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Main Report:

Considering the Impact of Social Conflict and War on Women and Children

The Economics

- The Analysis of the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Wars on the Indonesian Economy and the Mitigation Efforts
- An Analysis of the Environmental and Economic Vision-Mission of the 2024 Presidential-Vice Presidential Candidate Pairs

Law

- Accessibility and Assistance for Persons with Disabilities at Polling Stations in KPU Regulations
- Regulation and Policy Registration of Indigenous People on the Permanent Voters List
- Crucial Issues of State Civil Apparatus Neutrality in General Elections
- The Legal Policy of Bureaucratic Transformation in the State Civil Apparatus Law

Politics

- Dynasty Politics: Lessons from the Philippines
- The Relevance of the Parliamentary Threshold to the Presidential System and the Effectiveness of Policy Formulation, and the Existence of People's Sovereignty
- Observing Voter Participation in the 2024 Elections after the Determination of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates

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FOREWORD

The November - December 2023 edition of the Indonesian Update highlights a main report regarding the commemoration of the 16 Days of Anti-Violence against Women Campaign. Women and children are groups of the society that are vulnerable to being affected by conflicts, including social conflict. It is important to encourage collaborative and synergistic efforts from governments at various levels and other relevant stakeholders to anticipate and address the problems faced by women and children in social conflicts.

In the economic sector, the Indonesian Update raises the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts that have a significant domino effect on the Indonesian economy. Therefore, the Government through the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources can reduce oil dependence through the development of electric vehicles and attract investors that collaborate with the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment and the Ministry of Investment in new and renewable energy projects.

Next, we also discuss the analysis of environments and economic visions and missions of the presidential and vice presidential candidate pairs for the 2024 Elections. The presidential and vice presidential candidate pairs that will compete in the upcoming 2024 Elections have issued their visions, missions and programs. However, the missions and programs related to the environment and economy offered are still normative and limited.

In the legal field, the Indonesian Update addresses accessibility and assistance for people with disabilities at polling stations in KPU regulations. In order to encourage inclusive Simultaneous Elections and Pilkada in 2024, it is important for the KPU to equip the PKPU for Voting and Counting and PKPU PPU with specifications and criteria for mobility tools and facilities for people with disabilities to make it easier for KPPS to implement them at their respective polling stations. Apart from that, we also discuss the regulations and policies for registering indigenous peoples in the final electoral voter list. This is important as the existence of indigenous peoples must be truly recognized and respected as regulated in Article 18B paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, including in fulfilling the political rights of indigenous peoples in elections.

Next, in the legal field we discuss crucial issues of neutrality of the State Civil Service in general elections. This is important as there is the possibility and opportunity for public officials who do not have integrity to direct the use of state budgets and goods for electoral political interests. Then, still in the legal field, we also discuss the implementations of Law 20/2023 that give hope, not only to the reforms of bureaucracy, but also to the implementations of transformation. The problem of honorary staff must be resolved by prioritizing the principles of transparency, consistency and sustainability.

In the political field, the Indonesian Update highlights the lessons learned from the Philippines regarding dynasty politics. Even though the political rights of citizens are regulated in Article 28 E paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Constitution, the emergence of dynasty political practices has created concerns regarding inequality in the distribution of power. In the context of a democratic system, imperfect distribution of power can produce absolute power and damage democratic values. Next, we examine the relevance of the parliamentary threshold to the presidential system and the effectiveness of policy formulation, as well as the existence of popular sovereignty.

Next, we also discuss voter participation in the 2024 elections after the determination of the presidential and vice presidential candidates, as the benchmark for election success is the level of voter participation. Ahead of the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections and Pilkada, several efforts are needed to encourage the increasing of the quantity and quality of voter participation, as well as creating meaningful democracy for all Indonesian people.

It is hoped that the monthly publication of the Indonesian Update with current themes will help policy makers in government and business institutions - as well as academic circles, think tanks and elements of civil society, both at home and abroad, to obtain actual information and contextual analysis about economic conditions, politics, social and law in Indonesia, as well as an understanding of public policy in Indonesia.

Happy reading.

Considering the Impact of Social Conflict and War on Women and Children

Every November, there is an important commemorative event called the 16 Days of Activism against Violence against Women Campaign. The 16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence is an international campaign that promotes the elimination of violence against women around the world. As a national human rights institution, Komnas Perempuan (National Commission on Violence Against Women) initiated this activity in Indonesia. This activity was first initiated by the Women's Global Leadership Institute in 1991, sponsored by the Centre for Women's Global Leadership. Every year, this activity takes place from 25 November, which is the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, to 10 December, which is International Human Rights Day (Komnasperempuan.go.id, 12/11/2023). The timeframe was chosen in order to symbolically connect violence against women and human rights and to emphasize that violence against women is a form of human rights violation (Komnaperempuan.go.id, 12/11/2023).

The important role of Komnas Perempuan in initiating the Women and Human Rights movement is a proof that women (and even children) are the most vulnerable objects to become victims in various situations, including in the context of conflict and prolonged warfare.

The Vulnerability of Women and Children in Social Conflict and Humanitarian Disasters

Humanitarian conflicts and wars are life-threatening emergencies, especially for women and children. In addition to causing damage and destruction of physical infrastructure, the emergency situation can also cause a deep traumatic impact on each individual, especially if it is experienced by groups of women and children. Not a few of the women and children experienced torture, rape, and even murder committed by the perpetrators of the conflict.

It is also clearly exposed for example in the context of the war situation in Gaza, Palestine, over the past month the international

non-profit organization Save the Children reported that the number of children killed in the Gaza Strip during the three weeks of Israeli bombing has exceeded the annual number of children killed in global conflict zones every year since 2019 (CNBC Indonesia.com, 8/11/2023). According to the data compiled by Al Jazeera from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Israeli attacks have killed 4,104 children in Gaza during the current war. This death toll was reported during one month of violence. This means that an average of more than 100 children are killed every day (CNBC Indonesia.com, 8/11/2023).

Similarly, Palestinian women who have survived the war and the long occupation of the Israeli occupation by taking period-delaying drugs. Menstrual delay drugs are considered to be a solution for Palestinian women, not only because of the scarcity of clean water but also because of the difficulty in obtaining sanitary napkins. Warfare has caused Palestinian women to endure the burden of reproductive pain and deadly health disruption, even before the bullets redeem their bodies directly.

In addition, social and armed conflicts also cause population displacement that does not cross international borders, and it is not counted by UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). According to the data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the number of internally displaced people due to conflict and violence increased from around 25 million in 2009-2010, to 45.7 million in 2019, of which nearly 21 million (46%) are women and girls. In this regard, refugee statistics should be interpreted with caution as definitions and data collection methods often differ between countries and agencies.

According to data collected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees, defined as people forcibly displaced and crossing international borders unable to return safely to their homes, has nearly doubled over the past decade, from 5-10 million in 2008 to 4-20 million by the end of 2018. Two-thirds of these refugees come from five countries: Syria (6-7 million), Afghanistan (2-7 million), South Sudan (2-3 million), and Somalia (0-9 million). In addition, there were 1-3 million asylum seekers in 2017. As many as 4-5 million Palestinian refugees are under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency, not UNHCR, bringing the total number of refugees worldwide to 9-25 million in 2018. It should be noted that displacement is a complex process, and these estimates are estimates that cannot accurately capture mixed displacement patterns and distinguish conflict-induced forced displacement from other causes, such as drought (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov, 24/01/2021).

In Indonesia, another example that also reflects the vulnerability of women as victims in conflict situations can be seen in the case of West Papua, where there was a shooting of a Papuan woman activist named Michelle Kurisi Ndoga. She was allegedly killed after being interrogated about her destination on her way to Kwijawagi (Papua). Michelle, a female humanitarian worker and resident of Wamena, often entered the area to collect data on war refugees in Nduga. However, she has been repeatedly reprimanded by the West Papua National Liberation Army - Free Papua Organisation (TNPB-OPM) group about her humanitarian activities that are considered to have links with officials or figures of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (BBCnews.com, 31/8/2023).

Referring to the case above, research conducted by Sentiela Ocktaviana et al (2014) on "Women's Roles in Conflict Areas: Between Victims, Survivors, and Peace Agents" explains that conflict always results in a large number of victims. They experience physical, mental, material loss, or social suffering through various forms of crimes against humanity, such as murder, enforced disappearance, torture, rape, deprivation of property, or political discrimination. In this situation, women's voices are not considered and even tend to be lost in the conflict.

Women and children tend to be seen as passive victims, who need protection and a place to take refuge. In fact, there are also women who are active in overcoming conflict and even directly involved in trying to break up the parties to the conflict, as well as preventing and even saving the victims from the emergence of greater conflict, such as experienced by Michelle Kurisi Ndoga in West Papua.

Women and Child Protection Systems in Areas of Protracted Conflict

In international armed conflicts, women are among those protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention with respect to the protection of civilians in times of war. Under these conditions, women also benefit from all provisions stating the basic principles of humane treatment, including respect for life and morals, in particular prohibiting coercion, corporal punishment, torture, collective punishment, reprisals, looting, and hostage-taking. In addition, in the event of violations committed in connection with the conflict, women have the right to bring perpetrators of war crimes to justice through independent and impartial tribunals established with respect for generally recognized principles of judicial procedure.

Furthermore, in relation to policies on the protection of women and children in conflict areas, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (MoWECP) has developed a separate regulation through Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 18/2014 on the Protection and Empowerment of Women and Children in Social Conflict. The Perpres established the first framework of the National Action Plan for the Protection and Empowerment of Women and Children in Social Conflict (RAN P3AKS) 2014-2019. RAN P3AKS was created for a period of 5 years. Currently, the second period of RAN P3AKS 2020-2025 is being implemented, which is stipulated through the Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture Regulation (Permenko PMK) Number 5 of 2021 (Kemenpppa.go.id, 7/1/2022).

RAN P3AKS 2020-2025 contains updates based on the results of the review of RAN P3AKS for the 2014-2019 period. RAN P3AKS II focuses on 3 (three) pillars, namely: prevention, handling, empowerment, and participation, which is a blueprint for the Government of Indonesia to implement the agenda of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). This policy at the national level has also been implemented by local governments through collaboration with civil society to disseminate information and implement RAN P3AKS in a number of Indonesian regions prone to social conflict (Kemenpppa.go.id, 7/1/2022).

However, in an effort to prevent social conflict and address women and children as affected individuals, the government needs to consider the following points:

1. The Central Government together with other relevant ministries and institutions, as well as the Regional Government and all its apparatus need to work together in efforts to handle social conflicts that can occur prolonged. Often conflicts occur because the conflicting groups consider that the government does not respond to injustice caused by policies that are considered discriminatory.
2. In the conflict prevention strategy, the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as the TNI/Polri must collaborate to initiate negotiations between conflicting groups. The government needs to prevent the development of conflicts with peace, diplomacy and humanitarian approaches to avoid the impact that is mostly felt on women and children.
3. KemenPPPA together with the Regional Government through the Regional Regulation (Perda) on the Establishment of the Social Conflict Handling Task Force needs to encourage the

strengthening of the capacity of the unit officers, especially in dealing with women and children as affected victims.

4. The Central Government and Local Governments need to mitigate risks by building "safe houses" as evacuation sites and shelters for victims affected by armed social conflict, including for women and children who are vulnerable to becoming victims.
5. The Central Government and Local Governments also need to be encouraged to actively collaborate with civil society and humanitarian organizations, as well as organizations that focus on women and children's affairs, as well as other relevant stakeholders, including health workers, counselling, logistics suppliers, and the media, need to be encouraged to anticipate and deal with the impact of social conflict, including in meeting the special needs of women and children victims of conflict.

Women and children are vulnerable groups affected by conflicts, including social conflict. It is important to encourage collaborative efforts and synergies from governments at various levels along with other relevant stakeholders to anticipate and address the problems faced by women and children in social conflict.

