regulation. Until Presidential Regulation No. 55/2024 is passed, KemenPPPA has recorded 333 UPTD PPA units from 514 districts/cities in Indonesia (tribratanews.polri.go.id, 25/7/2024).

In a speech made at the PPA national coordination meeting (rakornas) at the Dyandra Convention Center Surabaya, Monday (24/6/2024), Minister of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (PPPA) Bintang Puspayoga said that as a form of support to local governments, his party had approved the Physical Special Allocation Fund (DAK) for 2025 and continued the Non-physical DAK for the protection of women and children that had been given since 2021. In addition, regarding the Physical DAK for the protection of women and children, new funding will be provided in 2025. However, currently only 71 regions will receive DAK Fisik for 2025. Physical DAK can be used to improve infrastructure and renovate UPTD PPA buildings. The allocation of DAK Fisik funding is estimated at around IDR 252 billion for 71 regions (rri.co.id, 7/24/2024).

Third, PP No. 27/2024 concerning Coordination and Monitoring of the Implementation of Prevention and Handling of Victims of Sexual Violence. The Coordination and Monitoring PP is the implementation of the provisions of Article 83 paragraphs (1) to (4) of the TPKS Law which mandates the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (KemenPPPA), the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI) and the National Commission on Disability (KND) as well as the community to coordinate and monitor. This PP consists of 4 chapters and 23 articles that regulate two main issues, namely the implementation of coordination of prevention and handling of victims, the implementation of monitoring of prevention and handling of victims (komnasperempuan.go.id, 9/7/2024).

Implementation Challenges

The implementations of the TPKS Law policy through derivative regulations has experienced a number of challenges. One of these

challenges is the completion of the administrative text of regulations in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The completion of regulations in this bureaucratic hierarchy can be a challenge and obstacle for policy implementers in implementing the TPKS Law policy immediately as envisioned.

In the implementations of the Perpres No. 9/2024 policy; for example. The implementations of education and training policies carried out by the state for the three target sectors (law enforcement officers, government service personnel, and community service personnel) requires readiness. This readiness can be measured by the existence of a learning system/curriculum model that will be used in the training module. The importance of this curriculum model will be a reference for experts (teaching facilitators) in organizing education and training. However, to finalize the curriculum system, methods and modules require regulations as legal standing of the guidelines to be used in training.

On the other hand, although the TPKS Law as a legal umbrella policy has been passed, public awareness of the presence of this law requires a proof test. It is realized that not all people Indonesia recognizes the importance of this law equally. Therefore, before implementing the policies of the derivative regulations of the TPKS Law, it is important for the government to ensure that the TPKS Law has been socialized throughout Indonesia.

The Importance of Collaboration in Accelerating the Implementations of the TPKS Law Policy

The establishment of derivative policies from the TPKS Law is important to be carried out immediately. This is because cases of sexual violence tend to occur anywhere, anytime and by anyone. For this reason, the preparations of this derivative policy requires an inclusive policy implementation mechanism.

In addition, in an effort to accelerate the implementations of comprehensive derivative policies from the TPKS Law, collaboration and cooperation of all parties are needed. The Ministry of Law and Human Rights, KemenPPPA, Komnas Ham, Komnas Perempuan, and civil society organizations engaged in upholding women's issues in policy, also have a role to play in the completion of policy texts. Although the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and the Ministry of PPPA are the lead sectors in policy formation, the participation of all institutions is important. Non-ministerial state institutions such as Komnas Ham and Komnas Perempuan can play their role in helping to develop a framework for policy monitoring instruments.

Although Kemenkumham and KemenPPPA are the lead sectors in policy formation, the participation of all institutions is important. Non-ministerial state institutions such as Komnas Ham and Komnas Perempuan can play their role in helping to develop a framework for policy monitoring instruments. Likewise, other community organizations such as the Service Providers Forum (FPL), related to their role in forming the framework of an integrated service delivery mechanism that will be applied in the UPTD PPA institution.

The Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Government Policies in Handling Gender-Based Violence Cases in the 2023 Annual Report

Catahu (Annual Note) of the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) is a periodic report document in Indonesia that compiles various data on cases of gender-based violence (GBV) (komnasperempuan.go.id, accessed on 15/09/2024). The data collected and compiled are data on cases of gender-based violence reported to Komnas Perempuan, including to various service institutions for women victims of violence and law enforcement institutions. The provision of this reporting document has been started by Komnas Perempuan since 2001 with a very limited number of service institutions (komnasperempuan.go.id, accessed on 15/09/2024).