- Dewi Rahmawati Nur Aulia -

The Analysis of the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Wars on the Indonesian Economy and the Mitigation Efforts

The world situation is dreadful in 2023. Several countries in the world are in the midst of war, such as the war between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the war between Israel and Palestine led by Hamas. The impact of the two wars is being monitored by the world, including the impact on the economy.

According to a report by Sherman, Arnson, and Ballentine (2001), entitled "The Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed" (2001), they say that the most persuasive motivation of conflict is a form of grief, whether it is economic, political or social. Greed-like forms of motivation, such as control of resources to finance war or to enrich elites, appear to be significantly more likely to sustain, prolong, and even transform a conflict. In other words, it can be expressed that economic motivation influences the occurrence of war.

The war also affects economic conditions. Thies and Baum (2020) explain that countries that suffer from war have poor performance in production and consumption. Moreover, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita decreased due to low labor and total factor productivity caused by war, which destroyed physical and human capital. GDP per capita also declined due to diminished trade on a domestic and international scale. This article will discuss the impact of the Russian and Ukrainian wars and the Israel-Hamas war on the Indonesian economy and the mitigation efforts for the new government in 2024-2029.

A Brief Analysis of the Russo-Ukrainian War and Its Impact on the Economy

Russia's massive invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was the result of an escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that occurred in February 2014. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had a multiplier effect on the world economy. Jenkins (2023) says the global economy is forecasted to grow around 5% in 2022 before

the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This invasion has delivered a massive and historic shock to the energy sector. The shock caused by the Russian-Ukrainian invasion is the main factor for the global economic slowdown in 2022, which is 3.1%, where economic growth is projected to stall in 2023 by 2.2% (Jenkins, 2023).

According to Guénette, Kenworthy & Wheeler (2022), Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had a very significant negative impact on the economies of several countries in Eastern Europe, the region of South Caucasus, and Central Asia, which have trade, financial, and migration connections with Russia and Ukraine. Thies and Baum (2020) previously said that countries suffering from war would face poor economic performance. In the case of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Ukrainian economy suffered greatly in 2022, where Ukraine's economic growth contracted by 29.1% compared to Russia's, which contracted by 2.1% (World Bank, 2023). The World Bank (2023) also says that this war has reversed 15 years of poverty alleviation efforts in Ukraine due to the loss of jobs and income in the private sector, high inflation, and loss of assets.

The impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the Indonesian economy potentially affects domestic wheat prices. Currently, the repercussion of it has not yet occurred because Indonesia does not import much wheat from Ukraine (Damiana, July 25, 2023). The Indonesian Wheat Flour Producers Association (APTINDO) said that the most imports of wheat in 2022 were from Australia (4.24 million tons), followed by Argentina (1.46 million tons), Canada (1.32 million tons), India (963,137 tons), and Brazil (641,633 tonnes). Imports from Ukraine only amounted to 166,758 tons in 2022 (Damiana, July 25, 2023). Despite this, Ukraine is one of the largest wheat exporters in the world (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed November 15, 2023). If the war continues, this will affect the world wheat supply chain, which could increase wheat prices due to supply chain disturbances. The potential multiplier effect of rising wheat prices could be felt by Indonesia in the future, both by consumers and producers. Moreover, there is a domino effect of weakening global demand. Russia's invasion of Ukraine weakened global demand, increased interest rates, and inflation due to rising prices of staple goods (Insider Studios & the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, March 16, 2023).

This has also been perceived by the Indonesians, where the prices of staple commodities, such as noodles, flour, cooking oil, pepper, eggs, chilies, and tea, have increased rapidly due to the domino ef-

fect of the Russian-Ukrainian war (Insider Studios & the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, March 16, 2023).

A Brief Analysis of the Israel-Hamas War and Its Impact on the Economy

As the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War has not yet diminished, the world economy has been shaken by the war between Israel and Palestine led by Hamas. The previous theory by Thies and Baum (2020) is also seen in Palestine. According to the data from Al Jazeera (November 7,2023), citing the World Labor Organization, it was recorded that 182 thousand jobs (61%) in Gaza, Palestine, were lost as a result of this war. The West Bank, Palestine, also lost 208 thousand jobs, or approximately 24%. The total daily revenue loss from these regions is US$16 million (Al Jazeera,November 7, 2023).

The Indonesian economy is also forecasted to be affected by this war. According to the Acting Head of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), Amalia Adininggar Widyasanti, in Kontan.co.id (November 7, 2023), the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian War has the possibility of influencing Indonesia's economic growth in Q4-2023 through the transmission of foreign trade: trade between Indonesia and Israel, trade between Indonesia and Palestine, and other factors. It could happen because Indonesia has currently boycotted several products that are presumed to be affiliated to Israel.

Professor at London Business School and former Director General of Research at the European Central Bank, Lucrezia Reichlin, said that the Israel-Hamas War would have a domino effect on energy prices, which, in fact, were already influenced by Russia's invasion of Ukraine (The New York Times, October 10, 2023).

In other words, if world energy prices, such as oil, skyrocket again, this will affect the Indonesian economy, especially in import costs. Indonesia is a country that depends on crude oil imports. As of 2021, Indonesia's crude oil imports amounted to US$6.03 billion, twice as high as exports of US$2.96 billion (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed November 15, 2023). Rising oil prices will increasingly burden Indonesia's finances. It could also affect the rate of Pertalite and Diesel fuel. According to the Cabinet Secretariat (November 2, 2023), a 10% increase in the price of Pertalite will increase the inflation rate by 0.27%; inflation will increase by 0.05% if diesel prices increase by the same percentage. According to monetary economic theory, one of the central bank's efforts

to mitigate inflation is to increase interest rates. It occurs in several world central banks, including Bank Indonesia (BI), which raised the BI 7-Day Reverse Repo Rate to 6% at the Bank Indonesia Board of Governors Meeting in October 2023. The increase in interest rates provides a contraction for growth to the real sector because financing costs are becoming increasingly expensive.

Policy Recommendations for Mitigation Policy Efforts for the Government and the New Government in the Future

The conflict resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas War apparently have a significant domino effect on the Indonesian economy. These wars have not shown any signs of ending. Therefore, policy recommendations are needed to mitigate the risks of the impact of these wars on the Indonesian economy:

1. The Indonesian government, through the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, must lessen the dependency on oil, which is a fossil fuel, as an energy source gradually and consistently. This can be done through the development of electric vehicles, which is currently being implemented. A just and sustainable energy transition can be implemented to reduce this dependence. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources needs to collaborate with the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment and the Ministry of Investment in attracting investors to invest their capital in new and renewable energy projects, as well as electric vehicle development projects in Indonesia;
2. Diversify imports of staple foods, such as wheat. Wheat is one of the raw materials for instant noodles. Consumption of instant noodles has also increased since 2019, which was 12.5 billion packages, to 14.3 billion packs in 2022 (Katadata Databooks, May 25, 2023). The Ministry of Trade, which is in charge of import policy, ought to strengthen the diversification of wheat imports that has been successfully accomplished.
3. Bolstering cooperation and collaboration between the members of the Financial System Stability Committee (KSSK), which consists of the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia (BI), Financial Services Authority (OJK), and the Deposit Insurance Corporation (LPS) in maintaining financial system stability as a shock absorber.

- Putu Rusta Adijaya -

The Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts have had a significant domino effect on the Indonesian economy. Therefore, the Government of Indonesia, through the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, can reduce oil dependence through the development of electric vehicles and should attract investors that can collaborate with the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment and the Ministry of Investment in new and renewable energy projects. The Ministry of Trade must also strengthen import diversification, especially for staple commodities such as wheat. The Financial System Stability Committee must also further strengthen collaboration in maintaining financial

An Analysis of the Environmental and Economic Vision-Mission of the 2024 Presidential-Vice Presidential Candidate Pairs

Three contenders of presidential-vice president candidates who will contest the 2024 General Elections in February 2024 have officially registered themselves to the General Elections Commission (KPU).

The three pairs have also issued official documents containing their vision, mission, and programs for 2024-2029, which they will implement if democratically elected as leaders of Indonesia. Anies Baswedan- Muhaimin Iskandar (AMIN) carries the vision of a Just and Prosperous Indonesia for All; Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD echoes Towards a Superior Indonesia: Fast Action to Realize a Just and Sustainable Maritime Country, Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka pledges a Together Indonesia Progresses Towards a Golden Indonesia 2045. This article will try to assess the missions and programs of each candidate pair regarding the environment and the economy.

An Analysis of the Missions and Programs of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates on the Environment

M. Afifuddin, a member of KPU, in a discussion on the Views of Presidential/Vice Presidential Candidates on Environmental Issues and Climate Change in the 2024 Election, which was held online by the Indonesian Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on November 2, 2023, said that the environment issues are 99.9% will be one of the main issues discussed in the debate theme.

Environmental issues are indeed one of the crucial issues for the young generation, both Generation Z and the Millennial, who, in fact, dominate as voters in the 2024 elections. According to the Q3 2023 National Survey: Views on the Issues (2023) by Kawula17, 51% of the younger generations said environmental issues were important.

To focus the analysis, four global environmental problems were chosen, according to Robinson (2023), which are also experienced

by Indonesia; namely:

1. Global warming from fossil fuels. In Indonesia, the Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysical Agency (BMKG) recorded a temperature increase of 0.4°C in 2023, even though the average increase in 10 years is 0.3°C (Iradat, 2023).
2. Biodiversity loss. Indonesia is home to nearly 32 thousand plant species, thousands of bird species, and hundreds of species of reptiles, amphibians, and freshwater fish (Interactive Country Fiches, 2023). However, Indonesia's Red List Index has declined since 1993.
3. Deforestation. Indeed, Indonesia's deforestation rate has shown a decline of 8.4% during 2021–2022 (Listiyarini, 2023). However, if not mitigated, the impact of deforestation on the economy, health, and environment will worsen.
4. Air pollution. The Air Quality Index in Jakarta, as of November 10, 2023, shows a value of 162 or unhealthy (IQAir, 2023). Untreated air pollution will have harmful effects on health, such as asthma, respiratory diseases, and even death.

In their document, AMIN outlined a mission called 8 Paths of Change to support the vision of a Just and Prosperous Indonesia for All. Their missions and programs, which include efforts for the environment according to Robinson (2023), are outlined in the 3rd Mission; namely, Realizing Sustainable Ecological Justice for Future Generations. In general, AMIN's 3rd mission has explained efforts to overcome the four environmental problems above, such as setting upper limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for each sector and goal (for point 1); increasing protection for rare and endangered animals by strengthening regulations (for point 2); protecting, restoring, reforesting, increasing funding and commitment for protected forests and ecosystems therein (for point 3); as well as accelerating the transition to new and renewable energy (EBT) and the provision of public transportation (for point 4).

Ganjar-Mahfud also explained their mission; namely, 8 Quick Actions of Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD in their official documents. Their 6th mission; namely, Accelerating the Realization of a Sustainable Environment Through the Green and Blue Economy, is a mission that accommodates environmental issues. In mitigating global warming and climate change, Ganjar-Mahfud offers efforts, such as the Climate Aware Village (KadarKlim) program, with facilities like green open spaces and comfortable, safe, and environmentally friendly public transportation. Apart from that, Ganjar-Mahfud is also committed to controlling fishing in order to preserve

fish resources and the marine environment (for point 2), deforestation moratorium, accelerated reforestation, reforestation, restoration and rehabilitation of forest areas (for point 3), and cutting air pollution from vehicle and industrial emissions (for point 4).

Prabowo-Gibran with their mission, Asta Cita, also explain their commitment to dealing with environmental issues, which are mainly stated in the 2nd Mission; namely, Strengthening the National Security Defense System and Encouraging National Independence through Self-Sufficiency in Food, Energy, Water, Creative Economy, Green Economy and Blue Economy. In fighting global warming and climate change, Prabowo-Gibran is committed to continuing the program to retire coal-fired Steam Power Plants (PLTU) according to the principles of justice and balance, stopping the trade in wild animals and rare plants, and striving for conservation and protection (for point 2); providing strict sanctions for mining practices that damage the environment and encouraging efforts to restore, rehabilitate and restore degraded environment (for point 3), as well as preventing and providing severe penalties for entities involved in pollution, environmental destruction and forest burning (for point 4).

An Analysis of the Missions and Programs of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates on the Economy

Economic issues cannot be separated from the missions and programs of the presidential and vice presidential candidates because economic development can support and improve people's welfare. Economic growth, which can be seen from the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is also one of the indicators that is always raised by presidential and vice presidential candidates, both past and present.

In their document, AMIN targets the average growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with a lower bound of 5.5% and an upper bound of 6.5% per year in 2025-2029. This lower bound figure is 0.5 percentage points higher when compared to the World Economic Outlook October 2023 report by the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Outlook September 2023 report by the Asian Development Bank, each of which estimates Indonesia's GDP growth at 5% in 2024. Compared with the East Asia and the Pacific Economic Update October 2023 report by the World Bank, this lower bound figure is 0.6 percentage points higher. However, this figure is still relatively around 5%.

To achieve the GDP growth target, AMIN offers programs, one of which is attached to the 2nd Mission in the section entitled Fiscal Policy as a Driver of Growth and Equity, which states 'Encourage budget efficiency by prioritizing productive spending and suppressing non-productive spending to produce wide fiscal space and growth Average GDP of 5.5% - 6.5% per year (2025-2029)'. In general, AMIN's economic agenda and programs are attached to the 1st Mission, 2nd Mission, 4th Mission, 5th Mission, and 6th Mission.

If we refer to data from Derry Wijaya, Co-Director of Data & Democracy Research Hub at Monash University Indonesia in BBC Indonesia (2023), economic issues expressed by AMIN tend to use the words 'fair' and 'prosperous'. At the Workshop of 100 Indonesian Economists, Anies Baswedan explained the changes in the economic paradigm being offered, namely, (1) from a focus on growth to growth, equality, and sustainability; (2) from a sectoral approach to a sectoral and territorial approach, and (3) from completing government projects to resolving the problems faced by citizens. Apart from GDP growth, AMIN also stated target figures for several other economic indicators, such as an average inflation rate of 2%-3% per year (2025-2029), an Open Unemployment Rate (TPT) of 3.5%-4% in 2029, poverty rate of 4%-5% in 2029, extreme poverty rate approaching 0% in 2026, creation of more than 15 million new jobs during 2025-2029, and Gini Index of 0.36-0.37 in 2029.

In contrast to AMIN, the economic policy of Ganjar-Mahfud seems to prioritize the words 'digital' and 'fast', according to Derry Wijaya in BBC Indonesia (2023). If you look at the number of 'digital' words (search without using '…'), there are 54 digital words appearing in the Ganjar-Mahfud document, 20 words in the AMIN document, and 18 words in the Prabowo-Gibran document. These can also be seen from the 3rd Foundation to realize Ganjar-Mahfud's vision and mission, namely, 'digitization of bureaucracy which speeds up and simplifies public services'.

Regarding the digital economy, Ganjar Pranowo, at the Workshop of 100 Indonesian Economists, said that one of the positive elements of Artificial Intelligence (AI) was to help ease human life. Moreover, he also explained the E-Commerce Annual National Spending, which is in 11th place in the world with a value of IDR 649 trillion. Ganjar Pranowo also believes that this is related to compliance with fair regulations, transactions within the country, the use of Rupiah,

and the improvement of human capital.
In the economic targets, Ganjar-Mahfud also explained several economic indicators, such as an average economic growth of 7% based on the 3rd Mission of the Superior, Competitive Economy section. This 7% economic growth target will be accomplished using an inclusive strategy through increasing the role of cooperatives and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), new businesses, infrastructure, digital economy, green-blue economy, manufacturing industry growth at 7.5%- 8%, as well as optimization of Special Economic Zones. In contrast to the projection of Indonesia's economic growth of 5% in 2024 by previous reports from the International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank, the average figure proposed by Ganjar-Mahfud is two percentage points or 40% higher. Their other economic targets are extreme poverty of 0%, a poverty rate of 2.5% by 2029, and providing 17 million new jobs. In general, their economic agenda and programs are in the 1st Mission, 2nd Mission, 3rd Mission, 4th Mission, and 5th Mission.

According to data from Derry Wijaya in BBC Indonesia (2023), the document of Prabowo-Gibran often uses 'build', 'strong', 'state', and 'society'. In this data, there is also the word 'order', which means that the economic policy proposed by Prabowo-Gibran is an effort to continue the policy of President Joko Widodo, as stated in the Foundation of Advanced Indonesia. These can also be seen from the search results for the word 'Joko Widodo' in their document that appears 17 times, once in the AMIN document and twice in the Ganjar-Mahfud document. Moreover, looking at the word 'command', based on public policy theory by Mankiw (2021), Prabowo-Gibran has the possibility of using command-and-control policies.

At the Workshop of100 Indonesian Economists, Prabowo Subianto explained that the Pancasila economy would be implemented as the basis of his economic policy, where the Pancasila economy took the best essence of the capitalist and the socialist economic systems. He said that the Pancasila economy not only opened up vast opportunities for innovation with market freedom but was also an economy that paid attention to and provided a social safety net for the weakest communities. The social safety nets explained by Prabowo Subianto include the Healthy Indonesia Card (KIS), Smart Indonesia Card (KIP), Basic Food Cards, Family Hope Program (PKH), and Village Fund Direct Cash Assistance (BLT).

In line with Ganjar-Mahfud, Prabowo-Gibran also targets an aver-

age GDP growth of 6%-7% (Kamalina, 2023). Some other economic indicators are the top five world economies in 2045, an increase in per capita income from US$4,580 in 2022 to US$30,000 in 2045, and an increase in GDP to US$9.8 trillion in 2045 (Madrim, 2023). In general, explanations regarding economic policy in Prabowo-Gibran's Asta Cita are found in the 2nd Asta Cita, 3rd Asta Cita, 4th Asta Cita, 5th Asta Cita, and 6th Asta Cita.

Although, in general, the three contenders have outlined their missions and programs related to the environment and the economy, their offered agendas and policies are still very normative, especially when talking about the natural environment. In fact, now is the right moment for every presidential and vice presidential candidate to clarify and specify missions and programs related to the environment, for example, the implementations of a carbon tax. According to Law Number 7/2021 concerning Harmonization of Tax Regulations (UU 7/2021), a carbon tax is implemented to support Indonesia's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It is in line with Mankiw's (2021) theory regarding corrective taxes, also known as Pigovian taxes, where these taxes are imposed to deal with the impact of negative externalities. In other words, a carbon tax is a form of corrective tax. However, this carbon tax has been repeatedly postponed and will finally be implemented in 2026 (Yanwardhana, 2023).

Moreover, the value of the carbon tax according to Law 7/2021 is still considered low; namely, IDR 30 per kilogram of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). In fact, in Sweden, the carbon tax is already worth EUR 122 (~IDR 2.05 million) per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2023 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023). This type of disincentive has also succeeded in reducing GHG emissions by 33% and raising Sweden's GDP by 92% during the 1990-2021 period (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023). It aligns with economic theory, where corrective taxes can increase state income while elevating economic efficiency (Mankiw, 2021).

It can be a momentum for the presidential and vice presidential candidates and the National Winning Team (TPN) who come from various professions, such as economists, to assess and explain to the public and businesses regarding the calculation and optimal value of the carbon tax that will be implemented as the elected President of Indonesia 2024-2029. Moreover, these candidates can raise other significant environmental issues, such as food waste, which has not been described in the official documents. In fact, food waste also

has a significant impact on the economy.
According to the Food Loss and Waste (FLW) in Indonesia (2021) by the Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), FLW piles in Indonesia were 23-48 million tonnes per year or equivalent to 115 –184 kilograms per capita per year during 2000-2019, which costing Indonesian economy approximately IDR 213-551 trillion per year in the same period. In fact, these piles can fulfill the needs of 61-125 million people, or the equivalent of 29%-47% of the population in Indonesia from 2000-2019.

Therefore, with the limited fraction of policies related to the environment, the efforts of the presidential and vice presidential candidates in providing resolutions to environmental problems must be thoroughly reviewed by all Indonesian people, especially Generation Z and the Millennials, who are considered more aware and concerned about the environment. This is because environmental problems will affect economic performance and vice versa.

Recommendations for the People as the Key Stakeholder
According to the previous analysis, these are recommendations for the public as the key stakeholder in the 2024 General Elections:

1. Analyze and comprehend thoroughly the environmental and economic missions and programs offered by the three candidates, both from each candidate's official document and from the media. By understanding the vision, mission, and programs related to the environment and the economy, it is expected that Indonesian people, especially Gen Z and Millennials, who according to data from the General Election Commission of the Republic of Indonesia (KPU RI) will dominate the number of voters in 2024 (55%), will not be trapped and carried away by the current of political polarization, including in relation to money politics, identity politics, as well as false information and incitement to hatred.
2. Trace and examine the track records of each candidate during their services in the Government and other state institutions, as well as their positions, efforts, and commitments to overcoming environmental and economic problems. Voters must be more critical, intelligent, and wise in understanding the track record and vision, mission, and programs offered by the candidates.
3. Analyze and assess critically the economic programs that use the phrases 'subsidies' or 'free'. The public is expected not to get caught up in promises that use this phrase. Because subsi-

dies, such as government subsidies, are budgeted from the State Budget (APBN). When government subsidies are not on target, the impact is not only on the people who should receive subsidy assistance, but it will also reduce the APBN's ability to act as a shock absorber.

4. Study the financing of economic and environmental programs and aspects of sustainability in development offered by the candidates. The young generation, both Generation Z and the Millennials, must be able to actively participate in presidential and vice-presidential debates regarding financing and sustainability aspects of development.
5. Study, track, and discover environmental and economic issues that are discussed or currently occurring in local, regional, and global contexts. This information can be accessed from various sources, such as Earth.org, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and even Ministries/Institutions such as the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK), Ministry of National Development Planning/Bappenas, Ministry of Finance, and others.

- Putu Rusta Adijaya -

The presidential and vice presidential candidates who will compete in the upcoming 2024 elections have issued their visions, missions, and programs. However, their missions and programs related to the environment and economy are still normative and narrow. The public must review and comprehend thoroughly the environmental and economic programs offered so as not to get caught up in the current political polarization. Moreover, the people must also research their track records, criticize promises that include phrase subsidies and free, analyze environmental and economic financing and sustainability aspects, and discover environmental and economic issues from various sources.

Accessibility and Assistance for Persons with Disabilities at Polling Stations in KPU Regulations

During the 2019 general elections, the participation of people with disabilities still faces problems. According to the second improved permanent voter data (DPTHP-2) from the General Elections Commission (KPU), there were 1,247,730 voters with disabilities who have been determined by the KPU (news.detik.com, 15/12/2018). However, according to the number of voters with disabilities in the 2019 elections, there were only 363,200 people in the DPT (opendata.kpu.go.id, 27/9/2021). It could be seen that many people with disabilities were recorded who in the end were not registered and participated in the 2019 Elections.

According to several national studies and regional case studies, it can be summarized that the problems of the lack of participation of persons with disabilities in the aspects of voting are poor accessibility, human resources in some areas that do not understand the needs of persons with disabilities, and the stigma of persons with disabilities in elections. Accessibility to polling stations (TPS) and assistive devices used in voting were still problems for people with disabilities in the 2019 elections (Rengganis, *et. al.*, 2021; Andriani & Amsari, 2020; Noviani, Subhilhar, and Amin, 2021; Sucahyo, 2019).

According to data from the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), as many as 2,366 polling stations were still difficult to reach by people with disabilities, especially physical disabilities. Then as many as 20,834 polling stations did not provide braille tools for people with visual disabilities (CNNIndonesia.com, 4/18/2019). Then the lack of knowledge about the needs of persons with disabilities by election implementers in the regions and the stigma that still surrounded persons with disabilities did not need to vote also contributed to the non-optimal participation of persons with disabilities in the 2019 elections.