In addition, Catahu Komnas Perempuan not only explains the ups and downs of violence against women, but also becomes a reference document to develop knowledge about GBV against women, the handling power for victims to fulfill their rights to truth, justice and recovery (komnasperempuan.go.id, accessed on 15/09/2024).

Catahu 2023 can be an important reference in measuring the effectiveness of government policies in handling cases of gender-based violence. The data collected is 2022 data, which is a milestone in the passing of the Law on Sexual Violence (TPKS). After the enactment of the TPKS Law, it is certainly a complement to various policies that have been created previously such as Law Number 23/2002 concerning the Elimination of Domestic Violence (PKDRT Law), Law Number 35/2014 concerning Child Protection and Government Regulation Number 4/2016 concerning the Implementation of Protection and Fulfillment of the Rights of Victims of Violence.

Therefore, in this paper the author shall describe the results of the analysis and evaluation of Catahu 2023, especially on GBV case data based on the number of reports and the area where the violence occurred against the effectiveness of policies in handling cases.

Gender-Based Violence Analysis 2023


Case reporting data collected by Komnas Perempuan every year provides important information related to gender-based violence in various domains of incident situations. The importance of reporting cases of gender-based violence also aims to be the basis for government formulation in developing policy-based evidence.

In Catahu 2023, apart from the Religious Courts Agency (Badilag) and Komnas Perempuan, there were 137 service providers and civil society organizations involved in data collection. Komnas Perempuan, as a non-ministerial state institution that upholds human rights, is not mandated to provide direct assistance in cases of violence against women. However, Komnas Perempuan has opened a Complaints for Referral Unit (UPR) since 2005.

The UPR was built to fulfill the need to document cases of violence against women, the UPR is also expected to help people who want to complain about cases of gender-based violence against women. In addition, UPR can provide access to companion institutions or service institutions. The complaint reporting mechanism can be done directly or through digital media platforms (electronic mail, telephone, fax, and social media) (komnasperempuan.go.id, 5/10/2022).

In 2022 the level of institutional participation through the return of Catahu forms increased by 25% (137 institutions). This was higher if compared to 2021, which was only 18% (129 institutions) of the total forms sent. Komnas Perempuan in collecting data on violence also involves the Indonesian National Army Legal Development Agency (Babinkum TNI) and the General Justice Agency (Badilum). Although the two institutions are involved, the data obtained cannot be compiled because of the different types of information (komnasperempuan.go.id, 5/10/2022).

Picture 1.
General Data from Komnas Perempuan, Service Institutions, and Badilag for 10 Years




Source: Catahu Komnas Perempuan 2023.

In general, the number of complaints in 2022 decreased from 459,094 to 457,895. The decrease in reporting figures was compiled from data from service institutions and Badilag. Meanwhile, the number of complaints to Komnas Perempuan increased to 4371 from 4322 cases. On average, Komnas Perempuan received complaints of 17 cases/day. This number is almost double that of 2020, where the average number of cases responded to by Komnas Perempuan per day was 9 cases (komnasperempuan.go.id, 5/10/2022).

In addition, based on the area of the case in Catahu 2023 Komnas Perempuan divided it into three forms. The three areas of the case include the personal sphere, the public sphere and the state sphere.

Picture 2
Data on GBV against Women by Domain



Source: Processed by the author From Catahu Komnas Perempuan 2023.

The figure above explains that Badilag, as the government agency that handles most cases of disputes, especially in the domestic sphere (personal sphere), recorded 326,534 reported cases during 2022. Meanwhile, Komnas Perempuan, although it does not directly handle cases, recorded only 2,098 complaints.

In the context of violence that occurred in the public sphere, community-based service organizations recorded 1,634 complaints. This figure was slightly lower than that obtained by Komnas Perempuan. Violence that occurs in the public sphere is related to a variety of violence received by women in areas that tend to be utilized for the benefit of the society such as harassment in public service spaces, exploitation of women's physicality to obtain sexual satisfaction including in the industry (grooming), sexism and discrimination in the job recruitment process and so on.