Technicalities related to accessibility and assistance for persons with disabilities in the implementation of voting at polling stations until the counting is regulated in several regulations that will be discussed in this paper. Therefore, this paper shall discuss the inclusiveness and completeness of PKPU that accommodates accessibility and the availability of assistance during voting at polling stations for persons with disabilities in voting based on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as ratified in Law Number 19/2011 concerning the Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Law No. 8/2016 on Persons with Disabilities (PD Law), and The Bill of Electoral Rights for Citizens with Disabilities (BERCD) by the International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) in 2002.

PKPU Analysis related to Fulfillment of Election Indicators with Accessibility and Assistance for Persons with Disabilities

In this article, the author summarizes the CRPD, PD Law, and BECRD to serve as indicators for evaluating the comprehensiveness of accessibility arrangements and assistance for persons with disabilities at polling stations during voting. The following indicator points are relevant to the context of voting at polling stations:

a. Minimum standards and guidelines for accessibility to facilities and services for persons with disabilities at polling stations;
b. A mechanism for monitoring the implementations of minimum standards and guidelines for accessibility to facilities and services for persons with disabilities at polling stations;
c. Training for Voting Organizer Groups (KPPS) and other election organizers in assisting voters with disabilities;
d. Companion assistance, voting aids, and/or voting information at polling stations based on their respective disabilities;
e. Provision of mobility access for persons with physical disabilities; and
f. Fulfillment of the principle of confidentiality for voters with disabilities.

According to the author's analysis, the following is the fulfillment of each indicator based on its arrangement in the relevant PKPU. *First*, there are minimum standards and guidelines for accessibility to polling station facilities and services. This indicator is fulfilled due to the existence of arrangements for persons with disabilities in PKPU Number 3 of 2019 concerning Voting and Vote Counting in General Elections as amended in PKPU Number 9/ 2019 (PKPU on Voting and Vote Counting) and PKPU Number 14/2023 concerning

Voting Equipment, Other Equipment Support in General Elections as amended in PKPU Number 16 of 2023 (PKPU on Voting Equipment). In the PKPU regulation, voting arrangements have been inserted for the context of persons with disabilities so that there are minimum standards.

In fulfilling the *second* category, the author has not found a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of minimum standards and guidelines for accessibility to facilities and services for persons with disabilities at polling stations in the PKPU on Voting and Counting and PKPU on Voting Equipment. The two PKPUs only discuss the standards of tools and mechanisms of work by KPPS during voting and counting. The Election Supervisory Agency Regulation Number 1/2023 concerning General Election Monitoring (Perbawaslu Election Monitoring), is regulated regarding monitoring during the voting process.

However, according to Articles 20, 21, 22, and 25 of Perbawaslu on Election Monitoring, election observers only monitor and report if there is fraud during the election and cannot intervene. The absence of monitoring the minimum standards of access and assistance for persons with disabilities at polling stations has the potential to impact the lack of a sense of responsibility and obligation of the KPPS to carry out the minimum standards as stipulated in PKPU.

Third, training for KPPS. Based on PKPU Number 8/2022 concerning the Establishment and Working Procedures of the *Adhoc* Body for the General Elections and Elections of Governors and Deputy Governors, Regents, and Deputy Regents, and Mayors and Deputy Mayors (PKPU PPU), there are no regulations related to the training period or socialization of KPPS work, either in general or for the context of persons with disabilities. The procedures for using voting aids, providing access, and assistance by KPPS are also not explained in PKPU PPU. In other words, reading this PKPU alone is not sufficient for KPPS members to know how to work with voters with disabilities. The author also has not found technical guidelines for KPPS work procedures during voting. Therefore, this indicator has not been met.

Furthermore, the *fourth* indicator is the assistance of companions, voting aids, and/or voting information at polling stations based on their respective disabilities. In PKPU on Voting and Counting, it is stipulated in Articles 43 and 44 that voters with disabilities can be assisted by a companion who is a member of the KPPS or another person at the request of the voter concerned. In Article 20 para-

graph (3) letter l of PKPU on Voting and Counting, assistance is also provided for people with visual disabilities by using blind aids provided, which are also regulated in PKPU PPU. Then for voters with physical disabilities can be assisted to move towards the booth or can be accompanied in the booth if needed.

However, the term "assistive devices for the visually impaired" raises multiple interpretations, whether it means voting aids in the form of braille letters or walking sticks (Soekanwo, 2023). Blind aids are defined in Article 26 of PKPU PPU, but in the field, blind people may not necessarily understand this. Thus, this has the potential to cause confusion when voting takes place.

The *fifth* indicator is the provision of mobility access for persons with physical disabilities. Easy access to mobility for persons with physical disabilities has been protected in Article 16 paragraph (2) letter a PKPU Voting and Counting and Article 13 paragraph (2) PKPU PPU where polling stations must provide easy access to reach persons with disabilities. The PKPU also regulates other easy access provisions such as entrances that must be able to guarantee access to movement for voters with disabilities in wheelchairs and ballot box tables that are not too high so that voters with wheelchairs can reach them.

However, there is no specific regulation of the criteria for polling stations that are friendly to access for people with physical disabilities, criteria for wheelchair walking places, and others. PKPU Voting and Counting and PKPU PPU only protect in general that polling stations must be disability-accessible, but do not provide an explanation of how this can be realized.

For the *last* indicator, the secrecy of votes of persons with disabilities is protected in Point 4 of the BECRD and the electoral principles in the PD Law. For persons with disabilities, a mechanism has been provided where the companion accompanying them to the booth must maintain the confidentiality of the votes of persons with disabilities. Article 44 paragraph (2) PKPU on Voting and Vote Counting stipulates that a companion appointed by a voter with a disability must sign a statement on the Model C3-KPU form stating that they will keep the voter's choice confidential.

The existence of this mechanism is good to maintain the confidentiality of the votes of voters with disabilities who are accompanied. However, in practice in the field, people with disabilities who state

that they are able to vote alone without being accompanied must be granted so that the principle of confidentiality in elections can be optimally protected.

"In order to encourage inclusive elections and simultaneous regional elections in 2024, it is important for the KPU to complete PKPU Voting and Counting and PKPU PPU with specifications and criteria for mobility tools and facilities for persons with disabilities to make it easier for KPPS to implement them at their respective polling stations.

Recommendations

According to the above discussion, the following recommendations are proposed:

a. KPU needs to complete PKPU Voting and Counting and PKPU PPU with specifications and criteria for mobility tools and facilities for persons with disabilities to make it easier for KPPS to implement them at their respective polling stations;
b. KPU, in collaboration with civil society organizations, needs to form an *adhoc* committee at the City/Regency level that focuses on fulfilling accessibility and assistance for persons with disabilities at polling stations;
c. Bawaslu needs to form an adhoc committee that oversees the fulfillment of accessibility and assistance for persons with disabilities at polling stations and make an evaluation report on fulfillment to be used as an evaluation and target in the following year; and
d. KPU conducts comprehensive training or socialization for KPPS or issues KPU Regulations on technical guidelines that at least explain about voting aids for the blind and other aids, how to become a companion of persons with disabilities, and assist persons with disabilities with mobility access problems.

- Christina Clarissa Intania -

Regulation and Policy Registration of Indigenous People on the Permanent Voters List

Indonesian citizens have the political right to vote in general elections (pemilu). However, of all walks of life, one group whose voting rights have not been properly fulfilled is the indigenous people. Reflecting on the 2019 elections, of the approximately 3 million indigenous people, only 530,000 could vote in the elections. The participation of 530,000 indigenous people was possible thanks to the affirmation policy of the General Election Commission (KPU) and the actions of the local governments. One of them was the Bulukumba Regent who succeeded in establishing a regent decree on the recognition of the Bulukumba Indigenous People (Salabi, 2018; Gladiaventa & Sari, 2022).

One of the reasons for the unfulfilled political rights of indigenous people to vote in elections is the obstacles in the data collection of indigenous people as voters; that is, they do not have an electronic identity card (KTP-el). KTP-el is one of the main requirements for registering residents in the electoral register, in accordance with Article 202 paragraph(2) of Law Number 7/2017 concerning elections as amended by government regulation in lieu of Law Number 1/2022 (election law) and Article 3 Paragraph (2) of KPU regulation Number 7,/2022 concerning the preparation of voter lists in the implementations of General Elections and voter Election Data Information Systems as amended by Regulation Number 7 of the KPU/2023 (PKPU preparation of voter lists).

Indigenous people who seek e-KTP have their own obstacles, especially the uncertainty of residence and discrimination experienced by indigenous people. The uncertainty of the place of residence is caused by the uncertainty of the territory of indigenous people due to the large number of agrarian conflicts that force them to leave their place of residence. Not only uncertainty, indigenous people also often experience discrimination in making e-ID cards because most adhere to beliefs outside the 6 (six) official religions in Indonesia. Although it has been decided in the Constitutional Court deci-

sion Number 97/PUU-XIV/2016, which allows the inclusion of the flow of trust in the e-KTP and Family Card, in fact, there is still discrimination in the field (Hidayat, 2019).

The difficulty of access to areas where indigenous people live is also one of the reasons for the government's difficulty in registering indigenous people as voters. Indigenous people tend to live in remote and even wooded areas, because the location of these remote areas is far from the center of government, so it is considered difficult to access (Hidayat, 2019).

In this paper, we shall discuss further the regulation of voter registration in the context of indigenous people and the affirmation policies that have been carried out so far to improve the data collection of indigenous people as voters in elections.

Indigenous Voter Data Collection Arrangements

In analyzing the arrangement of indigenous people's voter data collection, the author has analyzed PKPU number 7/2022 regarding the preparation of voter lists in the implementations of General Elections and the voter Data Information System (PKPU on Voter List). According to the PKPU electoral roll, the right of indigenous people to be registered and elected is protected in Article 2 Paragraph (1) related to the principles of preparing electoral rolls, including comprehensive, inclusive, participatory, open, and accessible.

In the PKPU on Voter List, there is an alternative for those who do not have an e-KTP under Article 4 letter e, namely using a Family Card (KK). However, it is necessary to re-examine the ownership of KK and the accessibility of indigenous people to obtain KK, because if KTP-el and KK are both difficult to obtain by indigenous people, it will produce the same results. In the election list, according to Article 11 paragraph (1) PKPU on Voter List, population data obtained from the government in the form of data on the potential population of voters from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) provided to the KPU.

In PKPU on Voter List, there are other types of voter lists besides DPT; namely, additional voter lists and voter lists at special locations. However, for the additional voter list, indigenous people do not meet certain criteria to be registered in the additional voter list under Article 116 paragraph (3) of the PKPU voter list. And according to Article 117 paragraph (2) PKPU on Voter List, to enter the additional voter list is still needed KTP-el or KK which is still a problem.

As for the list of voters in special locations, indigenous people can be interpreted as the special location of conflict areas based on Article 179 paragraph (3) letter D PKPU on Voter List. This can be interpreted as such because according to the Commissioner for assessment and research of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) Saurlin Siagian, until September 16, 2023, there were 692 cases of agrarian conflicts reported to Komnas HAM with indigenous people being one of the top 4 (four) parties involved in these conflicts as complainants (Siagian, 2023).

However, indigenous people need to be registered at a polling station in their home region that is in conflict first to be registered on the Electoral Roll at a special location (A. Akbar, Alliance of Indigenous People of The Archipelago / AMAN, interview on November 8, 2023), which according to the author also boils down to the problem of ownership of KTP-el.

Policy for Indigenous People to be registered in DPT

Currently, as well as since the 2019 election, there has been no policy or legislation that specifically provides convenience for indigenous people to be registered in DPT. On the other hand, one factor that hinders the data collection of indigenous people to be registered in the DPT is the provisions related to forest protection and conservation, namely the attitude of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the provision of Indigenous People' KTP-el cards provided that the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) issues forest area release permits (A. Akbar, AMAN, interview on November 8, 2023).

According to Article 7 of Environment and Forestry Ministerial Regulation Number P.96/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/11/2018 concerning Procedures For The Release of Convertible Production Forest Areas, as amended in Environment and Forestry Ministerial Regulation Number P.50/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/9/2019, forest area clearance is granted for business licensing activities in the agricultural, industrial, or transportation sectors or non-business licensing. Non-business licenses if viewed from several local regulations are practice permits such as veterinary practice permits, permits for beverage sales, and others issued by local governments. This is irrelevant to indigenous di people where indigenous people have neither.

According to the latest developments, AMAN has drawn up a memorandum of understanding with the KPU, in which the KPU

will work together with AMAN to record indigenous people, which will later be recommended to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Hidayat, 2023). As of this writing, the follow-up to the memorandum of understanding is the planning of election information dissemination for indigenous people in 5 (five) regions by the KPU (A. Akbar, AMAN, interview on November 8, 2023). There has been no sign of an affirmative policy for data collection specifically for indigenous people.

The eexistence of indigenous people must be truly recognized and respected as stipulated in Article 18b paragraph (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia year 1945, including in fulfilling the political rights of indigenous people in elections.

Recommendations

According to the above analysis, the author gives short-term recommendations for elections and long-term. For the short term in the context of elections, it is important to create a special affirmative policy to make it easier for indigenous people to be recorded in the DPT. To that end, there needs to be a cooperation between civil society organizations, local governments, especially at the district/city and village levels, the commission, and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

A memorandum of understanding between the KPU with AMAN is a good step, but this needs to be followed by commitments from other institutions that are also involved in the population data collection of indigenous people, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs which will issue KTP-el. Therefore, there is a need for commitment and close synergy between institutions through joint regulation making between the KPU and the Ministry of Home Affairs which establishes affirmative policies to facilitate the data collection of indigenous people in DPT.

For the long term, it is important to encourage the ratification of the Indigenous People Law and continue concrete steps to realize agrarian reform. The domicile of indigenous people needs to be given protection away from agrarian conflicts that violate the constitutional right of people to live and be valued for their existence. It is expected that the existence of indigenous people can be truly recognized and respected as stipulated in Article 18b paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

- Christina Clarissa Intania -

Crucial Issues of State Civil Apparatus Neutrality in General Elections

The neutrality of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) is one of the issues raised in every general elections. Mobilizing and directing the bureaucracy to support certain candidates are considered effective to guarantee victory. Moreover, Indonesia's bureaucratic structure is structured hierarchically and prioritizes obedience to the leadership. In other words, mobilizing ASN in elections tends to be a shortcut for candidates who have the ability and opportunity.

According to the data released by the ASN Commission (KASN) and the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), throughout 2019 there were 412 cases of ASN non-neutrality in the elections. The majority of cases were related to the expressions of ASN's supports for candidates in the elections. This number is expected to increase in the 2024 General Elections because it will face three election momentum at once, including the general elections of legislative members, the general elections of the president and vice president, and the simultaneous local government elections.

ASN neutrality consists of three aspects related to each other. The three aspects are neutrality in politics, neutrality in public services, and neutrality in ASN Management (Mokhsen, et.al, 2018). The question that arises is whether this neutrality can be implemented consistently in elections? There are at least three crucial issues that need to be supervised and monitored by the public. The aim is for all elements of the nation to participate together in maintaining and overseeing the neutrality of ASN in the elections. The first issue is about the involvement of high-ranking public officials in the contestation, both as candidates and success teams. Furthermore, preventive and repressive strategies to maintain the neutrality of ASN. The last issue is about the structural depoliticization of the bureaucracy.

The Problematics of Public Official Positions in Bureaucracy and Contestation

Currently, three pairs of candidates have been officially registered to run in the presidential and vice-presidential elections. There are three candidates who still serve in public positions as ministers and a regional heads. In this position, legally and ethically there are quite dilemmatic problems. Public officials such as ministers and regional heads have the functions of leading the agency bureaucracy while managing the state budget and assets.

Ministers and heads of the local governments according to Law Number 20/2023 on ASN (ASN Law) is a Personnel Supervisory Authority (PPK). As PPK, the ministers and the heads of the local governments have the authority to appoint, transfer, and dismiss ASNs who work in their institutions. This authority is highly vulnerable to abuse in the context of mobilizing and directing ASN support in elections.

In the context of budget spending, according to Law Number 1/2004 on State Treasury (PN Law), the ministers and the heads of the local governments also act as Budget Users and Assets Users of agencies. The high-rank public officials as Budget Users and Assets Users have strong authority to determine spending allocation policies and procurement of government goods/services within the scope of their agencies.

The problem becomes more complex when many public officials also serve as candidate success teams. This means that there are possibilities and opportunities for public officials who lack integrity to direct the use of the budget and state property together for electoral political interests. If this condition occurs, ASN will be in a dilemmatic position. On the one hand, as an employee, the ASN concerned must obey the orders of the agency's highest leadership. On the other hand, as an ASN, the employee concerned must also maintain neutrality in both politics and public services.

Many public officials who are actively involved in elections then take leave during the campaign period. This practice tends to be a mere formality, because in reality these officials only temporarily suspend their authority while still having the power to control the bureaucracy and budget in the agencies they lead. This means that the possibility to abuse authority is still open and used by public officials involved in election contestation.

Preventive and Repressive Efforts to Maintain ASN Neutrality

The Ministry of Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Reform, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bawaslu, General Election Commission, and ASN Commission have released a Collective Decree (SKB) to maintain ASN neutrality. This step can be classified as a preventive effort to maintain the neutrality of ASN. Information dissemination also continues to be conducted by Bawaslu to central and local government agencies. However, there needs to be a measurable evaluation related to the effectiveness of the SKB and the information dissemination undertaken by Bawaslu.

Repressive efforts are implemented by imposing sanctions in accordance with the violations committed by ASN. Sanctions in the form of reprimands to dismissal are options that can be chosen. At this stage, the possibility of problems arises again because the one who gives sanctions is the public official as PPK. What if the offending ASN actually supports a public official who is a candidate? Or just the opposite? Will the sanctioning be objective?

Indonesia has experienced five democratic elections since 1999. In other words, there have been 25 years of experience in maintaining ASN neutrality. If there are still continuous violations in every election, then it is certain that there are problems in the regulations governing ASN neutrality. In another perspective, it can be interpreted that the weakness of ASN neutrality arrangements is actually utilized by the politicians who lack integrity.

It is time to reform regulations related to ASN neutrality. The aspect of neutrality is not only seen from an individual perspective, but also institutionally. Neutrality is not only required by individual ASNs, but also by the institutions or agencies where ASNs work. Neutrality must also be seen not only from the internal perspective of individual ASNs, but there are also external factors that encourage and catalyze violations of neutrality. Therefore, a breakthrough is needed to create neutrality as an ASN culture and identity by reforming regulations governing the neutrality of civil servants.

Depoliticization of the Bureaucracy

The politicization of the bureaucracy is indirectly a result of the provisions regarding the possibility of non-civil servants to fill high leadership positions. This mechanism was previously regulated in Government Regulation Number 49/2018 on the Management of

Government Employees with Employment Agreements and later strengthened in the ASN Law. On the one hand, this provision can provide a breath of fresh air for the bureaucracy with the transfer of ideas and knowledge from the private world. However, it cannot be denied that the placement of non-civil servants opens up opportunities for political infiltration into the bureaucracy structurally. ASN neutrality in politics, public services, and management will be at stake, particularly in the face of election momentum. The mobilization of bureaucratic resources including personnel, budgets, and programs for electoral political purposes is an opportunity that can be used by officials who lack integrity. However, the bureaucracy has its own internal control system. The politicization of the bureaucracy will be rejected from within, especially from ASNs who have a professional character and identity.

Efforts to depoliticize the bureaucracy must be carried out by not providing opportunities for anyone to infiltrate electoral politics into the bureaucracy structurally. High-ranking officials in government agencies, both those from civil servants and PPPK, must be transparent if they support one of the election contestants. Resignation is the only option given to partisan ASN employees. The actions taken by Andi Widjajanto who resigned as Governor of the National Defense Institute and Rosan Roeslani who stepped down from Deputy Minister of State-Owned Enterprises become precedents that should be emulated by anyone working in the bureaucracy.

Recommendations

The recommendations are as follows:

1. To maintain political neutrality, public services, and ASN Management, public officials who act as PPK must hand over their authority to the High Leadership Officials in their institutions. The State Personnel Agency and the ASN Commission need to formulate this handover mechanism so as not to hamper ASN Management during the election period.
2. To ensure impartiality and unbiasedness in the Budget and State Assets utilization, public officials involved in election contestation must hand over their authority as Budget Users and Goods Users until the end of the election. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance needs to determine the mechanism for handing over authority to Budget Users and Goods Users who participate in elections.
3. Depoliticization of the Bureaucracy begins with ensuring that it is not only the ASN as an individual who must be neutral, but also the agency where the ASN works. Therefore, a monitoring mechanism is needed for the institution as an organ with

resources that can be mobilized and directed to support candidates in the election.

- Asrul Ibrahim Nur -

There are possibilities and opportunities for public officials who lack integrity to direct the use of the budget and state property together for electoral political interests. It is time to reform regulations related to ASN neutrality. The aspect of neutrality is not only seen from an individual perspective, but also institutionally. Neutrality is not only required by individual ASNs but also by the institutions and agencies where ASN work

The Legal Policy of Bureaucratic Transformation in the State Civil Apparatus Law

After nine years, Law Number 5/2014 on the State Civil Apparatus (Law 5/2014) was finally repealed and replaced with Law Number 20/2023 on the State Civil Apparatus (Law 20/2023). The enactment of Law 5/2014 initially provided a breath of fresh air to bureaucratic reform because it changed many provisions on civil service established by the New Order regime. However, the law, which was passed at the end of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's term, did not have a significant impact.

Indonesia's Public Service Index data released by The Global Economy shows fluctuations under the world average. In 2023, Indonesia's public service index is at 5.9, significantly behind Malaysia, which obtains an index of 3.7. The country with the highest public service index is Iceland with an almost perfect score of 0.9. Meanwhile, the country with the worst index in the world is Afghanistan with a score of 10.

The adoption of Law 20/2023 provides a new hope not only to reform the bureaucracy but also to transform it. Some important issues regulated in this law include those related to the ASN Position, the involvement of the military and police in the civilian bureaucracy and vice versa, and the future of temporary employees after 2024. These three issues will be discussed and analyzed in this article.

The Transformation of ASN Job Titles

Prior to Law 5/2014, the classification of ASN job titles was known as structural and functional positions. Structural positions were known by the concept of echelonization in four levels of positions. Since 2014, the term echelonization has been changed to the concept of High Leadership Position, Administrative Position, and Functional Position. Echelonization still exists and only changes the name and nomenclature. Therefore, President Joko Widodo in the second period of his administration initiated a two-level downsizing of the bureaucratic echelon. The policy is expected to accelerate

public services.

The classifications of ASN job titles are modified in Law 20/2023 with the terms Managerial and Non-Managerial Positions. The concept of echelonization remains in Managerial Positions. The difference is that there are clear definitions and roles between Managerial and Non-Managerial Positions. The clear difference in roles between the two types of positions is expected to make the bureaucracy more flexible and adaptable to deliver government programs.

There are at least three important things that need to be considered in the implementations of the transformation of ASN Job Titles. First, after the ratification of Law 20/2023 and followed by the stipulation of derivative Government Regulations, the Government, in this case the Ministry of Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Reform (PAN and RB) and the State Civil Service Agency (BKN), need to change technical regulations that still refer to Law 5/2014. Second, the Ministry of PAN and RB needs to conduct massive information dissemination to all government agencies, both central and local. Bureaucratic transformation regulations need to be disseminated to ensure that ASN employees can immediately adapt their work culture in accordance with the objectives of Law 20/2023. Third, within a certain period of time, the Ministry of PAN and RB needs to evaluate the implementations of Law 20/2023 to measure the effectiveness and identify the weaknesses of the law.