In addition, in the context of handling cases of violence against women facing the state, during 2022 Komnas Perempuan recorded 68 reported cases.

The Effectiveness of Government Policy in Handling Cases of Gender-Based Violence

According to the author, to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of government policies in handling cases of gender-based violence and efforts to support victim recovery can at least be measured in several ways:

First, the existence of regulations and rules. The effectiveness of government policies in handling cases can be measured by the existence of regulations and regulations. The law as a legal umbrella for policy regulations should be taken into account in efforts to handle cases of gender-based violence. Meanwhile, various regulations and regulations related to case handling policies include: Law No. 23/2004 on the Elimination of Domestic Violence (PKDRT Law), Law No. 35/2014 on Amendments to Law No. 23/2002 on Child Protection, Law No. 12/2022 on Criminal Acts of Sexual Violence and Permen No. 4/2016 on the Implementation of Protection and Fulfillment of the Rights of Victims of Violence. With the presence of related regulations and regulations, it is hoped that they will be able to encourage gender-equitable law enforcement.

Second, victim handling support service infrastructure. To support the handling of victim cases, the government has established a number of service infrastructures such as the 129 Sahabat Perempuan

dan Anak (SAPA) hotline service, the Integrated Service Center for Women and Children Empowerment (P2TP2A) which is a form of collaborative service institution between the government and the community, the Regional Integrated Service Unit for the Protection of Women and Children (UPT PPA) and safe houses (shelters). The existence of the infrastructure mentioned above shows that the state is able to respond to every expected need in handling victims.

Although the two instruments provided (both through regulations/regulations and service infrastructure) have been present in supporting efforts to handle and fulfill victims' rights, there are still challenges in their implementation. These challenges include the low skills and knowledge of law enforcement officers (APH) in handling cases of violence against women. In addition, the stereotypes of some people who still think that gender-based violence is not a serious problem or is only experienced by certain women are also a challenge for the government.

The importance of cooperation and collaboration between various parties in improving the effectiveness of handling cases of gender-based violence.

The government and all parties have a role in answering the challenges of handling cases of gender-based violence. In the context of human resources (HR) for example. According to Presidential Regulation No.9/2024 concerning the Implementations of Education and Training for the Prevention of Handling Crimes of Sexual Violence, the government can improve the quality of human resources of the apparatus by conducting education and training in handling cases of sexual violence. Education and training provided to human resources apparatus is very important to increase the effectiveness of handling cases of gender-based violence. By increasing sensitivity to gender issues, reducing stigma that leads to revictimization of victims, and ensuring a fairer and more efficient legal process, this training can contribute to a legal system that is more responsive to the needs of victims of gender-based violence. This will not only have an impact on providing better justice for victims but also build public confidence in the law enforcement system in Indonesia.

In addition, increasing public legal awareness of gender-based violence must still be carried out on an ongoing basis. The importance of increasing legal awareness in the community considers that there are still many community groups that view the problem of violence, especially against women, as a result of stereotypes and wrong

views of women, so this needs to be enlightened through discussions, forums, including seminars in various parts of Indonesia, of course by using a local wisdom-based approach.

With awareness-raising activities carried out consistently, it is hoped that gender-sensitive views of the community will no longer hinder the handling of cases of violence

- Dewi Rahmawati Nur Aulia -

By increasing sensitivity to gender issues, reducing stigma that revictimizes victims, and ensuring a fairer and more efficient legal process, this training can contribute to a legal system that is more responsive to the needs of victims of gender-based violence. Not only this will have an impact on the provison of better justice for victims but also on the efforts to build public trust in the law enforcement system in Indonesia.

THE INDONESIAN INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. TII is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

TII also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, TII has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by TII includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("Wacana" or Discourses), Instagram Live Series and Space Twitter (Policy Talks and Initiative!), monthly analysis ("Update Indonesia" in Indonesian and "The

Indonesian Update" in English), mid-year policy analysis ("Policy Assessment"), annual policy analysis ("Indonesian Report"), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues ("The Indonesian Forum").

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RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, TII research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, TII also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, TII also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

In order to respond those needs, TII research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. TII will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. TII also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of TII provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by TII **(1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.**

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that TII offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by TII is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: **(1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.**

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.

THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

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LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).

THE INDONESIAN INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

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