The Dual Function of State Civil Apparatus and the Armed Forces?

Several media outlets have reported that Law 20/2023 provides a red carpet for the Indonesian Armed Force (TNI)/Indonesian National Police (Polri) to fill ASN positions. This provision is actually not genuinely anything new. A similar clause is also available in Law 5/2014 and has been implemented for at least the last nine years.

Normatively, the fulfillment of ASN positions by active TNI/Kepolisian personels can be implemented in a limited manner. Both Law 20/2023 and Law 5/2014 limitatively determine that not all civil servant positions can be occupied by active members of the armed forces. The fulfillment of these positions requires compliance with the provisions of the Law on the TNI and the Law on the Police. In addition, the implementations of this provision also require further rules in a Government Regulation. Therefore, claims of a return to the dual function of the armed forces into civilian functions are premature.

Currently, the Draft Government Regulation (RPP) on the Fulfilling

of ASN Positions by TNI/Police is being prepared and under deliberations. Therefore, civil society needs to oversee the development of this RPP so that it does not deviate from the spirit of reform; namely, the elimination of the dual function of the armed forces. The filling of ASN positions by active members of the TNI/Police can be done on a limited basis in civilian agencies that require military or police expertise.

Law 20/2023 also regulates the opportunity for ASN to fill positions within the TNI / Police. This provision is actually not a novel thing for ASN. Currently there are indeed Civil Servants who work in TNI agencies with certain functions; for example, in carrying out tasks in the field of finance or procurement of government goods/services. The Explanation of Law 20/2023 further provides an understanding that the filling of ASN Positions by the TNI/Police and vice versa is part of equal career development based on the merit system.

However, there are different norm formulations between the provisions of TNI/Police occupying ASN Positions and ASN occupying positions within the TNI/Police. Article 19 paragraph (2) of Law 20/2023 formulates that certain ASN Positions can be filled from TNI soldiers and members of the Police. This formulation regulates that TNI/Police personnel with special qualifications can occupy certain ASN Positions. This means that there is a change in status from TNI soldiers/police personels to ASN employees. Different provisions in the formulation for ASN are stated to be able to occupy positions within the TNI/Police. The equality argument in Law 20/2023 is actually not that accurate, considering that ASN Employees who work in the TNI/Police environment still occupy ASN Positions as they should.

The Future of the Temporary Workers

The existence of temporary workers is an acute problem that has never been resolved in the Indonesian bureaucracy. The short-term solution provided by the government through the conversion to ASN cannot prevent the recruitment of temporary workers both at the central and local levels. Government Regulation No. 49/2018 on the Management of the Government Employees with Employment Agreements (GR PPPK) has made it clear that it will eliminate temporary workers by November 2023. However, in July 2023 the Minister of PAN and RB released letter number B/1527/M.SM.01.00/2023, which postponed the implementations of the pro-

visions in the GR PPPK.

Law 20/2023 prohibits the recruitment of non-ASN employees to fill ASN positions. Furthermore, the regulation also determines the settlement of temporary workers no later than December 2024. At first glance, this provision is a solution to the temporary worker problem. However, the explicit and definitive mention of time in the law can have a double meaning. First, this provision could mean throwing a fireball at the government and parliament for the next period. Second, the target time is indeed to provide an opportunity for the Government to prepare measurable steps until December 2024.

The Government also needs to manage the employment status of non-ASN employees in agencies under the Public Service Agency (BLU) or universities with the status of Legal Entity State Universities (PTN BH), which are authorized to recruit employees. Non-uniform recruitment patterns and employment statuses incompatible with Law 20/2023 will create a time bomb that can explode at any time.

The temporary worker problem must be resolved by prioritizing the principles of transparency, consistency, and sustainability. Transparency in resolving the temporary worker issue is conducted by ensuring that the settlement process and procedures are understood by all stakeholders. The principle of consistency is implemented by the government's commitment to resolve the temporary worker problem based on the mechanism established by the legislation. Procrastination must be stopped because it will not solve the problem and will only transfer the burden to the incoming administration. The principle of sustainability is applied by ensuring that the recruitment of temporary workers will not be continued in the future. Limiting or even eliminating the budget for non-ASN employees can be a tangible step.

Recommendations

The establishment of Law 20/2023 is a momentum to reorganize and transform the bureaucracy based on the vision of an developed Indonesia in 2045. This article recommends that both the government and the DPR consistently implement the mandate of the law to organize the bureaucracy. The Government needs to establish implementing regulations and replace all personnel regulations that still refer to the revoked civil service law. The DPR plays an important role in overseeing the implementations of Law 20/2023,

including the stipulation of its implementing regulations.

Civil society needs to oversee the implementations of Law 20/2023 and its delegated regulations. Currently, the issue of bureaucratic reform is less of a concern for civil society, since they are often too focused on environmental issues and elections. Bureaucratic reform is a mandate of the Reformasi movement and needs to be supervised until its completion. The bureaucracy is the driving force of the state that must be well organized in order to fully implement the government's vision and mission.

The enactment of Law 20/2023 provides a new hope, not only to reform the bureaucracy but also to transform it. The temporary worker issue must be resolved by prioritizing the principles of transparency, consistency, and sustainability.

- Asrul Ibrahim Nur -

Dynasty Politics: Lessons from the Philippines

As a country with dynamic politics, Indonesia is no stranger to the term "political dynasty". The definition of this term is that a regime of power and certain political actors is carried out from generation to generation based on family lineage or kinship (Bawaslu, 2021). This phenomenon is not a problem considering that in the Indonesian context, the political rights of every citizen are clearly regulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Article 28 E paragraphs (2) and (3). Although it is not wrong, the proliferation of political dynasty practices does not mean that it does not raise concerns about inequality in the distribution of power. This is crucial in a country that adheres to democracy because imperfect distribution of political power will give rise to absolute power, which can harm democratic values.

In many modern democratic countries, the phenomenon of dynasty politics is often found. In the United States; for example, there is dynasty politics built by the Kennedy family. The Philippines as a neighboring country to Indonesia also carries out this practice very smoothly, where data shows that 80% of provinces in the Philippines are involved in dynastiy politics, of which 74% are in power in the Philippine parliament (Gunanto, 2020).

In Indonesia itself, this practice has emerged since the leadership of President Soekarno. Sukarno's descendants who later became actively involved in Indonesian politics, such as Megawati Soekarnoputri, Sukmawati, and Guruh Soekarno. In KH's family. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur), several of his biological children are also involved in practical politics. This also applies to Megawati Soekarnoputri's family, where Puan Maharani's daughter is Chair of the Indonesian DPR. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) also built a political dynasty. Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, Eddie Baskoro, Hartanto Edhie Wibowo, Agus Hermanto, Sartono Hutomo, Dwi Astuti Wulandari, and Agung Budi Santosa are a number of names in Indonesian politics who come from the SBY family.

Even today, during the leadership of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), dynasticly politics is still thriving. Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who is President Jokowi's first child, was officially elected as the Mayor of Surakarta in 2021. Still in the same year, Jokowi's son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, was also appointed Mayor of Medan. In August 2023, Kaesang Pangarep, who is the president's youngest child, officially became a member of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), and two days later, he was immediately appointed as the general chair of the party.

Dynastiy politics has also flourished at the local level. Indonesia Corruption Watch at least noted that 2010 was the worst year, because there were many regional heads who were elected and also had the status of family or relatives of the previous regional heads. Some of these names are,l; for example: the Regent of Kendal, Widya Kandi Susanti, who is the wife of the previous regent; namely, Hendry Boedoro; The Regent of Kutai Kertanegara, Rita Widyasari, is the biological daughter of the previous regent; namely Syaukani HR, and there are many other examples. There is also Syahrul Yasin Limpo's child, Indira Thita Chunda, who has been a member of the DPR RI since 2023. Syahrul's nephew, Adnan Purichta, is also the Regent of Gowa, South Sulawesi for the 2021-2025 period, replacing his father.

What's Happening in the Philippines?

The Philippines is taken as a comparison considering that the country's characteristics are almost the same as Indonesia; namely, as an archipelagic country and a former European colony. In addition, data shows that 70% of congresses in the Philippines are dominated by dynasty politics (Mendoza, 2016). This is also shown by how; for example, the Marcos family controls the Philippine government. Interestingly, several studies show that there is a causal relationship between the level of poverty in a country and the dynasty political practices within it. Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) are among those who researched this. The results of their research show that the proliferation of dynasty politics in the Philippines has resulted in less competitive democratic space. It is this uncompetitive politics and democracy that is the main factor behind poor policies and unsatisfactory economic performance.

Several literatures in the field of political science also provide explanations of the possibilities behind these empirical findings. Teehankee (2007); for example, argues that the emergence and persistence of political dynasties can be traced to the highly unequal socioeconomic structure of the Philippine society and the govern-

ment's failure to develop a fully democratic electoral and party system. Institutional weaknesses and their associated impacts, such as low educational attainment, contribute to increasing the political power of small elite groups.

The inability of the majority to compete with the elite opened the door to the emergence of many political dynasties. This context shows how poverty and inequality can fuel the need for political patrons. In a situation filled with economic shocks and major crises, and without an effective social safety net, the poor in the Philippines have almost no option but to seek support from local patrons. This situation helps strengthen patterns of politics and governance based on personality. Therefore, political dynasties can be considered the result of economic inequality in the political arena (Mendoza, 2012).

Coronel (2007) highlights the important role of popularity in forming political dynasties at the national level, with the media playing a crucial role in promoting political personalities and strengthening name recognition among voters. This is reinforced by the findings of Teehankee (2007), which shows that the dominance of the media in elections provides opportunities for politicians to build the basis of political dynasties through the projected public image. Name recognition and media support contribute to the formation of a candidate's image, strengthen political viability, and facilitate the emergence of political dynasties. Analyzes generally recognize that this situation encourages politicians to increase name recognition in various ways, including associating programs and projects with their names, such as naming school buildings and emergency vehicles after specific politicians.

In conclusion, the proliferation of political dynasties in the Philippines, which has resulted in poor policy practices there is caused by three main factors. First, the socio-economic foundation factors on which the dynasty was built. Second, the inability of the state apparatus to implement the constitution in the Philippines, and third is the weakness of political competition and democracy within it.

Reflections for Indonesia

Djoni Gunanto (2020) in his study explains that there are at least two main factors that influence the formation of dynasty politics in Indonesia. First, the cadre formation process in political parties has stalled, which has resulted in recruiting political candidates

with lower capacity and quality. This has resulted in political parties adopting a pragmatic stance by supporting candidates who have family ties to officials currently in power. Second, the community context tends to maintain the *status quo* , especially at the regional level, where they want regional leaders who have a relationship or closeness to the current authorities, encouraging them to replace incumbent officials. This situation created the basis for the formation of political dynasties at the local level.

Indonesia should be able to learn from the findings in the Philippines. The mushrooming of political dynasties in the Philippines creates an uncompetitive political space, which then leads to ineffective policy implementations and low economic growth rates.

There are several important perspectives that reflect the risk of political dynasties in Indonesia. First, kinship politics in Indonesia hinders criticism, supervision and control mechanisms (*checks and balances*). Political dynasties in Indonesia tend to prioritize family relationships, with policies that benefit certain groups. Second, the development of dynasty politics results in an imbalance in *the playing field* , because political dynasties are able to accumulate influence, wealth, territorial control and control of certain economies. This creates a greater potential for victory in political contestations compared to other candidates who have limited resources and capital.

Third, the growth of dynastiy politics shows weaknesses in the institutionalization of political parties, indicating weak quality in recruitment and cadre formation. Fourth, the power of political parties is increasingly weakening because individual candidate factors determine victory in the contest. Political parties prioritize candidates who are related to families who hold political positions, are considered to have financial advantages, popularity and the ability to mobilize the masses.

Victory in contestation is the main focus of political parties, ignoring the effectiveness of power in the medium and long term so that various methods are used to ensure victory.

Recommendations

According to the explanations above, here are several relevant recommendations to prevent and minimize the negative risks of the widespread practice of dynastic politics in Indonesia:

1. Strengthening legal regulations; namely, Law Number 10/2016 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 1/2015 concerning the Establishment of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning the Elections of Governors, Regents and Mayors . This regulation needs to be evaluated by the DPR RI and of course in collaboration with political parties, especially in the supervision and implementations related to elections and political participation. It is also important to create provisions that discourage the practice of dynastiy politics and promote political diversity.
2. Strengthening supervisory mechanisms; namely, strengthening independent supervisory mechanisms, including ombudsman or anti-corruption institutions, to examine and supervise dynastiy political practices, as well as hold accountability.
3. Increasing political education means providing political education to the public so that they can understand and criticize dynastic political practices. Political literacy like this can be carried out by political parties in collaboration with civil society. An educated society has a greater opportunity to make choices based on the interests of the general public.

Indonesia, as a country with high political dynamics, is already familiar with the term "Political Dynasty". Even though the political rights of citizens are regulated in Article 28 E paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Constitution, the emergence of dynasty political practices has created concerns regarding inequality in the distribution of power. In the context of a democratic system, imperfect distribution of power can produce absolute power and damage democratic values.

- Felia Primaresti -

The Relevance of the Parliamentary Threshold to the Presidential System and the Effectiveness of Policy Formulation, and the Existence of People's Sovereignty

In many literatures, the parliamentary threshold is defined as the minimum requirements that political parties must have in order to obtain seats in the Parliament (Marijan, 2011; Prihatmoko, 2005; Yuda, 2010). This concept comes with the assumption that this mechanism can reduce the number of parties in the Parliament, which will then have an impact on dynamics and a more effective interest bargaining process (Prihatmoko, 2008). This then influences the effectiveness of the policy making process which has a direct impact on government performance. The assumption is that the more political parties there are in the Parliament, the longer and ineffective decision making will be, thus worsening government capacity.

Thus, parliamentary thresholds are often applied in countries that adhere to a multiparty system such as Indonesia. However, this idea is starting to be more or less questioned and has become the topic of discourse in many studies because in many cases, the application of parliamentary thresholds cannot simply simplify the composition of political parties in parliament.

Can Parliamentary Thresholds Simplify Political Parties?

In the Indonesian context, it could be said that the implementations of parliamentary thresholds do not have a very significant impact on the simplification ideals of political parties. This is related to how this issue is often raised as a political-legal product before elections so that it can be tweaked every five years. For example, this can be illustrated through the *electoral threshold policy* in Law no. 3 of 1999 (UU 3/1999) concerning General Elections as amended by Law no. 12 of 2003 (UU 12/2003). In Law 3/1999, it is stated that to be able to participate in the next election, political parties are required to have two percent of the seats in the People's Representative Council

(DPR), three percent in the Provincial, Regency and City Regional People's Representative Councils (DPRD) throughout Indonesia . However, in the new law UU 12/2003 an additional clause is provided, which states that if a political party cannot pass the threshold determined by the *electoral threshold policy* , then the political party can change its name and symbol to be able to participate again in the next election (Law Online, 2007) . This policy had major implications for the Justice Party, which at that time could not reach the threshold. So, to be able to compete in the next election, the path they took was to change their name to the Prosperous Justice Party or what we now know as PKS.

Apart from that, it is also necessary to look at the landscape of legislative elections in Indonesia. The 2004 election; for example, was won by four main parties, with the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar) gaining 21.5% of the vote. Golkar was then followed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle with 18.53%, PKB with 10.57%, PPP with 8.15%, and the Democratic Party with 7.45%. Meanwhile, the number of political parties participating in the elections at that time consisted of 24 parties, which in terms of numbers was still considered very large even though it had decreased from the previous number of 48 parties in the 1999 Elections (Gofar, 2012). An interesting thing in the 2004 Elections that can be underlined is that the Democratic Party, as a new party, was able to gain eight million votes and was in the top five competing with the old parties. The victory of the Democratic Party will certainly be a big motivation for other new parties to be able to compete in the next election.

This assumption was proven in the 2009 elections, where the number of political parties participating in the elections increased quite sharply; that is, from 24 parties to 38, which was won by the Democratic Party with a vote share of 20.85%. Although the number of participants in the 2014 elections decreased quite drastically,; namely, 10 participants, the number increased again in 2019 with 14 parties and increased again in 2024, at least according to preliminary data from the General Election Commission (KPU), totaling 17 participants.

The simple thing that can explain the mushrooming of the formation of new political parties, including "modified" parties in Indonesia, is because political parties still receive funding from the state (Adam, 2021). The statement raised from the results of this research is then in line with the theory presented by Gary W. Cox (2003), according to which many new political parties have emerged influenced

by the decision of the party elite themselves who want to enter the electoral arena as new contestants. There are at least three main driving factors that cause the proliferation of new political parties; namely: the costs of establishing them, the benefits that will be gained if they succeed in entering the power cycle, and the possibility of getting support from voting parties.

Fox's theory was then strengthened by the results of research presented by Margit Tarvit (2007) in 22 developed countries. According to the results of his research, the emergence of large new parties is influenced by registration costs, financial support, flexibility of regulations and administrative requirements determined by election organizers, as well as the benefits of corporatism that will be obtained later. Therefore, a relevant premise for understanding this phenomenon is that there is a large paradox and bias in political party elites in the Parliament when they design the rules for establishing new political parties.

Parliamentary Thresholds and the Existence of Popular Sovereignty

The unequal representation of political parties in the Parliament as a consequence of the parliamentary threshold policy certainly reaps pros and cons among the society. This is mainly related to the votes of parties that do not meet the threshold being simply thrown away. In the 2019 Elections; for example, the KPU determined that the number of valid votes was 139,971,260 (100%), which was a calculation of all political parties participating in the elections throughout Indonesia. Of this number, there were nine parties that reached the threshold out of a total of 17 party participants with a total vote acquisition of 126,376,418 (90.29%). Meanwhile, the remaining votes, namely 13,594,842 (9.71%) were then discarded because they did not meet the threshold (Aminuddin, 2015). This condition shows that not all voters' voices are represented in the Parliament.

In responding to the various problems that arise as a result of the parliamentary threshold system, it is important to consider the implementations of a representation mandate based on political party affiliation (political party coalition) as the main criterion in determining the number of seats given to political parties. This becomes relevant especially when we see differences in the number of residents spread across various regions. Therefore, proportional representation systems, which incorporate mixed aspects, emerge as an alternative worthy of consideration.

Furthermore, there needs to be improvements in the way votes are obtained and counted, considering that there are still weaknesses in the parliamentary threshold system. A special formula is needed that allows political parties that have not reached the threshold to seek solutions through coalitions with other parties to reach that threshold. Or, it could also be considered to eliminate the vote acquisition threshold completely (0%). This formula will help ensure that all voters' votes are actually counted and have an influence in the election, thereby avoiding injustice in political representation.

The parliamentary threshold is predicted to be a solution to simplifying parties in the Parliament so that processes in the presidential system can run more optimally. In fact, this policy cannot immediately achieve its goals. Apart from that, the parliamentary threshold policy also hinders the creation of popular sovereignty

One example of a fairly common mixed representation system is the *Mixed-Member Proportional* (MMP) System, which is used in countries such as Germany and New Zealand. In the MMP system, voters have two votes: one to elect a candidate in a single constituency as in a first-past-the-post system , and one to elect a political party in a proportional election that will form part of the parliamentary seats . Seats in the Parliament are then divided between members elected from single elections and members elected from proportional elections, with the aim of achieving fairer representation.

Recommendations

According to the explanations above, here are several recommendations that can be submitted for consideration.

1. In maintaining and at the same time creating proportional and fair parliamentary representation, a commitment from parties is needed not to "game" the law by raising and lowering parliamentary thresholds for certain purposes.
2. There needs to be a change in the system for determining seats in parliament to use a mixed system. This means that the DPR must amend Law no. 13 of 2019 concerning the People's Consultative Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Regional Representative Council and the Regional People's Representative Council (MD3).
3. By changing the Law Concerning MD3, this means that these changes also apply to other legal instruments that are hierarchically below it.

- Felia Primaresti -

Observing Voter Participation in the 2024 Elections after the Determination of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates

The Indonesian General Election Commission (KPU) has held a plenary meeting to determine the presidential and vice presidential candidates (capres-cawapres) who will compete in the 2024 Presidential Elections (Pilpres). As a result, the Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD, and Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming pairs had been officially declared as presidential and vice presidential candidates through the Republic of Indonesia KPU Decree Number 1632/2023 (kompas.com, 13/11).

Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar are nominated by the Change Coalition with three supporting parties; namely, the Nasdem Party, PKB and PKS. Next, Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD are nominated by PDIP, PPP, Hanura and Perindo.

Then, Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka are nominated by the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM), which consists of seven parties; namely, the Gerindra Party, Golkar Party, Democratic Party, National Mandate Party (PAN), Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), Crescent Star Party (UN), and the Garuda Party. With three pairs of presidential and vice presidential candidates, what will happen to voter participation in the 2024 elections? This article shall try to explore it.

Indonesia has held elections 12 times since 1955. In the 1955 Legislative Elections, the voter participation rate reached 91.4 percent. Meanwhile, the number of valid national votes reached 37.79 million votes with 257 seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). Entering the New Order era, elections were held again in 1971. In the 1971 legislative elections, the voter participation rate reached 96.6 percent. This figure was the highest in Indonesia's history (Katadata, 21/6/2022).

The high voter participation at that time was not due to public awareness of the importance of elections, but because of the mobilization carried out by the New Order regime's political machine consisting of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), Golongan Karya (Golkar), and the bureaucracy to mobilize voters.

Voter participation in the New Order era that was relatively low; namely, 93.6 percent in the 1997 elections. The decline in participation in the 1997 elections was due to the strengthening of community groups that abstained from voting (the white groups). Golput itself was a political protest movement based on national problems. The target of the protest of the golput movement was the holding of elections (Sanit in Arianto, 2011).

Commenting on abstentions, Eep Saefulloh Fatah classified abstentions into four groups. First, technical abstainers; namely, those who due to certain technical reasons (such as death in the family, oversleeping, etc.) are unable to attend the polling stationa, or those who vote incorrectly, so their votes are declared invalid (Arianto, 2011).

Second, technical-political abstainers, such as those who are not registered as voters due to their own faults or those of other parties (statistical institutions, election organizers). Third, political abstainers; namely, those who feel they have no choice among the available candidates or do not believe that the elections will bring change and improvement. Fourth, ideological abstainers; namely, those who do not believe in (liberal) democratic mechanisms and do not want to be involved in them either for reasons of religious fundamentalism or other political-ideological reasons (Arianto, 2011).

Suharto's resignation marked the birth of the Reform era. In this era, elections were held in 1999, with 48 political parties participating in the elections. The voter participation rate was also quite high, reaching 92.7 percent. However, entering the 2004 and 2009 elections, participation levels showed a decline. This decrease was due to the increase in the number of abstentions in the two elections. Furthermore, the election participation rate, especially legislative elections, again showed an increase to 75.11 percent in the 2014 Election. Then, in the 2019 Election, the participation rate again increased to 81.69 percent (Katadata, 21/6/2022).

Quoting the opinion of Ramlan Surbakti (1992) regarding two important variables that influence the level of political participation;

namely: first, the level of political awareness. Second, it concerns how government policies and government implementations are assessed.

Referring to these two variables, Purbolaksono (2019) considers that the increasing voter participation rate in the 2019 Election indicated the increasing political awareness of citizens regarding their rights and obligations. One of the rights and obligations of citizens in the political field is implemented through participating in elections. Then, if we refer to the second variable, it is about voters' assessment of government performance. This is influenced by the split in supporters of the two presidential and vice presidential candidates at that time.

For the supporters of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) - KH Maaruf Amin who are also the incumbent, the voters' assessment will be that the performance of Jokowi's government is very good and needs to be continued in the second term. Meanwhile, in the camp supporting Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno, they will assess that the performance of the Jokowi government is very bad, so it needs to be replaced by the pair of presidential and vice presidential candidates they support. What about the 2024 Elections?

According to the two variables above, it seems that political awareness will still be the same as in the previous elections. Enthusiasm for voting is still quite high, as with the 2019 elections. Moreover, currently there are three pairs of candidates who will compete, so this will encourage voter political participation. The three supporters of the presidential and vice presidential candidates will encourage voters to use their voting rights as citizens to fight for the candidate of their choice.

In the second variable, related to the assessment of government performance, although currently there is no incumbent like in the 2019 elections, there are candidates who represent the face of the current government. For example, Prabowo Subianto is the Minister of Defense, and Gibran Rakabuming Raka is the eldest of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi).

The performance assessment of the Jokowi Government will certainly have an impact on the level of participation in the voting to support the Prabowo-Gibran candidate pair. If the public's assessment of the performance of the Jokowi Government is good, there

will of course be an increase in participation in choosing this pair. However, if the performance assessment of the Jokowi Government is poor, then this pair will be affected by the lack of participation in choosing this pair and will choose another pair.

Apart from that, a factor that can also influence the level of voter participation is the increasing number of abstentions. Abstentions may arise as a form of protest against the behavior of the current political elite, or abstentions because they do not trust the performance of the election organizers. Therefore, this needs to be addressed jointly by all participants and election organizers to organize the competition well so that people will evaluate and be aware of voting in the 2024 election.

The benchmark for election success is the level of voter participation. Ahead of the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections and Pilkada, several efforts are needed to encourage increasing the quantity and quality of voter participation, as well as creating meaningful democracy for all Indonesian people.

Recommendations

According to the explanations above, the level of political participation is influenced by two things; namely, first, the level of political awareness. Second, how government policies and government implementation are assessed. Ahead of the 2024 presidential elections, several steps are needed to encourage increased quantity and quality of voter participation.

Some of these steps are: first, election organizers, both the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) working together to carry out every stage of the Presidential Election, from campaigning to vote counting by preventing fraud.

Second, it is very important for political parties participating in the election to create educational campaigns; that is, educational campaigns with an emphasis on discussing ideas. The aim of debating ideas in the public sphere is to generate public awareness of democracy.

Third, to encourage collaborative efforts between election organizers, mass media and civil society groups to disseminate information on elections and voter education, as well as strengthening media literacy for the community. Strengthening media literacy will foster people's critical understanding of the information circulating. The public will be able to sort out the information they receive, whether it is a hoax or not.

- Arfianto Purbolaksono -

THE INDONESIAN INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

The Indonesian Institute (TII) is a Center for Public Policy Research that was established on 21 October 2004 by a group of young, dynamic activists and intellectuals. TII is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit institution, whose main funding stems from grants and contributions from foundations, companies, and individuals.

TII has the aim of becoming a main research center in Indonesia for public policy matters and has committed to giving contribution to the debates over public policies and to improving the quality of the planning and results of public policy by promoting good governance principles and public participation in the policy processes in Indonesia.

TII's visions are public policies in Indonesia which highly uphold human rights and rule of law, as well as involve participation of various stakeholders and practice democratic good governance principles.

TII's missions are to conduct reliable research that is independent and non-partisan and to channel the research to the policy-makers, the private sector, and academia in order to improve the quality of Indonesian policy-makers.

TII also assumes the role of disseminating ideas to the society so that they are well informed about the policies that will have a good impact on the people's lives. In other words, TII has a position to support the democratization process and the public policy reform, as it will be involved in the process.

The scope of the research and review on public policies undertaken by TII includes economic, social, political, and legal affairs. The main activities which have been conducted by **TII** in order to achieve our vision and mission, are: research, surveys, facilitation and advocacy through training and working groups, public discussions, public education, weekly editorial articles ("Wacana" or Discourses), Instagram Live Series and Space Twitter (Policy Talks and Initiative!), monthly analysis ("Update Indonesia" in Indonesian and "The

Indonesian Update" in English), mid-year policy analysis ("Policy Assessment"), annual policy analysis ("Indonesian Report"), and monthly discussion forum on policy issues ("The Indonesian Forum").

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RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The economy tends to be used as an indicator of the success of the government as a policy-maker. Economy plays an important role as one of the fundamentals of national development. Limited resources have often caused the government to face obstacles in implementing economic policies that will optimally benefit the people. The increase in the quality of the people's critical thinking has forced the government to conduct comprehensive studies in every decision-making process. In fact, the studies will not be stopped when the policy is already in place. Studies will be continued until the policy evaluation process.

TII focus on economic issues, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy, as well as issues on sustainable development by using analysis which refer to economic freedom principles. Monetary issues will focus on the Indonesian Central Bank to maintain economic stability, both regarding inflation and exchange rate. Meanwhile, fiscal policy will focus on the discussions over the National Budget and infrastructure development both in the regions and in the cities. In relation to sustainable development, TII research is focusing on productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure development, and development gap. In addition, TII also upholds economic freedom principles in highlighting the importance of individual freedom and involvement of private sectors in increasing development and improving welfare in Indonesia.

The TII Economic Research Division is present for those who are interested in the conditions of the economy. The results of the research are intended to assist policy-makers, regulators, and donor agencies in making decisions. The research that TII offers: **(1) Economic Policy Analysis; (2) Regional and Sectoral Prospects; and (3) Program Evaluation.**

RESEARCH ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

According to stipulations in Law No. 12 Year 2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, every bill which will be discussed by the legislative and the executive must be complemented with academic paper. This stipulation is also confirmed in Law No. 15 Year 2019 on the Amendment of Law No. 12 Year 2011 regarding the Formulation of Laws and Regulations.

Therefore, comprehensive research is very important and needed in making a qualified academic paper. With qualified academic papers, the bills will have strong academic foundation both from academic and content aspects. Furthermore, academic paper also functions as an early tracking over possibilities of overlapping laws and regulations, so that revocation of local regulations or other related issues which can be caused by legal, economic, or political aspects in the future, can be minimized as soon as possible.

TII offers normative and legal research related to harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, especially in making academic papers, legal opinion on harmonization and synchronization of laws and regulations, and legislative drafting for the formulation of local regulations bill drafts or other laws and regulations. In addition, TII also offers openly research on other legal issues related to Constitutional Law and Public Administration, Human Rights, and Political Corruption.

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The enactment of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on the latest regulation on the Local Government, has created different relations between the Central Government and the Local Government. Entering the era of Bureaucracy Reform, specification of division of affairs of the Central Government and the Local Government has increasingly demanded the implementation of good governance principles. The government is demanded to be adaptive and responsive towards public aspiration and services. Therefore, public policy research become more important for both the Central Government and the Local Government to analyse context and current issues in the regions. The government must also consider various actors whether political actors or bureaucrats, as well as public's aspiration and other non-state actor in policy processes.

In order to respond those needs, TII research in political affairs offer policy assessment on various policies which were already applied or will be implemented. TII will look at socio-cultural, economy, legal, and political aspects in assessing public policies. Our research will be useful to assist government in formulating policies which are in line with context, priorities, and people's aspiration. TII also offers various breakthrough of transformative policies according to existing contexts in particular and Open Government principles' implementation in general, in order to increase public participation in policy processes, particularly in the era of the openness of public information.

Political Research Division of TII provide analysis and policy recommendations in order to generate strategic policy in the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of good governance both at the national and local levels. Political research forms are offered by TII **(1) Public Policy Analysis, (2) Media Monitoring, (3) Mapping & Positioning Research, (4) Need Assessment Research, (5) Survey Indicator.**

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Social development needs policy foundations that come from independent and accurate research. Social analysis is a need for the government, the businesspeople, academia, professionals, NGOs, and civil society to improve social development. Social analysis is important to identify strategic issues which are developing and to make the right stakeholders' mapping to promote significant change in the context of development, public policy, and democracy in Indonesia.

The Social Research Division is present to offer strong and valid recommendations to produce strategic, relevant, efficient and effective, and impactful policies, in addressing to existing various issues. For example, issues related to education, health, population, environment, women, children, and elderly. Social research that TII offers: **(1) Social Policy Analysis; (2) Explorative Research; (3) Mapping & Positioning Research; (4) Need Assessment Research; (5) Program Evaluation Research; and (5) Indicator Survey.**

PRE-ELECTION AND REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION

One of the activities carried out and offered by TII is a pre-election survey as well as a pre-election and regional head election. The reasons underlying the implementation of pre-election and regional head election surveys, namely: (1) A good election is a democratic process that can be arranged, calculated, and predicted in the resulting process; (2) Survey is one of the important and common discussions to measure, calculate, and predict how the process and results of the General Election and the Regional Head Election will take place, in accordance to the expectations of the candidates; (3) It is very important to win in the General Election and the Regional Head Election based on empirical, scientific, measurable and supportable data.

As one of the important aspects of a strategic candidate's election, the survey is useful for monitoring political power. In this case, the success team needs to conduct a survey for: **(1) mapping the candidate's position in public perception; (2) mapping voters' desires; (3) publishing the most effective political machinery used as voters; and (4) Looking for the most effective medium for the campaign.**

EVALUATION OF A PROJECT OR A PROGRAM

One of the activities that have been performed and experienced offered by TII is a qualitative evaluation of the projects and programs of non-governmental organizations and government. Evaluation activities are offered TII stages of mid-term evaluation of the project/program (mid-term evaluation) and also the final evaluation at the end of the project/program (final evaluation).

As we know, the evaluation is an important step in the implementation of a project or program. Mid-Term Evaluation of the project or program is intended to look at and analyze the challenges, the overall learning takes place during the project or program, and make recommendations for the continuity of the project or program. Meanwhile, the final evaluation allows us to view and analyze the outcomes and the lessons learned to ensure the achievement of all the objectives of the project or program at the end of the project or program.

THE INDONESIAN FORUM

The Indonesian Forum is a monthly discussion activity on actual issues in the political, economic, social, legal, cultural, defense, and environmental fields. TII organizes these forums as media for competent resource persons, stakeholders, policymakers, civil society activists, academicians, and the media to meet and have discussion.

Themes that have been raised were the ones that have caught public attention, such as migrant workers, social conflicts, domestic politics, and local direct elections. The main consideration in picking a theme is sociological and political reality and the context of the relevant public policy at the time that the Indonesian Forum is delivered.

It is expected that the public can get the big picture of a particular event as the Indonesian Forum also presents relevant resource persons.

Since its inception, the Indonesian Institute is very aware of the passion of the public to get discussions that are not only rich in substance but also well formatted, which support balanced ideas exchanges ideas and the equal involvement of the different elements of the society.

The discussions, which are designed to only invite a limited number of participants, do not only feature idea exchanges but also regularly offer policy briefs (policy recommendations) to relevant policymakers and also summaries to the participants, especially the media people and the resource persons at the end of each discussion. Therefore, the discussions will not end without solutions.

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LOCAL COUNCIL TRAINING

The roles and functions of local councils in monitoring local governments are very important. They need to ensure that participative and democratic policies will be espoused. Members of provincial and regent local councils are required to have strong capacity to understand democratization matters, regional autonomy, legislative techniques, budgeting, local Politics, and political marketing. Thus, it is important to empower members of local councils.

In order for local councils to be able to response every problem that will come out as a result of any policy implemented by the central government or local governments, the Indonesian Institute invites the leaderships and members of local councils to undergo training to improve their capacity.

WORKING GROUP

The Indonesian Institute believes that a good public policy process can be held with some engagement and empowerment of the stakeholders. The Indonesian Institute takes a role as one of mediator agencies to facilitate some forums in which the Government, Council Members, Private Sectors, NGOs and Academicians can meet in interactive forums. The Indonesian Institute provides facilitation on working groups and public advocacy.

The Indonesian Institute takes the role of mediator and facilitator in order to encourage the synergy of public policy work between the stakeholders and policy makers and also to have a synergy with funding agencies (donors).

THE INDONESIAN INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

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